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Abstract 
 
The representation of word meaning has received substantial attention in the psycholinguistic 
literature over the past decades, yet the vast majority of studies have been limited to words 
referring to concrete objects. The aim of the present work is to provide a theoretically and 
neurally plausible model of lexical-semantic representations, not only for words referring to 
concrete objects but also for words referring to actions and events using a common set of 
assumptions across domains. In order to do so, features of meaning are generated by naïve 
speakers, and used as a window into important aspects of representation. A first series of 
analyses test how the meanings of words of different types are reflected in features associated 
with different modalities of sensory-motor experience, and how featural properties may be 
related to patterns of impairment in language-disordered populations. The features of meaning 
are then used to generate a model of lexical-semantic similarity, in which these different types of 
words are represented within a single system, under the assumption that lexical-semantic 
representations serve to provide an interface between conceptual knowledge derived in part 
from sensory-motor experience, and other linguistic information such as syntax, phonology and 
orthography. Predictions generated from this model are tested in a series of behavioural 
experiments designed to test two main questions: whether similarity measures based on speaker-
generated features can predict fine-grained semantic similarity effects, and whether the 
predictive quality of the model is comparable for words referring to objects and words referring 
to actions. The results of five behavioural experiments consistently reveal graded semantic 
effects as predicted by the feature-based model, of similar magnitude for objects and actions. 
The model's fine-grained predictive performance is also found to be superior to other word-
based models of representation (Latent Semantic Analysis, and similarity measures derived from 
Wordnet).  5 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  The aim of the present work is to provide a psychologically and neurally 
plausible model of lexical-semantic representations for words referring to concrete 
objects and actions and events by collating features of meaning generated by naïve 
speakers. These features can be viewed as an indication of semantic representations, and 
when combined across multiple individuals, should provide some general insights into 
the meanings of words. Employing a feature-based semantic theory will allow the 
generation of a model of lexical-semantic similarity, in which different types of words 
are represented within a single system. This model will then be tested against 
behavioural data, and its predictive power will be assessed against extant models of 
semantic representation. The inclusion of the domain of actions and events into the 
model is important and innovative because nearly all previous research on word 
semantics has focused upon words referring to concrete objects and entities only. 
The representation and organisation of word meaning 
Meaning is a centrally important aspect of language which lies at the heart of 
communication. In language production, speaking is a continuous process of selecting 
the words that best correspond to the meaning of a message the speaker wishes to 
express (Levelt, 1989). Similarly, comprehending language is a continuous process of 
attempting to discern the meaning of a speaker's or writer's message. Word meaning 
provides the core information upon which all communication is built, and similarity in 
the meanings of words is invaluable in serving communication, for example, in 
providing definitions of technical terms (e.g. "The word deictic means 'pointing' or 
'showing.'", Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook & Rao, 1995, p.725). Such uses of similarity is not 
restricted to formal written or instructional materials, but also occur in numerous 9 
situations in which an interlocutor is not familiar with a particular word being used, a 
situation in which it is quite normal to produce similar alternatives for explanatory 
purposes.  
Such consequences of similarity in meaning may not necessarily reflect the 
underlying representations that are automatically consulted in normal conversational 
situations, but come into play only in situations in which word meaning are explicitly 
being discussed, and thus reflect a speaker's intuition about language rather than 
language itself. A more convincing demonstration of the impact of semantic similarity 
arises in cases in which semantic similarity does not facilitate communication, but 
instead has counterproductive consequences during online language processing. In 
production, this is particularly evident in slips of the tongue, where a substitution 
between one word and another (related in meaning) can result in a sensible sentence 
whose meaning is very different than the speaker intended:  
 
"US President Gerald Ford toasted Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and 'the  
  great people of Israel--Egypt, excuse me.' " Dell (1995), p.183 
 
In instances like these, semantic similarity between words can have undesired 
consequences. On the other hand, in online comprehension processes, semantic 
similarity can facilitate word recognition. For example, in the lexical decision paradigm, 
response time to a target word is faster if it is preceded by a semantically-related word 
than if it is preceded by an unrelated word (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Such priming 
may serve the purpose of speeding up lexical processing, or at least improving the 
efficiency of accessing the correct meaning during comprehension. 
Semantic similarity effects, both of a facilitatory and of an interfering nature, 
have been extensively studied in behavioural and neuroscientific research. Systematic 10 
investigation of spontaneously occurring speech errors reveals that lexical substitution 
errors are among the most frequent type of slips of the tongue (e.g. Fromkin, 1973; 
Garnham, Shillock, Brown, Mill & Cutler, 1981). The precise nature of similarity 
between the target and error word seems to vary, depending upon the semantic domain, 
but is predictable within a given domain (e.g., errors involving the names of body parts 
tend to be physically close to the intended body part, Garrett, 1992). Garrett's analyses 
of speech errors shows that, for nouns, most substitutions involve category coordinates 
(for example, shoulders/elbows,  eyes/ears). In contrast, for verbs, errors of antonymy 
(remember/forget) are frequent, while coordinates (drink/eat; looks/sounds) are much less so.  
More evidence of the consequences of semantic similarity comes from studies 
of semantic interference in naming tasks. This was pioneered in the work of Stroop 
(1935), who presented participants with words referring to the names of colours, 
printed in various colours of ink, and asked them to name the ink colour whilst ignoring 
the word itself (e.g., given the word "RED" printed in green ink, to say the word 
"GREEN"). The meanings of the written words had severe consequences on naming 
the ink colour: longer latencies and higher error rates. In the picture-word interference 
paradigm (a variant of the Stroop task) in which participants are asked to name a picture 
while ignoring a simultaneously appearing written word, semantically-related words 
interfere with picture naming (e.g. Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984; Schriefers, Meyer & 
Levelt, 1990; Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis & Garrett, 2004; Vigliocco, Vinson & Siri, 2005). 
In other contexts, semantic similarity has a facilitatory effect, such as semantic priming 
in comprehension as mentioned above  (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; reviewed in 
Neely, 1991;  Vigliocco, Vinson, Arciuli & Barber, 2008).  
Semantic similarity also has consequences for patients whose semantic 
knowledge has been disrupted following brain injury. Especially relevant here are 
category-specific deficits, a phenomenon where patients are selectively impaired in some 11 
categories of knowledge and spared in others. The dissociation between the domains of 
living and non-living entities is best documented (e.g., Basso, Capitani, & Laiacona, 
1988; Farah, Hammond, Metha, & Ratcliff, 1989; Hillis & Caramazza, 1995; Moss & 
Tyler, 2000; Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992; Sartori & Job, 1988; Sheridan & Humphreys, 
1993; Vinson, Vigliocco, Cappa & Siri, 2003; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; see 
Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), but numerous different patterns of finer-grained 
dissociations have also been reported, including selective impairment for body parts 
(McKenna & Warrington, 1978), animals (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), fruits & 
vegetables (Hart, Berndt & Caramazza, 1985) and medical terms (Crosson, Moberg, 
Boone, Gonzales Rothi & Raymer, 1997; see Rogers and Plaut, 2002 for a review). 
Some patients with impairments for living things may also show a deficit for other 
(non-living) categories such as musical instruments, materials and liquids (Borgo & 
Shallice 2001; Siri, Kensinger, Cappa, Hood & Corkin, 2002; Warrington & Shallice, 
1984). Patterns of impairment and sparing in category specific impairments offer further 
evidence for the psychological reality of semantic similarity because many such 
impairments seem to disproportionately affect semantically related clusters of items; 
they also provide important constraints on accounts of semantic representation, as will 
be discussed later. 
Theories of semantic representation 
How is semantic similarity represented in the mind and brain? Before 
attempting to answer this question, it is first necessary to outline the different 
theoretical frameworks within which the meanings of words corresponding to concepts 
may be represented. Theoretical accounts concerned with the representation of word 
meaning are strongly linked with conceptual categorisation and equivalence 
classification. In particular, they focus upon how different exemplars of a concept can 
be treated as equivalents, and can be assigned the same lexical label in a language. 12 
Important issues in semantic theory are identifying the content of word meaning, the 
organisation of word meaning, and how the link between referent and word can be 
characterised. 
Distinguishing semantics from concepts. Before describing the various theoretical 
perspectives, it is necessary to discuss the difference between conceptual-level 
representations and semantic representations. It is relatively uncontroversial that word 
meaning (i.e., lexical-semantics) is grounded in conceptual knowledge. More difficult is 
the question if the two are distinguishable from each other. The closeness of semantic 
and conceptual representations is clearly demonstrated by brain imaging research that 
shows, for example, that primary motor areas are activated when speakers see or hear 
words or sentences referring to actions (e.g. Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermuller, 2004; 
Martin & Chao, 2001; Tettamanti et al., 2005; Vigliocco, Warren, Siri, Arciuli, Scott & 
Wise, 2006). Moreover, it is often assumed that word meanings are indistinguishable 
from conceptual knowledge (e.g. Humphreys, Price & Riddoch, 1999).The working 
hypothesis of the present work, however is that conceptual and semantic knowledge are 
distinct levels of representation, each with its own distinct organisation. The present 
work also assumes that speaker-generated features provide a window into fundamental 
aspects of non-linguistic conceptual representations (such as the modality by which 
different types of information are learnt and experienced), and that the meanings of 
words are organised along different principles.  
A number of arguments have been made in favour of the distinction between 
conceptual and semantic representations. For example, it has been pointed out that 
speakers of a language have many more concepts than words. For example, “the actions 
of two people maneuvering for one armrest in a movie theatre or airplane seat” is a 13 
familiar concept for which no verbal label exists (Murphy, 2002, p.389)
1. This "more 
concepts than words" argument requires some sort of semantic level of representation 
(or at least a purely lexical level at which individual words are represented in some way, 
distinct from those concepts that are not lexicalised in a language), but does not require 
a separate level of organisation of this level. For example, concepts could be organised 
according to meaning whether they are lexicalised or not, and the semantic level of 
representation could simply be mapped from the relevant concepts on a one-to-one 
basis. Such a representational framework can be seen in the WEAVER
++ model of 
lexical retrieval in production (Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999) in which the meanings of 
lexical concepts (and of lemmas) are not interconnected (i.e., there is no local 
organisation at this level).  
Another argument that has been presented in favour of the conceptual-
semantics divide is the cross-linguistic differences in mapping between conceptual and 
linguistic domains (see Vigliocco and Filipovic, 2004; Vigliocco & Vinson, 2007 for 
discussion). For example, English speakers have different words for foot and leg, while 
Japanese speakers have a single word (ashi) which refers to both. Similarly, English has 
numerous verbs corresponding to different manners of jumping: leap, hop, spring, bounce, 
caper, vault, hurdle and so on, while Italian does not (Slobin, 1996a). Differences of this 
nature can even be seen in how spatial situations are realised in two closely related 
languages such as English and Dutch. While English has two terms, on and in, Dutch 
has three: aan, in and op (Bowerman & Choi, 2003). Under the assumption of identity 
between conceptual and semantic knowledge, these language differences would require 
that the speakers of different languages also have different conceptual representations - 
                                                            
1 Although nothing prevents speakers of a language from coining or adopting a new term for any 
concept. For example, the situation described above has been labelled "elbonics", originally by comedian 
Rich Hall, who has published a number of collections of such "missing lexical items" (e.g., Hall, R., 1984, 
Sniglets (Snig'lit : Any Word That Doesn't Appear in the Dictionary, But Should). Collier Books). 14 
 the view known as linguistic relativity (e.g. Davidoff et al., 1999; Levinson, 1996; Lucy, 
1992; Roberson et al., 2000; Sapir, 1921; Sera et al., 2002; Slobin, 1996a, b; Whorf, 
1956). But this conclusion only applies if conceptual and semantic representations are 
one and the same. If they are distinct levels of representation, these findings can be 
accommodated in the same manner as the "more concepts than words" argument. 
Conceptual organisation would be the same across languages; the only differences lie in 
which concepts are lexicalised.  
However, there is evidence that seems to require not only a distinction between 
conceptual and semantic levels of representation, but also different principles of 
organisation at these distinct levels. These come from some language-specific effects 
related to meaning, which appear to be limited to semantic representations as they are 
only present in tasks that require verbalisation, but not in nonverbal tasks (Brysbaert et 
al., 1998; Kousta, Vinson & Vigliocco, in press; Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi & Wang., 
1999; Vigliocco, Vinson, Paganelli & Dworzynski, 2005; see Slobin, 1996b). 
Brysbaert et al. (1998) tested for language-specific effects of the manner in 
which speakers' languages require them to produce number words, either in forms like 
"four-and-twenty" (Dutch) or "twenty-four" (French). Participants were asked to report 
the solutions of simple mental calculations (e.g. "20 + 4 = ?" or "4 + 20 = ?"), either 
verbally or by typing the numbers on a keyboard. Cross-linguistic differences were 
observed such that participants were faster in providing the answers when the addends 
were presented in an order that matched the language (e.g. "20+4" when the answer is 
expressed "twenty-four", or "4+20" when the answer is expressed "four-and-twenty"). 
However, this pattern was only observed when responses were made verbally. The 
differences disappeared when participants were asked to type their responses in digits. 
This suggested that these differences were a product of verbal encoding rather than 
cross-linguistic differences at a conceptual level related to arithmetic operations. 15 
Relevant results also come from investigations of the relationship between syntactic 
properties and semantic representations. Vigliocco, Vinson, Paganelli and Dworzynski 
(2005) investigated the effects of grammatical gender of Italian words on semantic 
relatedness and found that Italian words referring to animals sharing grammatical 
gender were judged to be semantically more similar, and were more likely to replace one 
another in slips of the tongue than words that were of different gender. Thus, 
grammatical gender, a syntactic property of words had semantic consequences. Crucially 
for the argument here, the effects of grammatical gender disappeared in similarity 
judgements upon pictures, a task that is most likely to tap conceptual knowledge. The 
study therefore was able to demonstrate the separability of conceptual and semantic 
levels of knowledge, and their separate respective organisation. In a follow-up study, 
Kousta, et al. (in press) induced slips of the tongue in bilingual speakers of Italian (L1) 
and English (L2) who performed the same task in both of their languages on different 
days. This study was designed to assess whether the above effects of grammatical 
gender would also be observed in a bilingual's second language – a pattern of results 
that would be predicted if such effects arise at a conceptual level (and/or if conceptual 
and semantic levels of representation are identical or mapped on a one-to-one basis). 
Instead, the errors made by bilingual speakers were comparable to those made by 
monolingual speakers, at least where grammatical gender is concerned.
2 Grammatical 
gender was reflected more in the bilinguals' errors in Italian than their errors in English 
for the same pictures, and this was true even when phonological similarity of the target 
and error words was taken into account (Kousta et al., in press). This provides strong 
support for an informational distinction between conceptual and semantic 
representations, showing not only that these effects of grammatical gender are limited 
                                                            
2 The only qualitative differences in the errors came from certain errors that were related to cross-
linguistic phonological effects, such as mistakenly producing horse for bear in English (the Italian word for 
bear is orso). 16 
to semantic representations rather than arising at the conceptual level, but also that they 
do not extend to the semantic representations of a speaker's second language. 
It is important to note that many theories concerning the representation of 
meaning are concerned with conceptual representations rather than semantic 
representations, or contain the implicit assumption that concepts and semantics are one 
and the same. Nonetheless, their stances with respect to content, organisation, and links 
between words and referents are still relevant to any discussion of semantic 
representation, particularly as the model of meaning that will be presented here 
addresses both conceptual and semantic levels of representation. 
Classical view of meaning. Due to the importance of meaning in language, it is no 
surprise that questions related to the meanings of words have captured the interest of 
scholars since antiquity. Early theories of meaning, often termed the "classical view" 
(Smith & Medin, 1981, for a review), were based upon the assumption that the meaning 
of a concept (represented by a word) is its definition - a set of necessary features which 
would include all exemplars of the concept and exclude all others. Such a view of 
meaning, often couched in terms of formal logic, have been pervasive since classical 
times (e.g. Aristotle's Categories, 350 BCE/1941), and dominated theorising through 
much of the 1900s (e.g. Cassirer, 1953; Bourne, 1970; Katz & Fodor, 1963). The 
classical view, however, fell under severe criticism (see Smith & Medin, 1981; Mervis & 
Rosch, 1981; Murphy, 2002; Wittgenstein, 1953/2001). Wittgenstein (1953) 
demonstrated the apparent impossibility of producing adequate definitions to 
encompass all the meanings of a word, using the much cited example of the concept 
game. "Game" evades attempts to define it, as games need not be competitive, nor have 
scores, nor involve multiple participants, nor any other property of a subset of games 
that comes to mind. Wittgenstein points out that this difficulty extends to most 
concepts, not just game. Work by Rosch and colleagues provided further arguments 17 
against the classical view. They argued that category boundaries are fuzzy rather than 
sharply delimited (Rosch, 1973; see also Hampton, 1979, for behavioural evidence), and 
they further developed Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblance" in which 
prototypical members of a category are those which have the most attributes in 
common with other members of the category (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Although a few 
researchers of semantics continue to pursue theoretical approaches similar to the 
classical view, most famously, Jackendoff (1990; 1992; 2002) who continues to explore 
the possibility of semantic representations in terms of primitives, most theories have 
diverged from the classical approach. 
Relational theories of meaning. A broad class of alternative theories to the classical view 
focuses on characterising semantic representations by investigating meaning relations 
between words, rather than attempting to dissect the meanings of individual words 
themselves. A pioneer in this approach was Charles Osgood (see Osgood, 1962; 
Osgood, May & Miron, 1975; Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957; Snider & Osgood, 
1969), who developed the method of "semantic differential" that quantifies semantic 
relations between words by asking participants to rate individual words on a variety of 
attitude scales (e.g. good-bad, strong-weak, tense-relaxed). Crucially, rather than 
claiming that ratings for a given word on these individual scales revealed the 
componential features of the word's meaning, Osgood and colleagues used the semantic 
differential scale responses to generate measures of psychological distance between 
words (where greater proximity reflects higher similarity between words). Rather than 
treating each scale as independent, Osgood et al. applied factor analysis to reduce a 
high-dimensional representation space (one dimension for each of the attitude scales) 
into one of lower dimensionality. This allowed them not only to obtain a measure of the 
overall similarity between pairs of words, but also to evaluate the dimensions along 
which the words differed. Three distinct dimensions were repeatedly observed in these 18 
kinds of studies--dimensions which, Osgood argued, were universal and allowed 
evaluation of any semantic space in any situation: evaluative scales (e.g., good-bad); 
power scales (e.g., strong-weak); and activity scales (e.g., active-passive). These scale 
labels are descriptive of the first three dimensions obtained from factor analysis (i.e. 
those which explain the most variance in the data) across the scales that entered the 
factor analysis, and can be applied to nearly all semantic domains. Although Osgood’s 
approach remains in use today in contexts such as advertising and marketing where 
evaluative judgments are important, the dimensions of evaluation, power and activity 
characterise semantic representations only in the broadest of terms, and relate only to a 
number of limited, relatively abstract domains. A bird, for example, is surely more than 
a combination of its ratings on evaluative, power and activity scales, which have nothing 
to do with specific physical form, activities performed, habitat, diet, or any other 
information that is important for the meaning of bird. 
Similarly to Osgood's approach, according to semantic field theory (Trier, 1931; 
see Lehrer, 1974; Kittay, 1987), semantic representations arise from relationships among 
the meanings of different words. Semantic fields are considered to be a set of words 
that are closely related in meaning. The meaning of a word within a field is determined 
in terms of contrast to other words within the semantic field. In contrast to Osgood’s 
approach, semantic field theory does not focus upon identifying broad dimensions that 
apply universally across all concepts, but instead attempts to identify the principles of 
contrast applicable within a field. For example, the semantic field of colour words is 
distinguished by hue and brightness (Berlin & Kay, 1969), kinship terms by age, sex, 
degree of relation (Bierwisch, 1969), cooking terms by factors like heat source, utensils 
involved and materials cooked (Lehrer, 1974), and body parts by function and proximity 
(Garrett, 1992).  19 
Network models of semantic representation, while very different from semantic 
differential scaling or semantic field theory, also belong to the class of relational 
approaches to semantics. Network models go beyond earlier relational theories by 
specifying the details of the semantic relationships among words, rather than simply 
describing their distribution across the distinguishing dimensions of meaning. Early 
network models were semantic networks in which words are represented as nodes, and 
semantic relationships are expressed by labelled connections between nodes (e.g. Collins 
& Loftus, 1975). In this approach, a word’s meaning is expressed by the links it has to 
other words, which other words is it connected to, and what types of connections are 
involved. Of paramount importance for network-based theories is the type, 
configuration and relative contribution of the links that exist between words. Numerous 
alternative frameworks have been developed (see Johnson-Laird, Herrmann & Chaffin, 
1984 for a review) which differ along these dimensions. Importantly, these models have 
in common a focus upon (explicit) intensional relations, and a necessity to explicitly 
designate those relations.  
Perhaps the most extensive model which implements distinct representational 
themes is Wordnet (Miller & Fellbaum, 1991), a network model of the representations 
of a large number of nouns, verbs and adjectives in English. In Wordnet, “nouns, 
adjectives and verbs each have their own semantic relations and their own organisation 
determined by the role they must play in the construction of linguistic messages” 
(p.197). These relations and organisation are constructed by hand based on the relations 
that are believed to be relevant within a given class of words. For nouns, the most 
important relations are synonymy, hierarchy and part-whole relations. For verbs, 
relations of troponymy (hierarchical relations related to specificity in manner), 
entailment, causation and antonymy are important. 20 
All the relational theories described above depend upon deciding which 
relationships are most relevant in representing meaning, and then deciding upon a 
manner of implementation. An entirely different relational approach, however, seeks to 
discover representations of words in terms of their relationship to other words without 
making any assumptions about the organisational principles involved. This approach 
can be found in global co-occurrence models such as Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA, 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997) and Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL, Burgess & 
Lund, 1997). These models use large corpora of texts, computing aspects of a word’s 
meaning based on other words found in the same linguistic contexts under the 
assumption that words that tend to share the same linguistic contexts will be similar in 
meaning. The resulting representations remain purely abstract, denoting a word’s 
similarity to other words without revealing which aspects of meaning contribute to the 
observed similarity. Measures of similarity based on these models have been 
demonstrated to predict behavioural performance to some extent (see Burgess & Lund, 
1997; Landauer & Dumais, 1997) suggesting that abstract relational representations 
derived from words’ contexts (e.g. LSA and HAL) reflect patterns of similarity that have 
psychological plausibility. 
Relational theories, however, have in common a serious flaw in that they focus 
only upon relationships among words and are not grounded in perception and action. 
As Johnson-Laird et al. (1984) wrote, “The meanings of words can only be properly 
connected to each other if they are properly connected to the world” (p. 313). Although 
Johnson-Laird referred to semantic network models, his criticism is relevant to any 
theory of representation that is not embodied in experience, at least, to some extent. It 
is largely with this concern in mind that many researchers developed perspectives that 
owe much to the classical view. 21 
Featural theories of meaning. Although severe criticisms have been applied to the 
classical view, its general assumption that word meaning is componential in nature 
offers a way to ground meaning in perception and action. Different featural theories of 
meaning (e.g. Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Collins & Quillian, 
1969; Jackendoff, 1990; Minsky, 1975; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Shallice, 1993; 
Smith & Medin, 1981) consider the representation of meaning in terms of feature lists - 
those properties of meaning which, taken together, express the meaning of a word in 
some way. One class of these theories can be described as a modified version of the 
classical view with the incorporation of additional assumptions to avoid the criticisms 
aimed at it (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Smith & Medin, 1981). These accounts 
assume the existence of definitions for concepts in the classical sense (core features), 
but also another set of relevant features. These features (nonnecessary features) reflect 
information that is not necessarily part of the definition itself, but instead, properties of 
some, but not all, exemplars of a category. Although core features will always be 
relevant (because they are common to all members of a category), nonnecessary features 
would be used for identification procedures, as they are more accessible than the core 
features (Smith & Medin, 1981). The postulation of nonnecessary features answers 
many of the problems of the classical view. For example, the fuzziness of category 
boundaries could arise because of the presence of a nonnecessary feature of a particular 
exemplar of a category. Likewise, typicality/category goodness effects could arise for 
the same reason. However this additional assumption comes at a high cost with respect 
to the classical view: core features become less and less important thus rendering the 
classical view essentially irrelevant (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
Perhaps the most influential work of this nature was that of Rosch and 
collaborators. Taking seriously the notion that the boundaries of categories are vaguely, 
rather than well, defined (Rosch, 1973), this work led to the notion of family 22 
resemblance. Their work was guided by the notion that categories are formed along two 
basic principles: cognitive economy (optimising the number of possible categories to a 
manageable extent) and real-world structure (the fact that many features of meaning 
naturally occur in tandem) (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). The best representatives of a 
category (prototypes) were found to be those exemplars which shared the most features 
of meaning with other members of the category, and shared the least with members of 
another category: a principle of family resemblance coupled with contrast to other non-
family-members. This led to the notion of the basic level of representation: the level of 
specificity at which the combined within-category resemblance and between-category 
dissimilarity is the greatest (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). For 
example, in the hierarchy {animal, mammal, pet, dog, collie, Lassie}, dog would be the basic 
level. Most of the work by Rosch and colleagues focused on category membership and 
addressed some of the dominant theoretical controversies of the time, and many 
researchers of semantics have adopted assumptions and methodologies of this theory, 
particularly the possibility that category boundaries can be vaguely defined, and the 
resulting constructs related to family resemblance rather than all-or-nothing category 
membership.  
A particularly useful application of Rosch's approach is the use of features of 
meaning as a tool to provide insight into word meaning. One method is to assemble 
sets of words from a semantic domain of interest and decide a priori upon their features 
but without claiming that these features constitute a complete set, and then use those 
features to build a computational model of representation which can then be tested 
against data. This method was taken by Hinton & Shallice (1991, also see Plaut & 
Shallice, 1993), who created a set of semantic features which intuitively capture 
properties of common objects (e.g. <has-legs>, <hard>, <made-of-metal>, <part-of-
limb>), and used these features to train an attractor network to learn the mapping 23 
between orthography and semantics. Lesioning this network produced semantic, visual, 
and visual/semantic errors consistent with patterns of performance in deep dyslexia. 
Plaut (1995) used the same approach to investigate dissociations between reading 
concrete and abstract words. A particular characteristic of the representations was that 
abstract words had fewer features than concrete words. This difference in featural 
properties between concrete and abstract words (possibly in conjunction with other 
differences) translated into different consequences when different aspects of the model 
were damaged: abstract words were more impaired when the feedforward connections 
were lesioned, while concrete words were more impaired when the recurrent 
connections were lesioned. Such findings suggest that even double dissociations can 
arise from a model with a (single) common level of semantic representation, depending 
upon underlying characteristics of the featural input. 
Theories based on independently-generated input. One possible problem with the 
computational models discussed in the previous section is the fact that the semantic 
features used were chosen by the investigators, and may, therefore, reflect the 
investigators' theoretical biases, or may not be true of the full range of meaning of the 
words in question. Other authors have addressed this concern by investigating those 
dimensions of meaning that are considered to be psychologically salient by others. 
Several models of semantic representations based on this kind of input have been 
implemented to date, differing mainly in the manner in which semantic representations 
are derived from the input. One class of models employs connectionist frameworks 
which develop representations from semantic input. These models are used in order to 
demonstrate how particular patterns of semantic impairment may be observed as a 
consequence of differential featural composition. This entails training a connectionist 
network with input that, although not directly obtained from speakers, is informed by 
characteristics of feature norms that are hypothesised to play a role. For example, Farah 24 
and McClelland (1991) constructed a model in which words referring to living or 
nonliving entities were associated with different proportions of visual-perceptual and 
functional features (the former predominant for living things, the latter predominant for 
nonliving entities). In this case, the proportions were derived from dictionary 
definitions, which were presented to naïve participants who were asked to rate the 
individual elements of meaning in each definition in terms of sensory/perceptual or 
functional content. When the model was lesioned, different category-related effects 
were found, depending upon whether the lesion targeted the visual-perceptual features 
(with living things more impaired) or functional features (with non-living things more 
impaired). A similar approach was taken by Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen and 
Seidenberg (1998) who investigated the role of intercorrelated features (those features 
which frequently co-occur, e.g., <has wings> and <has a beak>) and distinguishing 
features (those which allow similar entities to be distinguished from each other) upon 
impairment over time for living or nonliving things as a consequence of dementia. Since 
living things have many intercorrelated features but few distinguishing ones, and the 
situation is reversed for nonliving entities (McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg, 1997), 
differences in their composition were able to explain the progression of relative 
impairment for living and nonliving things in dementia, within a single representational 
system (see also Rogers et al., 2004) 
In these examples, semantic representations are based on specific characteristics 
derived from independently-generated information about meaning (e.g. more visual-
perceptual features for living things, as in Farah & McClelland, 1991; more 
intercorrelated but fewer distinguishing features as in Devlin et al., 1998). Such 
approaches, however, require making a priori assumptions about the particular 
properties that are relevant to explain a particular pattern of data, and do not allow for 
the possibility that other properties not explicitly embedded in the semantic 25 
representations may also play important roles. Indeed, the theories of Farah & 
McClelland and Devlin et al. are not necessarily incompatible with each other, but their 
implementations do not permit direct comparison. This is because each model only 
embeds certain specific properties of featural input, and not others which are 
hypothesised to play a role under other theories, rather than simultaneously embedding 
multiple characteristics of featural input.  
Another class of models based on independently-obtained input avoids the need 
of deciding in advance which properties are relevant to explain a given pattern of data 
by using speaker-generated features: separable aspects of meaning that naïve 
participants believe are important in defining and describing the meaning of a given 
word. These features are used to develop a model of representation, and then the 
properties of the resulting model are analysed to identify those properties that affect the 
representations (Hampton, 1979; 1981; Hampton & Gardiner, 1983; Rosch & Mervis, 
1975; Rosch et al., 1976; Smith et al., 1974; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984). The first work 
along these lines to be carried out on a larger scale was conducted by McRae et al. 
(1997), who collected speaker-generated features for a large number of nouns referring 
to concrete objects (animals, plants, fruits, vegetables, artefacts, vehicles, etc.). 
Subsequent work by McRae and colleagues has used these features to address a number 
of questions of semantic representation and impairment (e.g. Cree & McRae, 2003; 
Cree, McNorgan & McRae 2006; Cree, McRae & McNorgan, 1999; McRae & Cree, 
2002; McRae, Cree, Seidenberg & McNorgan, 2005; McRae, Cree, Westmacott & de Sa, 
1999). Similar work based on speaker-generated features for nouns referring to objects 
has also been conducted by other groups (Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Hodges & 
Patterson, 2001; Randall, Moss, Rodd, Greer & Tyler, 2004; Rogers & McClelland, 
2004), collectively providing comprehensive data sets which allow investigation of 
semantic representations from numerous directions. However, one crucial characteristic 26 
of many of these models is that they still tend to discuss the featural input in terms of 
one particular dimension (or just a few) to explain particular patterns of data. To permit 
the evaluation of such models more generally as theories of semantic representation, it 
is necessary to consider classes of models which do not depend on selecting particular 
characteristics of the featural input, but which still permit features to be analysed in 
such terms if desired (Vinson & Vigliocco, 2002; 2008; Vigliocco et al., 2004). This is 
one of the central aims of the present work. 
Going beyond semantic representations for words referring to objects 
Nearly all of the theoretical and behavioural research described above has 
focused upon nouns referring to concrete objects. As Miller and Fellbaum (1991) put it, 
“When psychologists think about the organisation of lexical memory it is nearly always 
the organisation of nouns they have in mind.” (p.204). But nouns referring to concrete 
objects are only one semantic domain, and it is unclear whether theoretical conclusions 
based only upon investigations of the semantics of concrete nouns can be generalised to 
other semantic domains. Words referring to actions
3 is the only other domain beyond 
words referring to concrete objects that has received some attention (although see 
Gross, Fischer & Miller, 1989, for some discussions on the domain of words referring 
to properties). A first difference between words referring to objects and words referring 
to actions is referential: words referring to objects can be understood in isolation, while 
words referring to actions are relational in nature. One implication of this difference is 
that words referring to actions are more abstract than words referring to objects (Bird, 
Lambon Ralph, Patterson & Hodges, 2000; Breedin, Saffran & Coslett, 1994). Some 
authors have also argued that words referring to objects and actions differ in featural 
properties (Graesser, Hopkinson & Schmid, 1987; Huttenlocher & Lui, 1979). For 
words referring to objects there are more features referring to narrow semantic fields 27 
(e.g., <domesticated> vs. <wild> for animals). For words referring to actions, instead, 
there are more features that broadly apply across a wide range of semantic domains 
(e.g., <intentionality>, <involves motion>). As a consequence of this, the patterns of 
correlation among semantic features would also differ for words referring to objects and 
actions; features should be much more strongly correlated within semantic fields for 
words referring to objects (e.g., <having a tail>, and <having four legs> for mammals) 
than for words referring to actions. 
Research on categories also demonstrates that distinguishing between different 
levels (superordinate, basic, subordinate) (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976) is 
relatively simple for words referring to (most) concrete objects; the situation is different 
for words referring to actions, for which it is typically difficult to create comparable sets 
of hierarchies. For example, yell does not fall easily into a superordinate category, as it 
can be considered communication,  noise, or mouth action, any one of which seems 
insufficient as a category label compared to something like animal or fruit. The word yell 
also appears to lack subordinates (more specific instances of yelling would probably be 
reflected in the use of modifiers rather than in selection of a different word). 
Nonetheless, there have been attempts to define basic level actions (Lakoff, 1987; 
Morris & Murphy, 1990) and some attempts have been made to describe words 
referring to actions in hierarchical terms (Jackendoff, 1990; Keil, 1989). Differences 
between the domains, however, persist. For example, in Keil (1989), the hierarchical 
organisation of words referring to actions has fewer levels (generally two) and with 
fewer distinctions at the superordinate level. Other attempts to capture a level of 
organisation for actions have included distinctions between light (e.g., do) and heavy 
(e.g., construct) verbs (Jespersen, 1965; Pinker, 1989) and distinctions between general  
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(e.g. run, throw, eat) and events of various kinds (e.g. clatter, glow, preach).   28 
(e.g., move) and specific (e.g., run) actions (Breedin, Saffran & Schwartz, 1998). However, 
the light/heavy dichotomy only allows drawing a distinction between verbs used as 
auxiliaries and those that participate in phrasal verbs (e.g., get up, throw away) on one hand 
and all other verbs on the other (and permits no such distinction for nouns referring to 
actions), and drawing the line between general and specific actions is not an easy or 
agreed-upon exercise. A related issue is that distinctions between close semantic 
neighbours differ across the domains of words referring to objects and to actions. For 
many domains of basic-level concrete objects, close neighbours offer true distinctions (a 
goat is not a sheep; an apple is not a pear) while this is not true in many action domains 
which seem to overlap to a greater extent (e.g. to shout, to yell, to scream; none of which 
necessarily exclude any of the others). 
  Words referring to objects and actions also differ in syntactic terms, particularly 
considering that all object words are nouns, while the typical action word is a verb. As 
such the syntactic information associated with words referring to actions tends to be 
richer than for words referring to objects: the lexical-semantic representations of actions 
are considered to contain not only the core meaning (the action or the process denoted) 
but also the thematic roles associated with the verb. For example, the core meaning of 
to kick is something like "striking out with the foot" and it is associated with the 
thematic roles of Agent and Patient, the arguments of the verb that specify "who did 
what to whom". (Grimshaw, 1991; Jackendoff, 1990; Levin, 1993). The same could also 
be said of nouns referring to actions, which despite fulfilling the same syntactic roles as 
nouns referring to objects (e.g., subject, object, head of noun phrases) also take 
arguments in the same manner as verbs referring to actions (Collina, Marangolo & 
Tabossi, 2001).  
Such differences between the semantic representations of words referring to 
objects and words referring to actions have led to some independently-developed and 29 
distinct models of representation for the two. As discussed above, in Wordnet (Miller & 
Fellbaum, 1991), different types of relational links have been implemented for objects 
and actions to accommodate the various differences between the domains. For nouns 
referring to objects, relations such as synonymy, hyponymy (e.g., dog is a hyponym of 
animal), and meronymy (e.g., mouth is part of face) are argued to play a primary role in 
semantic organisation. For nouns and verbs referring to actions, relational links include 
troponymy (i.e., hierarchical relation in which a subordinate term expresses the manner 
of its superordinate, such as the relation between crawling and travelling/ going/ moving/ 
locomoting), entailment (e.g., snoring entails sleeping) and antonymy (e.g., coming is the 
opposite of going). It is possible, however, that an assumption of separate 
representational systems is not necessary. After all, work by researchers using speaker-
generated features has revealed that substantially different semantic domains (e.g. living 
vs. nonliving things) can be represented in a single model, using a common set of 
implementational assumptions. Differences between these domains of knowledge come 
about because of differences in the types of properties speakers generate for words in a 
given domain. The present work extends this notion even further, investigating whether 
even more diverse domains of meaning, words referring to objects and words referring 
to actions, can be successfully represented in a single system.  
The present work 
Moving on from the extensive work by McRae and colleagues, the central question in 
the present study is whether the same speaker-generated semantic feature approach is a 
suitable way to investigate and model semantic representations for words referring to 
objects and actions despite the numerous differences between the two domains. This 
question will be addressed by a series of parallel studies based on speaker-generated 
features, collecting and analysing features of words referring to objects (for which much 
is known thanks to the work by McRae and others), and also words referring to events, 30 
in order to assess differences between the domains, and to find out if the 
representational assumptions provide similarity measures of comparable quality for 
object-nouns and for words referring to actions. Chapter 2 introduces the item set and 
describes the feature collection methodology. Chapter 3 contains analyses of the nature 
and content of features that were generated for words from various semantic domains. 
In Chapter 4, an implementation of a model with distinct conceptual and lexical-
semantic levels of representation is introduced and described. Chapter 5 explores the 
characteristics of the resulting lexical-semantic similarity space at different levels of 
specificity. Chapter 6 presents four behavioural experiments that tested the ability of the 
model to predict fine-grained word-level semantic similarity effects in comprehension 
and production, and compares the performance of the model for words referring to 
objects and words referring to actions. Chapter 7 uses data from the experiments in 
Chapter 6 to assess the quality of the speaker-generated feature model against two other 
models from which word-level semantic similarity measures are available (Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA), and Wordnet). Chapter 8 presents an additional experiment 
exploring the ability of the speaker-generated feature model to predict category-level 
semantic effects, and Chapter 9 offers discussion and conclusions. 31 
Chapter 2: Feature collection  
In order to provide a suitable basis for a model of semantic representation 
based on speaker-generated features, it is first necessary to select the model’s vocabulary 
from the entire English lexicon. After all, collecting and processing speaker-generated 
features is a very time-consuming process. At the same time, however, it is necessary 
that the words included in a model are suitably broad in scope and relevant to important 
issues in the literature.  
We begin with nouns referring to concrete objects, as a substantial literature 
already exists concerning this domain, particularly concerning category-related deficits, 
and because several sets of speaker-generated feature norms already exist to serve as 
comparison (e.g., Garrard et al., 2001; McRae et al., 1997; Randall et al., 2004; Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004). Patterns of category-related deficits suggest that it is especially 
important to include a variety of living and nonliving things, including fruits and 
vegetables, animals, clothing, furniture, vehicles, tools, and other artefacts. The field of 
body parts is particularly interesting in this regard, belonging to living things but for 
which it might be argued that functional properties are particularly important, thus more 
like nonliving things according to the distinctions described by Farah and McClelland 
(1991). Other considerations for selection of words referring to objects were that they 
should be familiar (so that participants would be able to generate features for the words 
rather than generic features referring to superordinates), relatively unambiguous or at 
least with a dominant meaning (so that participants would not produce diverse sets of 
features referring to different meanings of a given word), and ideally picturable (to 
permit their use in behavioural experimentation). A variety of exemplars were included 
within each category in order that a range of semantic similarity would be represented 
within the set, thus allowing the quality of the resulting model to be assessed at a variety 
of levels of specificity. 32 
Since less is known about the semantic organisation of words referring to 
actions, it was more difficult to decide which of these to include in the list. This 
selection process began with verbs referring to actions. An initial set were selected 
because they describe actions that are associated with words already included in the 
object set (e.g., words related to cooking, to the use of tools, and body actions). Other 
words referring to actions were selected because intuitively they offered variability in 
their featural composition: words referring to light and sound emission which were 
expected to have sensory-related features; words referring to manner and direction of 
motion for which motion features are expected to be important; and words referring to 
communication and exchange for which features related to purpose/function may 
dominate. Again, words were selected with familiarity and limited polysemy in mind, 
and picturable actions were selected where possible. Finally, a set of nouns referring to 
actions were included in the set. All of these were homonymous or derivationally related 
to the verbs in the list (e.g., plea/plead; donation/donate).  
Method 
Item selection 
A total of 456 words were selected. This list included 216 verbs referring to 
actions and 240 nouns, 169 referring to objects and 71 to actions. A complete list of the 
words, along with their semantic field labels, is given in Appendix A. The 456 words 
were pseudorandomly assigned to 14 lists, each of which contained 30 to 40 words. 
Nouns referring to objects, nouns referring to actions and verbs referring to actions, as 
well as exemplars from any given semantic field
4 (i.e., animals, tools, verbs of body 
action, verbs of light emission etc.) were distributed across the lists as evenly as 
possible. In English, many noun and verb forms are homonymous, therefore, in order 
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to obtain features for both the noun and verb versions of the same word form, all 
nouns and verbs were disambiguated by presenting them in a minimal syntactic context: 
verbs were presented in the infinitival, with to, and nouns were preceded with the 
determiner the. Noun-verb homonyms (e.g., the hammer, to hammer) were always assigned 
to different lists, as were derivationally-related nouns and verbs (e.g. donate/donation). 
The order of items in each list was randomised, and words were printed six to a page, 
each with ten blanks in which participants were to record their features. 
Procedure 
Two hundred eighty undergraduate students from the Department of 
Psychology at University of Wisconsin, Madison, participated in exchange for extra 
credit. Twenty participants completed each list. For each item they were asked to write 
down those features of meaning which, taken in conjunction, were sufficient to define 
and describe that word. The instructions defined features as "words or phrases that, 
taken alone, provide a single piece of meaning information". Features for two examples 
(one noun referring to an object and one verb referring to an action, neither occurring 
on that list) were provided as a model
5. Participants were instructed to avoid producing 
pure associations ("for the word 'cat', you would not produce the feature 'mouse', 
because although cat and mouse are related, 'mouse' does not reflect what a cat is"). 
Although the response sheets contained ten blank lines for each word, participants were 
not explicitly instructed to produce ten features per word, but rather, to produce 
"enough features to define and describe the word" (with a maximum of ten responses). 
Finally, participants were instructed to produce features for each word in turn, and not 
to return to a word once they had begun generating features for the following word. 
The task lasted approximately 45 minutes. Five participants who failed to comprehend 
the task were replaced. 
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When participants missed a word, generated features for the wrong word (or 
wrong meaning), or did not know a word, that word was added to one of three follow-
up lists. Follow-up lists were presented to additional participants to ensure that there 
were 20 participants' responses for each word in the set. During the feature collection 
process some words were shown to be problematic. For example, to trill was not known 
by almost half of the participants, and features for the twist almost always referred to a 
type of dance rather than to the intended noun depicting the physical action of twisting 
(features for the related verb to twist never referred to the dance). Features for the foot 
were (almost) evenly divided between referring to the body part and to the unit of 
measurement. Words with problems of this type were eliminated from the set. Although 
an effort was made to select words that were not polysemous, some degree of polysemy 
was unavoidable. In order to minimise the effects of polysemy, participants were 
instructed with the following, "Sometimes you might think of more than one meaning 
of a particular word. When this occurs, please write down features only for the most 
common meaning of this word, in your opinion". Indeed, nearly all participants 
generated features only for the most common meaning. Words for which some 
participants generated other meanings were added to one of the follow-up lists. 
Analysis 
Data consisted of a large quantity of hand-written speaker-generated features for 
each word from 20 participants. Initial data entry consisted of entering each feature into 
a feature x participant matrix for each word. Thus, this phase of data entry reflected the 
participants' intent as closely as possible. When a participant produced a given feature 
for a given word, a value of 1 was entered for that feature x participant cell (indicating 
that the feature was present), otherwise that cell was left blank and subsequently a value 
of 0 was entered (indicating that the feature was absent).  35 
Once the numeric data were entered for each word, the post-processing of the 
featural data involved making a number of decisions in order to capture aspects of 
similarity among speaker-generated features. For example, individual participants 
occasionally produced conjoint features (i.e. <red fruit> for the apple), while others 
produced such features separately (<fruit>, <red>, etc.). If other participants produced 
both features separately for the same word (as in <red fruit> above) these cases were 
considered to be unambiguously separable, and were converted into their separate 
features. For those situations in which this was not the case (e.g., if one participant 
produced <red fruit> but no other participant produced both <red> and <fruit> as 
separate features) this was decided on a case-by-case basis: a decision of whether the 
conjoint features (<red fruit>) had a substantially different meaning than its 
contributing features (<red> and <fruit>) taken separately. When a conjoint feature 
was separated, a value of 1 was entered for both features for that participant. Along 
similar lines, participants produced a wide range of variations in wording or synonyms 
to express the same feature (e.g. <4-legged>, <has four legs>, <quadruped>, etc.). 
Synonymous features were collapsed into a single feature, and the shortest, most-
frequent variation was chosen from the different alternatives. This procedure was 
carried out for each of the 456 words in the set. Sometimes, a participant produced two 
(or more) synonymous features in response to a single target word. Such cases were 
treated as if the speaker had produced the feature only once (in other words, a binary 
coding of present or absent for each participant).  
Because the above analyses were carried out on a word-by-word basis, the 
treatment of synonymous features proved somewhat problematic: a "synonymous 
feature pair" for one word might be missed when another word is considered (for 
example, if <fast> and <quick> are considered synonymous, and all instances of 
<quick> converted to <fast>, this could easily be missed for a word for which the 36 
feature <quick> is produced but <fast> is not). Therefore, once all synonymous 
features were dealt with, a complete list of features was prepared, consisting of one 
instance of each feature that occurred across the entire set of words. This list was 
examined independently from the target words, and each feature was examined in 
relation to all other features in the list, to identify further possible synonyms, on an 
intuitive basis and with the aid of a thesaurus (for example, given the feature <fast>, the 
list was searched for other words referring to speed such as <quick>, <speedy>). A 
feature was considered as "synonymous" if it appeared in a thesaurus entry for another 
word such as <noisy> for <loud>. When a feature pair was judged to be synonymous, 
it was changed across all target words in the set. Feature weight values were determined 
for each feature in that word, as the number of speakers who generated that feature for 
that word (for example, 19 participants produced the feature <red> for the cherry, so the 
feature <red> was given a weight value of 19 for cherry). Feature weight vectors for 
each word were then prepared by enumerating all of the feature weight values of that 
word, assigning values of zero to all features not produced for a given word. Finally, a 
word x feature matrix was created by combining the feature weight vectors across all 
456 words in the set. In this matrix, values represented the number of speakers who had 
produced a given feature for a given word. At this point, idiosyncratic features (those 
produced by nine or fewer participants across all words, i.e., with summed feature 
weight values of less than 9) were discarded, resulting in a feature weight matrix of 456 
(words) by 1029 (features). Features and their weights for each word are published as 
online supplementary materials accompanying Vinson and Vigliocco (2008; see 
Appendix A for details). 37 
Chapter 3: Properties of the speaker-generated features. 
 
Once the feature x word matrix was completed, it was then possible to evaluate 
the extent to which properties of the features differ across words from different 
domains of meaning (words referring to objects and actions), and across words from 
different semantic fields (e.g., words referring to animals, body parts, artefacts; manner 
of motion, tool action, communication, etc.). Beyond providing descriptive information 
about the different domains and semantic fields, analysis of the featural space also 
allows us to assess specific claims within cognitive psychology and neuroscience. These 
include differences between semantic representations of objects and actions (both in 
terms of their content and their organisation) and between living and nonliving domains 
for which many specific claims have been made. They also allow us to assess claims 
concerning category-related deficits, such as the different role of sensory, functional and 
motoric features, and different patterns of correlations among features. 
 
Here we report the following analyses: 
Characteristics of the general featural properties of the words themselves (number of 
features and total weight of features). These general properties can reveal aspects of 
representation such as semantic richness which might presumably differ across domains 
of knowledge. For example, words referring to objects might be semantically richer than 
words referring to actions because the latter are relational (and thus not containing 
semantic content related to the participants involved in the activity); this could be 
reflected in higher number/weight of features for object-nouns than for action-words. 
The reverse could also be true, if words referring to actions also include content related 
to the participants involved in the activity. These analyses can also reveal fine-grained 
differences between semantic fields in a broad domain (e.g., whether different categories 38 
of words referring to objects exhibit different featural characteristics, or if categories of 
words referring to objects are homogeneous in this regard). 
Distribution of features of a given type (visual, other perceptual, motional and 
functional) among words in a given field. A number of theories explaining differential 
patterns of impairment following brain injury are based upon distinctions between 
different feature types (e.g. the sensory-functional theory, Warrington & Shallice, 1984) 
Analysis of these characteristics of words across domains of words referring to objects 
and to actions, and also fine-grained analysis at the level of semantic fields, can provide 
further insight into the applicability of these theories which have mainly addressed 
representations of nouns referring to objects only.  
Relationships among features in words: the extent to which words of different domains 
share features, the extent to which features correlate, and the role of distinctive features 
in words from different domains. Some theories rely upon these aspects of meaning to 
explain differential patterns of impairment, though only in the domain of nouns 
referring to objects, as discussed below. 
 
General featural properties 
Number of features. First the number of features generated for each word 
regardless of the number of participants who generated them was calculated. The 
average number of features per word was 28.33 (SD=6.09). Second, the average number 
of features for individual words in a given semantic field was calculated, as a measure of 
semantic richness. The first column of Table 1 gives a summary of mean number of 
features, organised by semantic field.  39 
Table 1. Average number of features, average sum of feature weights, and their ratio, as a function of 
semantic field (standard deviation in brackets) 
Mean # features    Mean feature weight  Weight/number ratio 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Objects 
Animals    30.96  (7.47)    126.2  (24.65)   4.08  (0.70) 
Fruit & vegetables   26.88 (5.00)      115.8 (21.59)    4.31 (0.69) 
Tools    30.48  (6.44)    109.9  (18.56)   3.61  (0.60) 
Vehicles    31.00  (6.41)    109.8  (24.62)   3.54  (0.53) 
Body parts    32.46 (5.93)      116.4 (18.40)    3.59 (0.65) 
Clothing    27.18  (5.21)    108.4  (16.69)   3.99  (0.49) 
Misc. artefacts    32.45 (5.17)      106.6 (17.73)    3.29 (0.59) 
 
Actions 
Body actions    29.15 (5.80)       98.0 (17.23)    3.36 (0.86) 
Body sense    26.17 (7.38)       89.7 (20.01)    3.43 (0.90) 
Change of location  29.36 (7.29)       86.4 (15.39)    2.94 (0.68) 
Change of state    25.40 (4.86)       76.4 (15.93)    3.01 (0.36) 
Noises    28.17  (3.58)      93.6  (29.10)   3.32  (0.91) 
Communication    28.89 (7.97)       88.8 (23.36)    3.07 (0.74) 
Construction    27.29 (6.00)       95.1 (26.23)    3.48 (1.00) 
Contact    27.33  (5.92)      91.5  (17.77)   3.35  (0.84) 
Cooking    24.43  (5.79)      95.9  (18.25)   3.93  (0.80) 
Destruction    31.88 (6.52)       89.4 (24.61)    2.80 (0.59) 
Exchange    23.50 (5.39)       80.3 (16.92)    3.42 (1.00) 
Heat/light emission  25.54 (6.09)       88.8 (20.04)    3.48 (0.48) 
Motion direction    22.00 (5.32)       73.6 (25.83)    3.35 (1.02) 
Motion manner    29.12 (6.78)       95.9 (23.33)    3.29 (1.06) 
Tool action    34.22 (5.59)      104.1 (14.03)    3.04 (0.51) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In order to statistically compare the number of features for words from 
different semantic fields, we started by formally comparing object and action words 
using a two-tailed t-test. To examine finer-grained semantic field effects, we conducted 
separate analyses for objects and actions, first conducting omnibus F tests comparing all 
of the semantic fields listed in Table 1. When an omnibus F-test was significant, we 
followed up with one-tailed t-tests (Bonferroni-corrected) contrasting semantic fields 
that appear to exhibit large numeric differences on a given measure. This approach is 
necessary in order to reduce the number of comparisons to a manageable level; there 
are 105 possible comparisons involving pairs of the 15 action semantic fields listed, and 
21 possible comparisons involving pairs of object fields. Comparisons were therefore 
restricted to testing apparent differences, and cases for which specific claims have been 40 
made in the literature. This same procedure was also carried out for the other semantic 
field comparisons reported later in this chapter. 
In general, more features were generated in response to words referring to 
objects than to words referring to actions (t(383) = 3.4196, p < .001), though this was 
not true for all semantic fields. For example, speakers generated numerically more 
features for tool actions than for any of the object fields, and fruit/vegetables and 
clothing had an average number of features similar to that of an average action field. 
Among words referring to objects, the highest number of features were produced for 
body parts and miscellaneous artefacts, and the fewest, for clothing and fruit/vegetables 
(Body vs clothing t(38) = 2.59, p = .014; body vs. fruit/veg t(57) = 4.64, p < .001; misc 
artefacts vs clothing t(36) = 2.50, p = .017; misc artefact vs. fruit/veg t(55) = 4.41, p < 
.001). Among the words referring to actions, the highest number of features were 
produced for tool actions and actions referring to destruction, and the fewest, for more 
abstract words, such as those from semantic fields like direction of motion and 
exchange (tool action vs. motion direction t(22) = 6.08, p < .001; tool action vs 
exchange t(23) = 4.54, p < .001; destruction vs motion direction t(21) = 4.60, p < .001; 
destruction vs exchange t(22) = 3.33, p = .003). 
 
Summed feature weight. Although feature number indicates semantic richness 
to some extent, it does not capture the whole nature of semantic representations, 
because the binary distinction between presence/absence of a feature for a word does 
not take into account how salient features are (see Smith & Medin, 1981 for a number 
of arguments in favour of variable, rather than binary, values of semantic features). This 
is especially important because for most words in the set, the vast majority of features 
had very low weights (i.e., they were produced only by a few participants). For example, 
the word lemon had a total of 31 features, but only three of them had weights greater 41 
than 10 (<yellow>, <sour>, <fruit>) and only three more had weights greater than 5 
(maximum = 20). Here, feature weights (the number of participants who produced a 
feature for a given word) were used as a more informative measure of semantic 
composition and a more precise reflection of the underlying meaning representations of 
words. The measure used here is summed feature weights: the total number of different 
features produced by all participants for a given word (after the post-processing 
procedure and removal of idiosyncratic features described in chapter 2). 
Unlike the number of features, feature weights clearly distinguished between 
words referring to objects and words referring to actions. All object fields exceeded all 
action fields in mean summed feature weights and they were significantly different when 
analysed by items (t(383) = 13.32, p < .001).(although this was not always true of 
individual exemplars of low-weighted objects such as ceiling [70], shield [73], wing [85], tail 
[85], dress [87] and a few high-weighted actions such as breathe [140], speak [132], swim 
[129],  write [127], cook [124]). Again, fine-grained semantic field distinctions were 
observed, but not necessarily in the same way as for number of features. Within the 
object domain, largest weights were observed for animals, fruit/vegetables and body 
parts, and lower weights for tools, vehicles, clothing and other artefacts (Animals were 
significantly higher than all four of the latter categories (vs tools t(48) = 3.44, p = .001; 
vs vehicles t(36) = 2.90, p = .006; vs clothing t(39) = 3.33, p = .002; vs misc artefacts 
t(45) = 4.03, p < .001). Fruit/veg were significantly greater than misc artefacts only: 
t(55) = 2.33, p = .024, all other p > .10. Body parts exhibited the same pattern: vs. misc 
artefacts t(44) = 2.49, p = .017, all other p > .05). For actions, largest weights were 
observed for tool actions, body actions, cooking, manner of motion, and lower weights 
for change of state, direction of motion and exchange (Tool action vs change state t(17) 
= 4.84, p < .001; tool action vs. motion direction t(22) = 6.28, p < .001; tool action vs. 
exchange t(23) = 3.73, p = .001. Body action vs change state t(48) = 3.24, p = .002; 42 
body action vs. motion direction t(53) = 4.45, p < .001; body action vs exchange t(54) = 
3.13, p = .003; cooking vs change of state t(15) = 3.30, p = .005; cooking vs motion 
direction t(20) = 4.41, p < .001; cooking vs exchange: t(21) = 2.24, p = .035 (n.s. after 
correction for multiple comparisons); manner vs change state t(33) = 2.94, p = .006; 
manner vs direction t(38) = 4.08, p < .001; manner vs exchange t(39) = 2.66, p = .011) . 
The second column of Table 1 above gives the average feature weights of the different 
semantic fields.  
The relative difference between the values of feature numbers and feature 
weight (for example, fruits/vegetables had the lowest number of features produced yet 
were among the highest in terms of summed feature weight), is due to the fact that 
feature weight takes into consideration not only the number of features generated but 
also inter-participant agreement. Some words elicited relatively small number of features 
overall, but for which participants were largely in agreement. This was reflected in the 
relatively high weights assigned to those features (e.g., zebra had only 19 features but 
with a high summed weight of 147; shirt had only 17 features with weight of 113; peach, 
21 features with weight of 136). Words with high levels of inter-participant agreement 
tend to be uniquely defined and concrete nouns referring to objects. Other words may 
have elicited many features, but they were not highly weighted, because of less 
agreement among participants as to their meaning characteristics (e.g. argue elicited 33 
features with a summed weight of only 57; preach, 36 features with weight of 66; give, 35 
features with weight of 74). Because of the mismatch between feature number and 
feature weight, the ratio of weight per feature was also calculated for each word, as 
illustrated in the last column of Table 1. The largest ratio of weight to features was 
observed for words referring to objects (objects vs actions: t(383) = 7.93, p < .001): 
living things (animals and fruit/vegetables) with a ratio above 4 and other object fields 
with a ratio above 3.5 (except for miscellaneous artefacts, with a ratio of 3.29). In 43 
contrast, no action field exceeded a ratio of 3.5, and much more variability was 
observed among semantic fields. Construction and heat/light emission had the highest 
ratio (3.48), and destruction, change of location, change of state and tool actions had 
the lowest (all below 3.1) (Construction vs destruction t(13) = 2.77, p = .016; 
construction vs change location t(16) = 2.62, p = .018; construction vs change state 
(n.s.) t(15) = 1.96, p = .069; construction vs tool actions (n.s.) t(14) = 1.88, p = .080; 
heat/light emission did not significantly differ from the others due to the small number 
of words in this category). 
Taken together, these results indicate that most words referring to objects in the 
set - measured in terms of the speaker-generated features - are semantically richer than 
words referring to actions: they had more features, with greater weights, and a higher 
ratio of weight to features. This is consistent with previous claims in the literature 
concerning differences between object and action representations (e.g. Plaut, 1995), and 
is the first indication that some of the important differences between words referring to 
objects and words referring to actions are reflected in basic properties of speaker-
generated features. 
 
Types of features  
A second question of interest was whether words from broadly different domains 
(objects and actions) and within different semantic fields (animals, tools, 
communication, manner of motion, etc.) differ in terms of feature types. Previous 
studies (discussed in more detail below) suggest that three major differences are 
expected: (a) more perceptual features are expected for words referring to objects than 
for words referring to actions, (b) more perceptual features are expected for living 
things than for artefacts, and (c) motion features are expected to be more common 
among the words referring to actions than among the words referring to objects. 44 
Identifying the feature types associated with different domains and semantic 
fields would allow the evaluation of the claims of the sensory-functional hypothesis that 
has been put forward to account for category-specific deficits (Warrington & Shallice, 
1984). In order to do so, a finer-grained criteria than in previous studies (e.g., Farah & 
McClelland, 1991; Garrard et al., 2001) was used for classifying the speaker-generated 
features. Instead of distinguishing only between sensory and functional features, the 
present study made further distinctions between functional and motoric features, and 
also between visual and other perceptual features. The contrast between motoric and 
functional features was introduced because of evidence that knowledge of how to use 
an object (motoric) and knowledge of what the object is used for (functional) can 
dissociate in some patients (Buxbaum, Veramonti & Schwartz, 2000), an especially 
important finding considering that motoric features are not mentioned by sensory-
functional accounts of impairment. Note that to some extent, the distinction between 
functional and motoric features may correspond to explicit and implicit knowledge of 
action, and both functional and motoric features tend to be very general in nature (for 
example, the specificity of motoric features related to grasping are limited to the 
observation that a particular implement is used with the hand, rather than any further 
details such as hand configuration, orientation, muscles used for action, and so on). The 
speaker-generated features were classified into five categories by two native English 
speakers. Any disagreements were discussed and agreed upon. First, all perceptual 
features, using the definition of “features that describe information gained through 
sensory input, including body state and proprioception” were identified. Perceptual 
features were subdivided into Visual Features (constituted 22.2% of all features), and 
Other Perceptual Features that refer to any other sensory modalities (which constituted 45 
 19.7% of all features)
6. Next, features were classified into Functional (features referring 
to the purpose of a thing, "what it is used for", or the purpose or goal of an action. 
These constituted 26.5% of all features), Motoric ("how a thing is used, or how it 
moves", or any feature describing the motor component of an action. These constituted 
12.0% of all features), and Other Features (those meeting none of the previous 
classification schemes, constituting 37.6% of all features) The class of Other features 
contains the largest proportion of all the features, and is highly heterogeneous. Some of 
the features classified as Other are encyclopaedic (e.g., [comes from] <Africa>); while 
others refer to relationships among meaning components, (e.g., ISA <animal>; PART 
OF <face>, relationships that are particularly common in taxonomies developed by 
lexicographers; (see Miller & Fellbaum, 1991). As such these are highly variable among 
items. 
For the purpose of the current work, Other Features were not further classified, 
since these do not play a role in previous theories of semantic organisation. Figure 1 
represents the distribution of feature types in object semantic fields, and Figure 2 
represents the distribution of feature types in action fields, (taking weights into 
account). As can be seen in the following Figures (see next page), words referring to 
objects and to actions appear to differ in their featural composition.  
 
                                                            
6 These feature type classifications were not mutually exclusive; for example, some sensory properties can 
be experienced through multiple channels, such as <smooth> which has visual implications as well as 
tactile. Features of this kind were permitted multiple classifications, so the total number of features 
exceeds 100%. 46 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of feature types in exemplars from various object semantic fields, 
adjusted by weight. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean by items. 
Figure 2. Percentage of feature types in exemplars from a subset of action semantic fields, adjusted by 
weight. Fields were selected to be indicative of the range of featural composition in the complete set of 
semantic fields. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean by items. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Body-act Chg State Commun. Cooking Light emission Motion
manner
Noise Tool action
Action semantic field
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
-
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
f
o
r
 
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
 
t
y
p
e
Visual
O.Percept.
Functional
Motoric
Other
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Animals Fruit/Veg Tool Clothing Vehicles Other artifacts Body parts
Object semantic field
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
-
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
f
o
r
 
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
 
t
y
p
e
Visual
O.Percept
Functional
Motoric
Other47 
Perceptual features. First, all perceptual features were considered together. 
Words referring to objects were found to be more dependent upon sensory features 
than words referring to actions (t(454) = 6.215, p < .001)
7, with the exceptions of light 
emission (77.3% of all features) and noise making words (46.6%) which were the only 
action categories above the group mean for objects. Within object domains, living 
things were most dependent upon sensory features (48.0% for animals, 47.5% for fruit 
and vegetables), and other artefact fields appeared to be less so (tools 34.5%, clothing 
32.2%, vehicles 32.2%, other artefacts 33.0%), while body parts had an intermediate 
number of perceptual features (38.0%). However none of these within-category 
differences reached significance, likely due to variation of individual items within each 
class (all p-values > .03, not significant when corrected for multiple comparisons). The 
difference between living and nonliving things (excluding body parts) was significant; 
t(142) = 5.860; p<.001. This finding is consistent with the claims of the sensory-
functional hypothesis. In contrast to the object fields, most action fields had 
substantially lower proportions of sensory features (e.g., change of state, 14.9%; 
communication, 11.1%), suggesting the prediction that action naming (relative to object 
naming) should be relatively spared when sensory features are impaired. Nevertheless, 
despite the finding in the present study that some words referring to actions (e.g., noise 
making, communication, light emission labels) had far more sensory features than any 
object domain, there are no reports in the literature of impairments of words belonging 
to these semantic fields associated with impairments to sensory features (possibly 
because no one has tested patients on words from these fields). Next, more specific 
analyses were conducted, focusing on visual features (the dominant modality among the 
perceptual feature types). 
                                                            
7 All t-tests reported in this thesis are two-tailed unless otherwise specified. 48 
Visual features. Among the words referring to objects, visual features were most 
salient for animals (43.9% of all features) and fruits and vegetables (36.8%), moderately 
salient for vehicles (29.4%) and body parts (30.1%), and less so for other (artefact) fields 
(26.4% for tools, 21.3% for clothing and 27.1% for miscellaneous artefacts), (animals 
vs. clothing: t(39) = 4.210, p < .001; animals vs tools: t(48) = 3.671, p < .001; animals 
vs misc artefacts t(45) = 3.815, p < .001; fruit/veg vs clothing t(49) = 2.991, p = .004; 
fruit/veg vs tools t(58) = 2.656, p = .010; fruit/veg vs misc artefacts t(55) = 2.42, p = 
.019)This tendency is in line with the distinction between living and nonliving categories 
and with the claims of the sensory-functional account. Living things had significantly 
higher weighted feature composition than nonliving things, t(142) = 4.151, p < .001 
(this comparison includes all object fields except body parts). Fine-grained differences 
were also observed within these fields: among living things, animals were more 
dependent upon visual features than fruits and vegetables (t(57) = 2.990, p = .002) and 
among artefacts, vehicles were more dependent upon visual features than tools or 
clothing (t(57) = 2.451, p < .001). Considering words referring to actions, visual 
features were predominantly salient only for the narrow semantic field of light emission 
(e.g. "glow", "shine"), for which visual features were by far the dominant feature type, 
amounting to 64.6% of all features. Other action fields had little, if any, dependence 
upon visual features. This finding lends credence to the suggestion that loss of visual 
features can result in category-specific impairments of object naming, and within object 
fields, of living things (e.g. Allport, 1985; Farah & McClelland, 1991). 
Other perceptual features. In relation to other perceptual features, among words 
referring to objects, again, consistent differences between fields were observed. Fruit 
and vegetable (10.8% of all features) and clothing (10.9%) were most dependent upon 
nonvisual perceptual features, tools (8.1%) and body parts (7.9%) moderately so, but 
other fields less so (animals, 4.2%; vehicles, 2.8%; other artefacts, 5.8%). Again, some 49 
fine-grained differences were observed within artefact and living domains: e.g., clothing 
had significantly more other-perceptual features than tools (t(44) = 1.813, p = .038); 
tools had more than vehicles (t(41) = 2.162, p = .019); fruit/vegetable had more than 
animals (t(57) = 4.684, p < .001). Several action fields, noise making (43.6%), cooking 
actions (21.4%), communication (10.4%) and light emission (12.7%), were more 
dependent than any object field on nonvisual perceptual modalities. 
Functional features. Artefacts and living things were consistently distinguished 
insofar as nonliving things were more dependent on functional features than living 
things (t(142) = 8.152, p<.001). Among the nonliving things, clothing (25.0% of all 
features) and miscellaneous artefacts (27.2%) were most reliant upon functional 
features, followed by tools (20.8%), body parts (22.0%) and vehicles (19.1%). Clothing 
had significantly more functional features than either tools or vehicles (respectively, 
t(44) = 1.982, p = .031; t(27) = 1.996, p = .028). Living things - animals (6.8%) and fruit 
& vegetables (7.3%) were considerably less dependent on functional features, 
significantly differing from all of the nonliving categories (all pairwise comparisons 
yielded t > 3.5, p < .001, significant after correcting for multiple comparisons). 
Considering words referring to actions, purposeful acts such as change of state (20.9%), 
communication (21.0%), cooking (21.2%) and tool actions (20.9%) relied most heavily 
on functional features. Other action fields relied on functional features to a considerably 
less extent (e.g., light emission (7.1%), noises (7.6%) and manner of motion (7.3%), all 
of which significantly differed from change of state, communication, cooking and tool 
actions; all pairwise comparisons yielded t > 3, p < .001). Overall, functional features 
were more important for the semantic makeup of words referring to objects than of 
words referring to actions (t(454) = 2.774, p = .003). This is contrary to the suggestion 
of Bird, Howard & Franklin (2000) that functional features are similarly important for 
actions and for inanimate objects (and that the loss of functional features should result 50 
in impaired performance for artefacts and actions alike). Functional features were also 
more important for artefacts than for living things, a finding consistent with the 
suggestion that loss of functional features selectively affects artefacts (e.g. Allport, 1985; 
Farah & McClelland, 1991). Again, however, reports of impairments to action fields 
such as change of state, communication, cooking and tool actions, all of which have a 
relatively large proportion of functional features (in numbers comparable to artefacts) 
and, thus, predicted by Bird et al. (2000) to be selectively impaired along with artefacts 
hitherto have not been reported in the literature.  
Motoric features. Again, fine-grained differences between semantic fields were 
observed. Within words referring to objects, vehicles (27.6% of all features) were the 
most dependent upon motoric features, body parts (17.4%) and miscellaneous artefacts 
(15.4%) moderately so, along with fruits and vegetables (13.5%), where motoric features 
were related to food preparation e.g. <peel>, <cut>. Other fields were less dependent 
on motoric features (clothing for example, had virtually no motoric features: 1.5%). 
Vehicles had significantly more motoric features than body parts (t(40) = 3.01, p = 
.002), body parts had more than fruit and vegetables (t(52) = 2.380, p = .010), fruits and 
vegetables had more than animals (t(57) = 2.980, p = .002) and animals had more than 
clothing (t(43) = 4.652, p < .001). In contrast to objects, words referring to actions were 
far more dependent upon motoric features (t(454) = 15.182, p < .001). Among the 
action fields, especially, manner of motion (56.4%), but also change of state (41.1%), 
body action (36.3%) and tool action (38.0%) were highly dependent on motoric 
features. Fields of communication (15.0%) and cooking (16.5%) were moderately 
dependent on motoric features, and a few action fields (e.g. light emission at 6.6%) had 
hardly any motoric features. 
Overall, the present findings are consistent with the claims of accounts that 
assume differences across concepts in the number and weight of different feature types 51 
(e.g. Cree & McRae, 2003; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Tyler et al., 2000). The 
investigation in the present study, however, went a step further than previous studies by 
making distinctions on a more fine-grained level by distinguishing between Visual and 
Other Perceptual features, and also between Functional and Motoric features. These 
distinctions are important with respect to predicting fine-grained patterns of 
performance. Although selective impairments for living things relative to artefacts have 
been claimed to be associated with the combined effects of impairments to visual and 
other sensory features, different patterns of performance may result depending upon 
which sensory classification is used. For example, animals and fruit/vegetables are 
indistinguishable when visual and other sensory features are combined, but are 
distinguished when only visual features are considered, animals being more dependent 
on visual features than fruit/vegetables. The fine-grained distinction here allows 
dissociations between animals on one hand and fruit/vegetables on the other, which 
could explain cases in which one of these fields is spared but not the other (e.g., Hart et 
al., 1985). 
The present data also provided novel predictions with respect to what type of 
impairments we should expect in the action domain, depending upon the type of 
features that make up the semantic organisation of the different words referring to 
actions. While motoric features were shown to be important for most of the semantic 
fields in the domain of words referring to actions, some action fields could be 
distinguished on the basis of feature types. For example, words referring to light 
emission were highly dependent on visual features, while noise making and cooking 
words were dependent on sensory features from other modalities. Interestingly, these 
distinctions in the domain of actions show a degree of similarity to the sensory and 
functional distinctions in the domain of objects. Therefore, assuming the sensory-
functional theory of naming impairments, "category-specific" effects should also be 52 
observed for words referring to actions, provided that suitable items are used for 
testing. It remains to be seen whether the absence of reports of such cases in the 
literature is merely a consequence of the lack of attention of past research to 
impairments in the domain of actions. Alternatively the lack of selective deficits within 
the action domain may constitute evidence against the sensory-functional theory (for 
additional discussion and simulation results consistent with the analyses above, see 
Vinson & Vigliocco, 2002; Vinson et al., 2003). 
Relationships between words 
The previous analyses were concerned with the feature properties of individual 
words. Here, relations between words, as illuminated by their featural makeup, are 
explored, focusing upon a number of dimensions about which specific claims have been 
made. One set of analyses consider shared features and correlated features (e.g. Devlin, 
Gonnerman, Andersen & Seidenberg, 1998; Garrard et al., 2001; McRae et al., 1997; 
Tyler, Moss, Durrant-Peatfield & Levy, 2000), and ask whether words referring to 
objects and words referring to actions, and living and non-living things, differ along 
these dimensions. A second set of analyses consider the distinctiveness and correlation 
of features in the fields of animals and tools, testing specific claims made by Tyler and 
colleagues (Tyler et al., 2000) about the types of features that tend to be intercorrelated.  
Shared features. Traditional featural views of semantic representations (e.g. 
Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974) and 
current work (e.g. Maki, Krimsky, & Muñoz, 2006; see Lucas, 2000; Hutchison, 2003 
for reviews of the semantic priming literature) use some kind of feature overlap as the 
crucial measure of similarity between words' meanings. At least for some semantic fields 
of nouns referring to objects, shared features have been shown to have an effect on 
performance in behavioural tasks such as semantic priming (McRae & Boisvert, 1998). 
The notion of shared features is also important to many views of semantic 53 
representation and impairment, even if they do not specifically rely upon shared features 
per se as the centrally important aspect of meaning. For example, theories such as the 
Conceptual Structure account (Tyler et al., 2000), and other theories in which 
intercorrelation or distinctiveness among features is important (e.g. Devlin et al., 1998; 
McRae et al., 1997), depend upon shared features as this is the only way intercorrelation 
can arise. Moreover, feature distinctiveness is defined in contrast to shared features: 
distinctive features are those that are not shared among many exemplars. 
The present study thus begins with analyses of shared features. The raw 
similarity among words within the complete featural space was assessed by considering 
the extent to which words had features in common. First, a measure of shared features 
was calculated on the basis of the number of features shared between two words (see 
the first column of Table 2).  
Table 2. Average number of shared features and shared feature weights (standard deviations in brackets) 
as a function of semantic field classification for words referring to objects and actions (for actions, 
semantic field labels are taken from Levin, 1993). 
 
Field    Mean shared number of features   Mean shared feature weights 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Animals    7.78  (3.36)    27.73  (11.20) 
Fruit & vegetables   9.38 (2.91)      34.88 (15.11) 
Tools    8.80  (3.39)    31.66  (13.58) 
Vehicles    9.44  (4.10)    27.14  (13.04) 
Body  parts   6.56  (4.05)    18.84  (14.17) 
Clothing    8.48  (3.43)    31.39  (12.20) 
Misc. artefacts    5.65 (3.61)      12.17 (  9.91) 
ALL OBJECTS    3.00 (2.50)        7.26 ( 8.48) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Body actions    4.47 (2.24)      11.34 (  5.86) 
Body sense    5.52 (2.84)      14.77 (  8.55) 
Change of location  6.44 (2.92)      17.91 (  7.53) 
Change of state    5.60 (2.60)      13.84 (  6.59) 
Noises    6.52  (3.09)    20.07  (    9.47) 
Communication   6.70  (2.79)    16.94  (    7.67) 
Construction   8.71  (3.65)    23.24  (    9.91) 
Contact    8.60  (4.09)    26.94  (14.16) 
Cooking    6.90  (2.92)    28.86  (13.21) 
Destruction   8.57  (4.11)    20.00  (    9.05) 
Exchange   7.07  (2.76)    20.63  (    8.67) 
Heat/light emission  4.65 (2.80)      15.71 (11.46) 
Motion direction    4.53 (1.80)      12.27 (  4.89) 
Motion manner    5.75 (2.20)      16.75 (  6.70) 
Tool action    8.44 (3.58)      18.75 (  8.31) 
ALL ACTIONS    3.33 (1.64)        8.16 (  4.24) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Substantial variability was observed. For words referring to objects, the number of 
features shared among exemplars in a semantic field was numerically largest for 
fruits/vegetables, tools and vehicles and smallest for animals, body parts and 
miscellaneous artefacts (although it should be noted that these differences do not reach 
statistical significance, a consequence of wide variability among items, stemming from 
the varying properties of similarity within a given category). These tendencies may 
reflect the existence of subfield distinctions in these latter fields such as, for example, 
wild vs. domestic animals, face vs. limb-related body parts, and furniture vs. buildings. 
In the action domain, the largest number of features were shared in fields of contact, 
construction, destruction and tool action, and the smallest number was shared among 
body action, heat/light emission and direction of motion. Importantly, comparing the 
domains of objects and actions, there were, roughly, similar numbers of semantic fields 
with many and few shared features (although fields with the fewest shared features were 
in the action domain), although considering objects and actions without regard to 
semantic field distinctions it is interesting to note that these objects tended to share less 
features than actions (t(383) = 6.75, p < .001), perhaps illustrating a general tendency 
for object-nouns to be organised into separable categories while action-verbs tend to 
share features more generally.  
In order to assess featural overlap taking weights into account, it was first 
necessary to create an index of shared weights between word pairs, which was 
calculated as follows. The weighted feature overlap measure for a given pair of words 
was defined as the sum, across all features, of the minimum feature weight for the two 
words, taking into account only those features with nonzero weights. Since only the 
total value of featural weight is taken into account (and not the number of features 
contributing to this measure), the measure is the same for two words sharing ten 
features with weights = 1, and for two words sharing only one feature with weight = 55 
10). Shared (weighted) feature overlap was first assessed within semantic fields, to 
illustrate the characteristics of semantic fields as above (see the second column of Table 
2 above).  
Considering words referring to objects, the highest feature weight similarity was 
again found among fruit/vegetables, tools and clothing, with lowest similarity levels 
among miscellaneous artefacts and body parts, although again these differences do not 
reach statistical significance due to the extremely high variance at the item level. 
Considering words referring to actions, the highest weight similarity was observed 
among words referring to cooking, contact and construction, with lowest similarity 
among direction of motion, body action and change of state. Words referring to objects 
had higher within-field shared weights than words referring to actions (t(383) = 12.51, p 
< .001), although this may be a consequence of the higher weights for objects overall as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Further, this pattern is reversed when semantic fields 
are disregarded and shared weights are considered within all objects and within all 
actions (t(383) = 6.75, p < .001): feature weights tend to be shared more widely across 
action-verbs while shared weights tend to be limited to members of the same 
superordinate category in the object domain. 
These patterns of similarity do not differ drastically whether feature weights are 
considered or not, at least when comparing semantic fields to each other, suggesting 
that they are quite robust in indicating a hierarchy of differences in shared features 
within semantic fields, possibly, illustrative of the relative semantic density of the fields 
investigated. 
Correlation among features. The pattern of correlation among features is closely 
related to featural overlap, because features that frequently overlap will be highly 
correlated to each other. Correlation, however, takes not only overlap into account, but 
also the relative amount of overlap for pairs of features vs. those instances in which 56 
only one of a pair of features occurs for a given item. Analysis of correlation first 
considers how strongly correlated features are for different semantic fields, but can also 
be applied to questions related to specific types of features (whether different broad 
classes of features tend to co-occur depending upon the semantic field in question). The 
Conceptual Structure account by Tyler and colleagues (2000) makes specific claims 
about correlation, suggesting that living things have more strongly intercorrelated 
features than non-living things, and words referring to objects have more strongly 
intercorrelated features than words referring to actions. This is consistent with the 
analyses of shared features reported above: living things tend to share more features 
than artefacts, which in turn tend to share more features than action-words. Tyler et al. 
also make specific claims about the kind of features that are correlated, depending upon 
semantic domain. Sensory features of living things are, in general, less distinctive, and 
thus the strongest correlations between features are expected to be between sensory 
features shared among many exemplars, such as the fact that things that have tails also 
tend to have legs. Such features are typically strongly correlated (often with numerous 
other features as well) and shared among a number of exemplars). For artefacts, on the 
other hand, sensory features tend to be distinctive, and thus should be correlated not 
with other sensory features but with their related functions, such as the fact that things 
that are sharp are also used for the function of cutting, a correlation much stronger than 
between sensory feature <sharp> and other related sensory features like <hard>. 
However, counterevidence has been provided by Garrard et al. (2001) based on analyses 
of speaker-generated features. According to Garrard et al., the greatest degree of 
intercorrelation among features is observed for distinctive features of living things (e.g. 
beaks and wings are quite distinctive when considering all living things, but there are 
virtually no exceptions to their co-occurrence), higher than either shared or distinctive 57 
features for artefacts. Garrard et al. further showed that the representations for artefacts 
are not strongly dependent upon distinctive form-function correlations.  
It is premature, however, to discount the Conceptual Structure account based 
on this evidence, because some criticisms may be levelled against the feature norms 
obtained by Garrard et al. (2001). First, they were obtained using a rather restrictive 
methodology in which participants were asked to generate a certain number of features 
of a given kind for each word in the set by completing phrase frames (six features for 
each of the phrase frames "IS ____", "HAS ____" and "CAN _____", plus one 
"category" feature, in which participants were meant to report a superordinate category). 
This method of feature collection, which was identical for all items, may have led 
participants to generate predominantly shared features for category exemplars. Second, 
Garrard et al. used a limited set of words, of eight semantic fields, and eight exemplars 
in each field. Third, all their items were labels of concrete objects. This point is 
important as the specific context in which feature generation is employed (i.e., the other 
words included in a feature generation list) could, in principle, bias participants to 
produce only those features sufficient to distinguish a given item from others in the set, 
which could be a crucial weakness of this methodology (see Murphy, 2002). It is 
therefore important to replicate Garrard et al.'s tests of the predictions of the 
Conceptual Structure account, using different methods of feature collection less 
susceptible to these criticisms. The methodology in the present study differed from 
those of Garrard et al. (2001) as a wide range of semantically unrelated exemplars 
(including numerous words referring to actions) were included and the participants were 
allowed to generate whatever type of features they felt were important to the describe 
the meaning of a given word rather than being constrained to produce only certain 
kinds of features, and in certain proportions.  58 
In order to provide a close basis for comparison, these analyses focused upon a 
limited set of exemplars from three semantic fields: animals, tools and action words. A 
limited set of words was investigated in this case to allow equating the words for 
concept familiarity, an important consideration because less familiar items may exhibit 
less typical featural profiles (for example, participants might only produce generic 
features related to a superordinate if the item itself is not so familiar). Items used for 
this comparison were 12 animals (bird, camel, cat, dog, fish, fox, goat, horse, lion, mouse, sheep, 
tiger), 12 tools (fork, tweezers, brush, pencil, pen, pliers, chisel, scissors, razor, gun, file, hammer) and 
12 verbs referring to actions (touch, clang, smell, hold, throw, frown, drill, write, twist, spray, 
exchange, inhale).  
Following the analysis used by Garrard et al. (2001), first the value of the 
correlation coefficient for all possible pairs of features across exemplars (in the entire 
set of 456 words) were calculated (taking feature weight into account). For each of the 
words in the test set (12 animals, 12 tools, 12 actions), all possible pairings of that 
word's features were assigned average correlation values based on the correlations in the 
entire set of 456 words (e.g. if <wings> and <beak> had a correlation of r = +0.96 
across all items in the set, this value was assigned to the feature pair <wings>, <beak> 
for the item bird.). These values excluded the numerous instances where neither feature 
occurred for a given word, which would have produced inflated correlation measures 
due to the sparseness of the feature vectors. These values were then averaged across all 
feature pairs for a given word. The average correlation coefficient for each semantic 
field was 0.146 for animal features, 0.119 for tools, and 0.081 for actions; pairwise 
comparisons between feature pairs (items as a random factor) using nonparametric tests 
(Mann-Whitney U) revealed that all three correlations differed significantly from each 
other (all p<.001). This is consistent with other analyses of featural correlations within 
object domains (e.g. Garrard et al., 2001; McRae et al., 1997) in which the features of 59 
animals are more highly intercorrelated than the features of tools, for which 
distinctiveness is argued to be more important. These results also provide novel 
information about the action domain for which correlations are overall lower than for 
objects despite the overall tendency for actions to share features more than objects. 
Distinctiveness and correlation. Differences between the semantic fields of 
animals and tools in terms of feature distinctiveness were assessed following Garrard et 
al. (2001). A feature's distinctiveness was operationalised as being the proportion of 
words within a semantic field that share that feature (weights > 0). Thus a value of 1.0 
indicates a feature that is shared among all exemplars within a field, and smaller values 
indicate higher level of distinctiveness (features with values of zero were excluded, as 
they are by definition not representative of any exemplars in a field). Features with 
values greater than 0.5 on this scale were considered to be "shared" and those 0.5 or 
below, "distinctive". To assess whether living things were predominantly characterised 
by shared and correlated sensory features, and artefacts by distinctive features (for 
which form and function are correlated, such as <sharp> and <cut>), the following 
analysis was performed. The dependent measure was the number of statistically 
significant correlation coefficients between pairs of features for each word. Two 
different types of feature pairings were considered: "intracorrelation" (as described by 
Garrard et al.), the pairing between two features of the same type (sensory-sensory or 
functional-functional); and "intercorrelation", the pairing between features of different 
types (sensory-functional). Feature pairs were also divided into two conditions 
according to their overall distinctiveness (shared vs. distinctive features), thus allowing a 
2x2 factorial analysis of pairing type and distinctiveness. Separate analyses were carried 
out for animals and tools. The overall proportion of statistically significant correlations 
(correlations that differed from zero, alpha = .05) in this set was very low (animals = 60 
9.1%, tools = 8.4%, actions = 8.0%); proportion of significant correlations by condition 
is reported in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Average proportion of feature correlations that were statistically significant for animals, tools 
and actions as a function of featural distinctiveness and feature-correlation type, considering only sensory 
and functional features. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean (by feature pairs). 
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Animals had a small but significant tendency to have more correlation involving 
shared features than distinctive features (F(1,11) = 5.21, p = .03); however the effect of 
correlation-type was not significant, nor did the two factors interact (Fs < 1). For tools, 
instead, main effects of distinctiveness (more distinctive features than shared; F(1,11) = 
7.36, p = .020), as well as a main effect of correlation-type (more correlations within 
features of the same type than across feature types; F(1,11) = 6.90, p = .024), but no 
interaction between the two (F < 1), were observed. This replicates the general pattern 
found by Garrard et al.--more correlation among shared than distinctive features for 
animals, more correlation among distinctive than shared features for tools--but runs 
counter to the prediction that form-function correlations (intercorrelations) should be 
more prevalent in artefact domains. In addition to this contrast, animals and tools were 
directly compared, by comparing distinctive features for animals to distinctive features 
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for tools. Distinctive features for animals were more likely to be significantly correlated 
(8.3% of cases) than those for tools (7.3%), a significant difference (t(22) = 2.49, p = 
.021). 
To summarise, in the analyses reported above, some--but not all--of the 
differences that have been claimed to be important in determining concept organisation 
for different fields were observed. Within the object domain, living things differed from 
non-living things with respect to correlated features (more common for living than non-
living) but not with respect to the number of features and the number of shared 
features, as has been argued by other accounts (e.g. Tyler et al., 2000). Furthermore, 
despite methodological difference in feature collection methods, these analyses 
replicated the general finding by Garrard et al. (2001) that distinctive features of living 
things were more correlated than features (distinctive or not) of artefacts, contrary to 
the predictions of Tyler et al. (2000). Hence, this work does not support Tyler’s account 
of category specificity. 
Finally, contrasting the domains of objects and actions, as suggested by 
Huttenlocher and Lui (1979), the two were found to differ along the dimensions of 
feature numbers (richer representations for words referring to objects than words 
referring to actions) and proportion of correlated features (more for objects than for 
actions). However, objects and actions differed with respect to number or weight of 
shared features, depending on whether the analysis was fine-grained (considering shared 
features within semantic fields, where objects exhibited more shared features than 
actions) or more coarse-grained (ignoring semantic field differences, objects exhibited 
less shared features than actions overall). These findings emphasised the importance of 
differences in terms of correlated features between domains, and highlight the possible 
problems in considering only a single measure of similarity such as shared features, 
which may not adequately characterise the true semantic relations among items in a set. 62 
Chapter 4: Modelling the lexical-semantic level of representation 
 
The featural representations described in the previous chapter can perhaps best 
be described as representing conceptual knowledge - nonlinguistic mental 
representations of things, events, etc. However, as discussed in Chapter 1 there are 
compelling reasons to posit a distinction between conceptual and semantic 
representations. A way to conceptualise this distinction is to assume that only concepts 
have featural representations, and the lexical-semantic level of representation binds 
featural representations to serve language functions. This level, at least for concepts that 
are lexicalised in a language, serves to mediate between meaning, syntax and wordform. 
Representational architectures of this kind have been described in neural terms by 
Damasio et al. (2004) as convergence zones, which connect different brain areas 
responding to different streams of sensorimotor information. Such an architecture 
applied to the meanings of words would avoid the problems associated with theories 
which do not include a conceptual/semantic distinction (or which do not include 
separate organisation at these levels): only those concepts which are lexicalised would 
have representations at this lexical-semantic level, which could differ cross-linguistically. 
Further, the language-specific effects observed only in verbal tasks (e.g. Brysbaert et al., 
1998; Vigliocco et al., 2005; Kousta et al., in press) would arise at this lexical-semantic 
level of representation, leaving conceptual representations unaffected by linguistic 
differences. 
Conceptual basis of modelling 
  In the present study, properties of the speaker-generated features provide the 
basis for modelling semantic organisation. Note that this is importantly distinct from 
the features themselves, which are argued to represent conceptual information; 
properties of features concern their co-occurrence, patterns of correlation, and other 63 
aspects concerning their combination into the meanings of words. This general 
framework will henceforth be termed FUSS: Featural and Unitary Semantic Spaces: a 
conceptual representational space which is operationalised by the speaker-generated 
features themselves, and a semantic representational space derived from properties of 
similarity among words' featural content.
8 This latter space is obtained using a technique 
which does not require making a priori assumptions about which specific properties of 
features are responsible for characteristics of organisation at this level: self-organising 
maps (SOMs, Kohonen, 1997). This approach takes a multidimensional input and 
produce as output a lower-dimensionality space in which important relationships among 
entities in the input are preserved.  
Representing meaning with self-organising maps 
Self-organising maps are particularly well-suited for modelling lexical-semantic 
representations because they create a spatially-organised output network ("map") of 
units in an unsupervised manner based upon various differences between different 
representations in the input space without the need to identify which particular aspects 
of the input are important in determining similarity (Kohonen, 1997). Important 
elements of self-organising maps are first, the input vectors. Each input vector 
corresponds to a single concept to be represented by the output network, made up of 
numeric entries in an input space of high dimensionality. Sets of input vectors make up 
the training set, which represent the experience by which the model learns its 
representations. The output map is a low-dimensionality similarity space, intended to 
ultimately reflect similarity structure in the input space. Crucially, each unit in the output 
network is associated with two types of information: co-ordinates of its spatial location 
in the output map, and a prototype vector of equal dimensionality to the input. This  
                                                            
8 Reference in the text to the Unitary Semantic level of representation will often refer to "lexical-
semantics" as a reminder of the assumption that this level is separate from conceptual representation. 64 
serves the dual roles of vector projection (nonlinearly projecting an input space of high 
dimensionality to an output space of much lower dimensionality) and vector 
quantisation (providing a point estimate for a region in the input space). This is 
achieved via a training regimen which allows the system to develop through experience, 
adjusting the spatial coordinates on the output map so that concepts with similar input 
vectors appear on nearby regions on the map. Each training event consists of 
presentation of an input vector, which is compared to all prototype vectors. The one 
unit whose prototype vector is most similar to that input (according to Euclidean 
distance) is selected as the "winner", and the values of that prototype vector are 
adjusted in the direction of the input vector according to some function (typically a 
decreasing function which applies the greatest amount of change at the early stages of 
training and reduces to a small amount over the course of training). These adjustments, 
however, are not limited to the winning unit, but also extend to its spatial neighbours on 
the output map, the extent of adjustment depending upon a neighbourhood function 
which, again, typically reduces in size over the course of training. This reducing 
neighbourhood function serves to organise the output space coarsely in the early stages 
of training (reflecting the greatest regular differences in the input), and then gradually 
narrows its focus, thus reflecting finer degrees of similarity as training proceeds. Finally, 
each self-organising map is characterised by an initial state; the initial prototype vector 
for each location in the output map is initialised to a starting value. This reflects the 
state of affairs before any training has occurred. Typically this is done either by 
assigning random weights, or by applying some regular function related to two-
dimensional position.  
In this case, the multidimensional input is the 1029-dimension space defined by 
the number of features, with one vector for each of the 456 words in the feature set 
(thus each word can be considered as a point in a 1029-dimensional conceptual 65 
representation space), A two-dimensional output layer is taken to reflect the lexical-
semantic level of representation. Application of the SOM algorithms results in local 
clustering of words with shared features, emphasising those properties of features that 
are most crucial for distinguishing between features. Organisation occurs not only on 
the basis of whether words share features or not, but also on other properties of 
features such as the weights of features (higher weighted features have greater impact 
than lower weighted features), the distinctiveness of features (features shared by a large 
number of words have less impact than features shared by fewer words, although 
widely-shared features will have greater global impact), and co-occurrence of the 
features (features correlated with each other will offer mutual support to the 
development of the output map, while features that never co-occur may have opposite 
effects, not only upon each other, but also upon other features correlated to one but 
not the other). In short, the trained SOM output space reflects the combined influence 
of a number of properties of featural representations, and these properties need not be 
specified in advance (or even known). 
One concern about the use of SOMs involves the reduction of a space of high 
dimensionality into one of lower dimensionality is that the lower-dimensionality 
representation may result in coincidental proximity among concepts, especially because 
equal distances on the spatial map may not correspond to equal distances in prototype 
space. For example, consider the simple example of a linear sequence (1-2-3-4-5-…-n) 
mapped into two dimensions. Such a sequence can successfully be mapped into the bi-
dimensional space in any number of ways, provided that adjacent values are still 
adjacent in the final map. Figure 4 (see next page) illustrates two such cases. 
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Figure 4. Two possible configurations of the numeric sequence {1 ... 12}  
as it could be represented in a two-dimensional output space (4 x 3) 
 
1 2 3 4   12  11  2 3 
8 7 6 5   9 10  1 4 
9 10  11  12    8 7 6 5 
 
In both cases, the sequence was exactly preserved, but the constriction of the 
sequence into a two-dimensional space produced misleading conclusions about 
similarity of concepts in the space. In the example on the left, one might conclude from 
the spatial arrangement alone that 1 is equally similar to 2 and 8, more similar to 7 than 
to 3, etc. In the example on the right, instead, 1 is not at all similar to 8 but is instead 
equally similar to all members of the set {2, 4, 6, 10}. Such concerns can be reduced by 
starting with a large neighbourhood radius and gradually reducing the size of the 
training effects, thus serving to initially provide a very coarse-grained arrangement 
which reflects the most distinctive differences among the items in the training set (in the 
cases above, largest numbers vs. smallest numbers), and eventually capturing the finer 
qualities of the input set (e.g., local proximity between values adjacent on the number 
line). But this does not entirely eliminate such problems, especially when we consider 
cases more complex than the ordered numeric set illustrated above. However, if 
multiple SOMs are trained using the same input vectors, but using different (random) 
starting configurations of the output space, such coincidental (misleading) proximities 
will be reduced, while, instead, truly proximal concepts will remain proximal across 
output maps. Considering the examples in Figure 4 above, merely averaging across the 
two maps is enough to remove most of the coincidental proximities (e.g. the only 
immediate neighbours in common for 2 between the two maps are 1 and 3; the only 
common neighbours of 8 are 7 and 9) although a few instances still remain (e.g., these 
two maps together are not enough to rule out 7 and 10 as immediate neighbours). In 67 
order to avoid problems of this nature in estimating semantic similarity in feature-based 
maps, ensemble average distances were calculated: the similarity of two words was 
determined by the average of their Euclidean distances across multiple output maps. 
This allows a means of preserving the regular relations based upon featural contrasts 
and similarities (see Kohonen, 1997), and is analogous to averaging across speakers, 
each of whom has idiosyncratic relations among lexical concepts based on personal 
experience, but who share overall commonalities based on common reference and 
linguistic convention. 
Method 
Input data consisted of the 456 x 1029 (word x feature) weight matrix, and each 
of 100 output maps was defined as a rectangular space of 40x25 units, arranged in a 
rectangular lattice. This dimensionality was determined based on the two principal 
eigenvectors of the input data vectors, and number of units based upon the number of 
input vectors (Kohonen, 1997). Each unit on the output map is associated with a 1029-
dimension prototype vector associated with a (two-dimensional) location on the output 
map. These prototype vectors were initialised to random values, independently for each 
output map. Training was conducted using SOM Toolbox 2.0 
(http://www.cis.hut.fi/somtoolbox/) which implements self-organising maps 
(Kohonen et al., 1996) within MATLAB. There were two steps in the training of each 
map: first a "rough" step intended to be sensitive to the most salient distinctions, 
followed by a "fine" step to make more sensitive adjustments at a local level. The rule 
for adjusting weights is as follows: 
w(t+1) = w(t) + a(t)K(t) [x - w(t)] 
where w(t) is the weight at time t, [x(t) - w(t)] is the difference between vector w and 
the input vector x (constant over t), a(t) is the learning rate (here, defined as a linear 
decreasing function, in the rough phase beginning at 0.5 and in the fine phase beginning 68 
at 0.05, with an intercept of zero at ttotal+1 where ttotal is the number of training epochs 
in a given phase: 40 for the rough phase and 160 for the fine phase), K(t) is the 
Gaussian neighbourhood kernel function 
K =  exp (-d
2 / 2σ(t)
2 ) 
where d is the distance between a unit and the winner, and σ(t) is the neighbourhood 
radius at point t in time. Neighbourhood radius σ also decreases linearly: in the rough 
phase from 20 (half of the maximum map dimension) to 10, and in the fine phase from 
10 to 1. 
Each map was trained in batch mode, which means that all feature vectors were 
presented to it in a single epoch (rather than presenting one of the feature vectors and 
then adjusting the map based only on that item), and all adjustments based on the 
identification of the "winner" for each input vector and the application of the 
neighbourhood function were simultaneously applied at the end of a set of epochs 
(comprising one presentation of each feature vector). In essence, this means that each 
prototype vector is replaced with its weighted average over each of the input samples 
(i.e. one vector corresponding to each of the 456 words in the training set), where 
weights are assigned according to the neighbourhood function K above (given that the 
learning rate a(t) is constant for a single epoch). The use of batch mode thus minimises 
idiosyncratic fluctuations of the output map based on presentation order of the 
individual input vectors, and thus requires fewer training cycles to reach a stable 
configuration, similar to the end configuration resulting from randomly-ordered 
presentation of single vectors. It also has a significant advantage in the amount of 
time/computing resources required; batch mode requires only one application of the 
neighbourhood function for the entire set of words, vs. 456 applications if each word is 
presented individually. 69 
Once the fine training phase was complete, the output map was considered to 
be complete.
9 Each map was then labelled with the words in the training set: whichever 
unit was most similar to a given input vector was labelled with the corresponding word. 
Euclidean distances between all possible pairs of words were calculated, giving a 
measure of word-word similarity for that map
10. Once this was complete, a composite 
distance measure was obtained, by averaging distances for each word pair across all 100 
maps. This distance measure serves as an estimate of semantic (dis)similarity based on 
characteristics of the featural input, and thus provides the basis for evaluating the 
lexical-semantic representations arising under the FUSS model as described above. 
Global and local properties of this lexical-semantic space will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
                                                            
9 This procedure was judged to be sufficient based on visual inspection of the first few maps created with 
these parameters, which appeared to suitably reflect semantic similarity, at least according to intuition. In 
subsequent chapters this will be assessed more formally. 
10 In a few cases, a single unit in the output map could be the best matching unit for more than one input 
vector. In this event, that unit was given multiple labels, and the distance between them was zero. Such 
cases can be considered "true synonyms", i.e. indistinguishable according to that particular map. 70 
Chapter 5: Properties of the lexical-semantic space in FUSS. 
 
Given the transformation of the speaker-generated features into a composite 
semantic similarity space as described in the previous chapter, it is first necessary to 
establish that the resulting representations actually do reflect semantic similarity. In 
other words, assessing whether words with similar meanings are close to each other, and 
words with dissimilar meanings are far apart. This serves as the most basic test of FUSS, 
because any acceptable model of semantics must be able to capture the gross distinction 
between related or unrelated words. Since independently-obtained measures of semantic 
similarity for the items included in the present set were unavailable, it was necessary to 
start by assessing whether the organisation of this space conforms to intuition about 
which items should be similar to each other and which should not (this will be 
complemented with behavioural evidence in subsequent chapters). This question about 
organisation will be examined at a number of levels of specificity, ranging from 
similarity among words, to similarity among semantic fields, to similarity across the 
object and action domains. Analysis of the clustering performance of nouns referring to 
actions will also reveal the relationship between grammatical class and semantic 
representation. This is an important question because many studies investigating 
grammatical class distinctions between nouns and verbs have conflated this grammatical 
class distinction with the semantic distinction between objects and actions (see Vinson 
& Vigliocco, 2002; Vigliocco, Vinson, Arciuli & Barber, 2008).  
 
Contrasting semantic fields 
The first analyses tested whether sets of words of the same (intuitively 
designated) semantic field are near each other and distant from members of other 
semantic fields in FUSS lexical-semantic representation space. These analyses also 71 
indirectly provide information concerning proximity among semantic fields (i.e., groups 
of words related in meaning according to the similarity space) to evaluate whether the 
clustering patterns between semantic fields reflect (intuitive) semantic similarity. These 
analyses were conducted separately for words referring to objects and verbs referring to 
actions (for now, excluding nouns referring to actions). 
Here, the average semantic distance between words from a given field (e.g., all 
possible pairings involving two words referring animals) was compared to the average 
semantic distance between those exemplars and exemplars from other fields (e.g., all 
possible pairings involving one word referring to an animal, and one word from another 
semantic field). If FUSS semantic similarity measures reflect this kind of category-level 
similarity, the within-field distances should be much less than cross-field distances. 
Distances for object fields are reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. OBJECTS. Average distance between exemplars of the same semantic field, and between 
exemplars of different semantic fields (standard deviations in brackets). Distances are measured in 
arbitrary units based on ensemble averages of maps with dimensions 40x25 units. All within vs. between 
comparisons are significant using independent-samples t-tests; p < .001(one-tailed).  
 
Within-field distance    Between-field distance 
______________________________________________________________ 
Semantic field: 
fruit/vegetable       7.0 (3.4)      23.0 (1.7) 
body parts      16.0 (6.0)      18.7 (2.7) 
animals         6.1 (2.9)      20.5 (1.6) 
clothing        4.2 (1.8)     20.7  (1.2) 
tools          9.9 (3.4)      19.5 (2.2) 
vehicles        8.6 (5.8)      21.0 (2.3) 
other artefacts     12.0 (4.8)      19.3 (3.1) 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
In all of these cases, the average distance between exemplars of a single semantic field 
was significantly lower than distances between exemplars of different semantic fields, 
suggesting that distances are capturing properties of family resemblance associated with 
these semantic fields. This was so even for less-coherent fields. For example, body parts 72 
were highly segregated into subfields, distinguishing between facial parts and 
limbs/extremities, which had very few features in common. Similarly, "other artefacts" 
included items of furniture; parts of buildings like wall, ceiling, floor; and other items such 
as bomb, book, box which are difficult to classify at a finer level. Nonetheless, these items 
were overall more similar to each other than to exemplars from other object semantic 
fields. The same analysis was carried out for action fields, as reported in Table 4. 
Table 4. ACTIONS. Average distance between exemplars of the same semantic field, and between 
exemplars of different semantic fields (standard deviations in brackets). Distances are measured in 
arbitrary units based on ensemble averages of maps with dimensions 40x25 units. All within vs. between 
comparisons are significant using independent-samples t-tests; p < .001(one-tailed). 
 
Within-field distance    Between-field distance 
______________________________________________________________ 
Semantic field: 
body action       16.4 (4.1)      18.1 (3.6) 
body sense      14.6 (3.6)      18.4 (2.4) 
change location      7.7 (3.2)      15.4 (1.9) 
change state        8.4 (3.7)      15.0 (2.1) 
communicate        9.8 (3.5)      16.7 (2.8) 
construct        5.9 (2.3)      16.0 (1.4) 
contact         6.5 (3.4)      16.3 (1.2) 
cook          5.4 (3.2)      19.5 (1.0) 
destroy         9.3 (4.4)      15.4 (2.4) 
exchange        5.7 (3.3)      16.7 (1.5) 
light emission        9.2 (6.1)      19.1 (1.6) 
motion direction      7.9 (2.6)      15.3 (1.8) 
motion manner    11.0 (3.7)      17.0 (2.3) 
noise          6.1 (2.5)      19.6 (1.5) 
noise animal        4.0 (2.1)      20.7 (0.7) 
tool action      10.4 (4.0)      17.2 (2.2) 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
As was the case for the object fields, within-field distance measures were significantly 
different from the between-field measures for every field listed. Again, this was even the 
case for the less coherent fields such as ‘body actions’, a somewhat generic semantic 
field encompassing verbs such as inhale,  inject, itch, lick, retch, sit, spit, wash; or ‘body 
senses’, including disparate sensory verbs such as feel, hear, listen, look, smell (see Appendix 
A for a full set of items and their semantic field labels), reflecting the fact that even 73 
these kinds of words were somewhat semantically clustered, and roughly separable from 
other action verbs as a whole. 
  Interestingly, the between-field distances for words referring to actions were 
notably smaller than between-field distances for words referring to objects. This is 
because action fields tended to be close to each other, while this was hardly ever the 
case for object fields (also illustrated in the analyses of shared features and shared 
feature weights reported in Chapter 3). For example, noises and animal noises were 
separated by an average of only six units, change of location and direction of motion by 
only nine, change of location and change of state by 10, tool action and construction by 
10, manner and direction of motion by 11, destroy and change of state by 12, exchange 
and change of location by 12, animal noise and communication by 15. For object fields, 
the most similar classes were body parts and clothing (15), tools and miscellaneous 
artefacts (16), animals and body parts (17), vehicles and tools (18). These relationships 
among relatively proximal semantic fields make intuitive sense, but this will be formally 
tested (at least for certain semantic fields) in the behavioural experiment reported in 
Chapter 8. 
Figure 5 (see next page) illustrates the general tendency for object semantic 
fields to be more strongly differentiated from each other than action semantic fields. A 
clear category division is observed between “fruits and vegetables”, while actions 
involving exchange blend into “communication” (exchange of information) which in 
turn blend into “manner of communication”, which in turn blend into “non-
communicative sounds”. Importantly, in both cases local proximity remains consistent 
with intuitive judgements of similarity. 
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Figure 5. Two-dimensional projection of semantic similarity space for fruit and vegetables (left panel) and 
selected words referring to actions (right panel). Distances between words reflect degree of semantic 
(dis)similarity. 
 
 
 
The different patterns of similarity for words referring to objects and words referring to 
actions are consistent with claims that have been made about the differences between 
the lexical-semantic organisation of objects and actions as discussed in Chapter 1. The 
words referring to objects in the model are organised categorically, with few 
intermediate exemplars (for example, onions and potatoes, which seem to form a 
separate subcategory from the majority of other vegetables, and watermelon which is 
somewhat distinct from other fruits), while category boundaries were shown to be 
essentially meaningless for the words referring to actions depicted above. 
Contrasting objects and actions 
Another crucial question is the extent to which words referring to actions and 
words referring to objects are separable in FUSS lexical-semantic similarity space. 
Because objects and actions are different in so many ways (e.g., objects refer to an 
identifiable entity and actions express inter-entity activities; they fulfil different 75 
sentential functions; they differ in interconceptual organisation, Graesser et al., 1987; 
Huttenlocher & Lui, 1979) it is important to demonstrate that they are also separable in 
lexical-semantic space. Were this most basic distinction not reflected in the organisation 
at this level, it would cast doubt upon FUSS even if it proves able to capture fine-
grained similarity. 
In a first analysis, semantic field proximities were calculated across the 
object/action divide, with special attention paid to those object and action fields that 
were shown to be close to each other. Fruit/vegetables were close to cooking (average 
distance 15 units), and tools were close to tool actions (11 units), construction (12 
units), and destruction (16 units). These proximities were almost entirely due to item-
specific proximity between words referring to tools and their most closely associated 
actions (e.g. to shovel was close to the hoe and the shovel; to drill was close to the drill, etc.), 
but almost none of these actions was as close to its most associated object than that 
object was to other related objects (e.g. the hoe was 4.4 units from to hoe, but only 2.4 
units from the broom and the rake; the drill was 3.1 units from to drill, but only 2.2 units 
from the screwdriver, 2.3 from the wrench). 
In order to gain a more general view of the space as a whole, the semantic 
distances between all words of a particular pairing type in the similarity space (see Table 
5 below) were calculated, to see whether words referring to objects and words referring 
to actions exhibit similarity effects that would distinguish between the two domains, 
despite the wide range of concepts included in each. These comparisons also included 
the set of nouns referring to actions, in order to test whether these words' 
representations follow their grammatical class (in which case they should be most 
similar to nouns referring to objects) or their semantic content (in which case they 
should be most similar to verbs referring to actions). 
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Table 5. Average word-word distances in semantic similarity space, within and across category. Distances 
are measured in arbitrary units based on ensemble averages of maps with dimensions 40x25 units 
(standard deviations in brackets) 
 
Grammatical class comparison  
    Noun-noun   Noun-verb   Verb-verb 
Average distance      19.88 (4.05)    19.53(2.91)    16.12 (3.95) 
 
Semantic classification comparison (Within class) 
   Object  noun   Action  noun   Action  verb 
Average  distance    18.90  (4.90)   15.94  (4.95)   16.12  (3.95) 
  
Semantic classification comparison (Between class) 
    Object  N-action  N Object  N-action  V Act.N-act.  V 
Average  distance    21.91  (2.54)   20.70  (2.67)   16.53  (4.26) 
  
 
First, the comparison between all nouns referring to objects and verbs referring 
to actions (169 objects and 216 actions) showed a distinction between these two groups 
of words. The average word-word distances (derived from ensemble average distances 
across the 100 self-organising maps with dimension 40x25, as described in Chapter 4) 
were 19.82 units within object-nouns (a total of 14,196 unique combinations of two 
object-nouns), 16.55 units within action-verbs (23,220 unique combinations of two 
action-verbs), and 20.35 units between action-verbs and object-nouns (36,504 possible 
pairings between one action-verb and one object-noun in the set). Action-verbs were 
more similar to other action-verbs than object-nouns were to other object-nouns; 
independent sample t-tests comparing the 14,196 object-object pairings to the 23,220 
action-action pairings revealed a significant difference (t(37414) = 57, p < .0001). This 
difference may have resulted from the differences in distances between semantic fields, 
with object-nouns tending to be more segregated into specific categories than action-
verbs. The average distance between object-nouns and action-verbs (36,504 such pairs) 
was greater than either within-group average distance (within-object vs object-action 77 
t(50,698) = 21, p < .0001; within-action vs. object-action t(59,722) = 106, p < .0001), 
demonstrating that the object-noun/action-verb distinction is reflected in the similarity 
space. This is a particularly important finding given the importance of this distinction in 
tasks involving meaning (Vigliocco, Vinson, Woolfe, Dye and Woll, 2005). 
Investigating grammatical class: nouns referring to actions 
Next, measures of semantic distances were used to calculate the extent to which 
grammatical class is reflected in FUSS. Grammatical class is one of the best candidates 
for being a language universal, and some researchers have claimed that grammatical 
class distinctions are emergent from semantic distinctions, beginning with the 
correspondence between objects and nouns on one hand, and actions and verbs on the 
other (e.g. Bates & MacWhinney, 1982, Elman, 2003). This would suggest that nouns 
and verbs should be semantically distinct from one another, a difference that should be 
reflected in behavioural tasks as well as neural organisation. Numerous studies in 
cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology (reviewed in 
Vigliocco, Barber, Vinson, Druks & Cappa, in prep) have investigated this question by 
comparing performance of various impaired and unimpaired populations on tasks 
involving nouns and verbs, often showing substantial differences between the two. 
However, a majority of such studies fail to tease apart the grammatical class distinction 
between nouns and verbs from the conceptual distinction between objects and actions, 
so it is often unclear whether these findings are related to grammatical class or some 
other conceptual factor (see Vinson & Vigliocco, 2002; Vigliocco, Barber, Vinson, 
Druks & Cappa, in prep, for further discussion). In fact, the few studies of grammatical 
class that do control for conceptual factors have typically shown that grammatical class 
differences for nouns and verbs are not observed for tasks involving processing of 
(uninflected) single words (e.g. Chiarello, Liu, Shears & Kacinik, 2002; Vigliocco, 
Vinson, Arciuli & Barber, 2008; Vigliocco, Warren, Siri, Arcuili, Scott, & Wise, 2006). 78 
This suggests that, contrary to views in which grammatical class is emergent from 
semantics, this might only be true for the strong correspondence between objects and 
nouns and not more generally of grammatical class. This question is examined through 
analysis of similarity within the lexical-semantic level of FUSS. 
In order to do this, it was necessary to focus upon a set of words for which the 
(grammatical) distinction between nouns and verbs does not also correspond to the 
(semantic) distinction between objects and actions: nouns referring to actions such as 
the blink and the scream. The question asked was whether action-nouns are more similar 
to other object-nouns than to their action-verb counterparts (to blink and to scream). If 
grammatical class per se is an organising principle that goes beyond the semantic 
distinction between objects and actions, or if grammatical class is emergent from 
semantics, action-nouns should exhibit more similarity to object-nouns than to action-
verbs. This could be expressed at various levels of specificity, ranging from the broadest 
(action-nouns should cluster among object-nouns and not among action-verbs) to the 
finest (action-nouns should exhibit a tendency to cluster among other action-nouns 
compared to similar action-verbs). 
Considering all nouns together (object-nouns and action-nouns), the average 
within-grammatical class distances were 20.16 units for nouns (compared with only 
16.55 for the verbs) . Moreover, the average distance between all noun-verb pairs was 
19.49, a value significantly smaller than the average distance between pairs of object-
nouns (t(66,034) = 7.332, p < .0001). This may be surprising until we consider the 
greater extent to which different categories of words referring to objects are 
distinguished from each other, while words referring to actions are much less separate 
(as illustrated by analyses of shared features and shared feature weights described in 
Chapter 3, and the analysis of distances between different semantic fields reported 
earlier in this chapter). By adding action-nouns to the set of object-nouns, the within-79 
grammatical class coherence for the nouns was further reduced (and it was already fairly 
limited due to the categorical distinctions among object-nouns) and the difference 
between nouns and verbs was reduced. A follow-up distance analysis that compared 
distances within the class of action-nouns (17.40 units) to distances between action-
nouns and verbs (17.33), and between action-nouns and object-nouns (20.39) showed 
that action-nouns were significantly closer to each other than to object-nouns (t(14,482) 
= 43, p < .0001), and were no closer to each other than to verbs despite the huge 
number of comparisons and resulting power to detect even small differences (t(17,819) 
= 0.554, p = .579). This shows that action-nouns are (semantically) more similar to 
action-verbs (in fact, indistinguishable from them in this type of analysis) than to object-
nouns; that is, the semantic characteristics of actions vs. objects are responsible for the 
patterns of semantic similarity in FUSS, while grammatical class (verbs vs. nouns) does 
not have semantic consequences. 
To further measure the extent to which action-nouns' representations are more 
similar to action-verbs than to object-nouns, distances of action-verb/ action-noun 
pairs (e.g. to blink/the blink,  to construct/the construction) were examined. If there is 
correspondence between grammatical class and semantic similarity, action-nouns' 
representations should be closer to object-nouns in the similarity space than their 
minimal-paired action-verbs (e.g. the blink/to blink; the construction/to construct). To test this 
prediction, the average distance between a given action-noun and all object-nouns was 
calculated and compared to the distance between the corresponding action-verbs and all 
object-nouns. This measured the extent to which action-nouns are perceived as being 
closer to the centre of mass of the "object-noun space" than action-verbs. Because the 
measures of distance were so similar (reflecting the fact that action-nouns are 
represented very near their verb counterparts), non-parametric sign tests were used to 
test for the presence of any effect of grammatical class. Of the 71 action-noun/action-80 
verb pairs, nouns were nearer to the object-nouns 36 times; and verbs was nearer 31 
times (with 4 ties); a nonsignificant difference (sign test p = .625).  
These results seem to indicate that grammatical class does not have semantic 
consequences, at least for this set of action-nouns. However, it may be possible that 
grammatical class effects are observed in a more subtle manner rather than being 
reflected in some kind of semantic properties common to all nouns. Properties of the 
semantic similarity space may preclude action-nouns from being represented near the 
object space because of intervening concepts, but some kind of nounlike characteristics 
within a semantic field might still be observable. In order to investigate this possibility, 
one more analysis of semantic distance was conducted to investigate whether effects of 
grammatical class could be observed within semantic fields referring to actions of 
different kinds. Here, only sets of action words within semantic fields were investigated. 
If grammatical class has consequences for semantic similarity, action-nouns should 
generally be closer to the action-noun member of a (different) action-noun/action-verb 
pair. For example, the action-noun the request should be closer to the demand than it is to 
to demand, to demand should be closer to to request than the request, and so on. In order to 
provide minimal semantic contrasts, only the following sets of words that 
unambiguously represented the same narrow semantic fields were selected: direction of 
motion (ascent/ascend  vs.  descent/descend); eye action (blink,  squint,  wink), noises (clang, 
clatter,  crackle), light emission (flicker,  glow,  shine,  sparkle), communication (demand, 
plea/plead,  request,  suggest/suggestion), vocal noises (scream,  screech,  shout,  yell), facial 
expressions (frown, smile), body action (pull, push), and exchange (trade, exchange, loan). 
Within each field, distances were compared between each action-noun/action-verb pair 
and the other nouns and verbs only within each subset. Again non-parametric sign tests 
were used to test whether nouns tended to be closer to other nouns than to the 
corresponding verbs, and whether verbs tended to be closer to other verbs than to the 81 
corresponding nouns. Action-nouns were closer to other action-nouns in the same field 
in 15 comparisons, and to same-field verbs 14 times (1 tie), a non-significant difference 
(p > .90). A similar pattern appeared for verbs. Verbs were closer to the verb member 
of a pair 14 times, and closer to the noun 15 times. In short, there was no tendency for 
action-nouns to be semantically segregated from their action-verb counterparts: nouns 
and verbs appear to cluster together irrespective of grammatical class. 
Taken together, the above results present a picture of the semantic similarity 
space obtained from the speaker-generated features which is highly consistent with 
intuitive judgements of semantic similarity, ranging from coarse-grained distinctions 
between objects and actions; to distinctions of moderate grain such as the segregation 
between different semantic fields: object-noun categories like fruit/vegetables, vehicles, 
animals, and action fields like cooking, light/heat emission, sounds, to fine-grained 
distinctions such as farm animals vs. wild animals vs. small mammals. They also reveal 
that the patterns of similarity among speaker-generated features are not related to 
grammatical class: action-nouns were not distinguished from action-verbs, and both 
were separable from object-nouns. This finding is in contrast with any account by which 
grammatical class has a conceptual or semantic basis. 
These comparisons between distance measures in FUSS semantic similarity 
space and independently obtained semantic field relations reveal the utility of the 
dimensionality reduction techniques used in FUSS: similarity relations are respected, 
from very broad distinctions such as the divide between words referring to objects and 
to actions, down to very fine-level properties of similarity such as the semantic 
proximity of apple, pear, peach; or get, receive, acquire. However, a much more crucial test of 
the value of these measures is the extent to which they predict performance in 
behavioural tasks which are sensitive to semantic similarity, which will be addressed in 
the following chapters. 82 
Chapter 6: Predicting fine-grained behavioural effects using measures of similarity from 
FUSS 
 
The previous chapters have described properties of speaker-generated features 
and the development of FUSS, a model of lexical representation based upon them. 
Although the properties of the features in the conceptual level of FUSS and of the 
resulting semantic space are consistent with previous claims about semantic 
composition, and with intuitive notions of categories and similarity, a more direct test of 
FUSS is necessary. If the semantic similarity measures obtained from FUSS are indeed 
psychologically real, they should be able to make fine-grained predictions of semantic 
effects in behavioural tasks. That is, they should go beyond previous studies by showing 
that semantically-related words produce measurable effects compared to unrelated 
words (for example, the oft-replicated semantic priming effect), and more importantly, 
by predicting how such effects are modulated by the degree of semantic similarity.  
  Of crucial interest at this stage is the relative predictive power of the semantic 
distance measures in domains of objects and actions. In the previous chapters it became 
clear that both can be represented in this framework, but it remains to be seen whether 
these representational assumptions benefit words referring to objects and words 
referring to actions similarly. While graded semantic effects within the object domain 
are predicted by most models of semantic organisation, it is not clear whether this 
would be the case for the action domain, given that most models to date do not deal 
with this domain of knowledge. So in addition to testing for graded behavioural effects 
of the semantic distance measures in comprehension and production of words referring 
to objects, of critical interest will be the ability of the semantic distance measures to 
predict performance for words referring to actions.  83 
Two complementary behavioural methodologies will be used to this end. One 
tests the effects of fine-grained semantic similarity in comprehension on the degree of 
semantic priming in a lexical decision task (Experiment 1: objects, Experiment 2: 
actions), and the second tests the degree of semantic interference in picture naming 
(Experiment 3: objects, Experiment 4: actions). Both sets of experiments will test, first, 
whether FUSS can predict graded semantic effects for words referring to objects, and, 
second, whether the same patterns of results are obtained for words referring to actions. 
 
LEXICAL DECISION: SEMANTIC PRIMING 
Semantic priming refers to the robust finding that speakers respond faster to a 
target word when preceded by a semantically related word than when it is preceded by 
an unrelated word (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; see Neely, 1991 for a review). The 
phenomenon of semantic priming has been extensively investigated because it arises in 
a largely automatic manner, and has been considered to reflect the organisation of 
semantic memory (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Cree, McRae & 
McNorgan, 1999; McRae & Boisvert, 1998). Cree et al. (1999) and McRae and Boisvert 
(1998), have shown that categorical priming (i.e., words from the same semantic 
category such as jar-bottle; subway-bus; raft-canoe) can be observed even when those 
words are not associated, if the related items are selected on the basis of empirically 
obtained measures of semantic similarity, showing that such effects are not simply the 
product of word association reflected indirectly through speaker-generated features. 
Further, semantic priming effects appear to be symmetrical (e.g. turkey primes goose as 
much as goose primes turkey; McRae & Boisvert, 1998), consistent with the assumptions 84 
underlying the semantic distance model employed in FUSS, e.g., that a single distance 
measure between turkey and goose predicts behavioural effects in both directions.
11  
In this section two experiments are reported. Experiment 1 replicates previous 
work for words referring to objects, given measures of semantic distance from FUSS. 
Most importantly, however, this experiment goes beyond previous work, in that FUSS 
distances are not only used to distinguish between related and unrelated words, but also 
at a finer level, assessing the role of fine-grained degree of similarity among words that 
are somewhat related in meaning. Graded effects of meaning similarity are predicted 
under most theories of semantic representation, but to date there have been only a 
limited number studies of semantic priming which have explored this possibility using 
single words.
12. Experiment 2 extends the investigation to the action domain, applying 
exactly the same methodology but using different items and participants. With respect 
to words referring to actions, most studies tend to investigate verbs in phrase or 
sentence contexts, and/or priming effects across grammatical classes (for example, 
broom-sweep) rather than priming from one action-verb to another (see Vigliocco, 
Vinson, Arciuli & Barber, 2008, for discussion) Only a few studies have reported 
semantic priming effects for verb-verb pairs (Rösler, Streb & Haan, 2001;Vigliocco et 
al., 2008; see also Bushell & Martin, 1997), and only using synonymous prime-target 
pairs (Bushell & Martin; Rösler et al.) or at least highly related pairs (Vigliocco et al.). 
The present study, therefore, will establish whether semantic priming effects for words 
                                                            
11 Importantly, asymmetrical priming results can be observed when the relationship between words is 
primarily associative rather than semantic (e.g. Najmi & Wegner, 2008). It remains to be seen 
whether asymmetrical, purely semantic priming can be observed. If so, this would require a different 
set of processing assumptions than those employed here. 
12 Certain studies of morphological and phonological priming effects also embed items varying in 
semantic relatedness (in terms of the extent to which two words sharing the same stem or letter string 
are semantically related to each other), showing similar graded effects (e.g. Gonnerman, Seidenberg 
& Andersen, 2007). However, these studies typically focus upon gradation among words sharing 
orthographic or phonological overlap, with goals related to testing different account of morphology, 
while the present studies approach lexical-semantic representations across words typically without 
morphological or orthographic overlap. 85 
referring to actions can be observed when prime and target are not synonyms, similarly 
to priming effects that have been repeatedly reported for nouns referring to objects.  
 
Experiment 1: Objects 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-four native English speakers from the UCL community
13 
participated in this study and received £3 for their participation. All participants 
reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Nine participants who had high 
error rates (>10%) or extremely slow response times (> 3 SD's from other participants) 
were replaced. 
Materials. Target items were selected from the list of words included in FUSS, 
and meeting various other restrictions as follows. First, target words and primes were all 
nouns depicting concrete objects, and were matched as closely as possible for verbal 
frequency, number of letters, and had minimal orthographic or phonological overlap 
with the target word. Primes were selected to be (1) very close to the target word 
(operationalised as word-word semantic distances in FUSS between 1.5 and 4.5), for 
example dagger – sword; (2) close (distances between 4.5 and 7.5), for example dagger – 
razor; (3) medium (distances between 7.5 to 10.5), for example, dagger - hammer; and (4) 
far (distances between 18 to 22), for example, dagger - tongue. Verbal frequency (Kucera 
& Francis, 1967) did not differ across conditions (average frequencies were 41.7 in the 
very close condition (SD = 16.7), 40.9 (14.6) for close, 41.5 (16.4) for medium and 42.0 
(15.9) for far; ANOVA revealed that the four conditions did not significantly differ in 
                                                            
13 Experiments 1-5 all included participants with various language backgrounds who reported their 
native language as English, and that they did not speak any other language fluently. Most of these 
participants spoke British English, but all experiments included some participants with other English 
backgrounds (Australia/New Zealand being most common, followed by US/Canada, and a few others 
such as South Africa and Singapore). Because these participants did not behave measurably 
differently from the British English speakers, their results were combined in all analyses reported. 86 
terms of item frequencies: F(3, 93) < 0.1), nor in terms of length in letters (average 
length = 4.97, 5.19, 5.09, and 4.97 respectively: F(3,93) < 0.1). See Appendix B for a 
complete list of items used in the experiment.  
  Four lists were prepared from the experimental items, such that each target 
word appeared only once in a given list, and each prime word also appeared only once 
(although a single prime could appear for different targets across lists). Each list 
contained eight prime-target pairs from each of the four. There were altogether 32 
experimental items in each list. 
  The experimental items were presented within the context of a large number of 
filler items including 40 noun-noun prime-target pairs (all selected to be unrelated at an 
intuitive level), and 72 verb-verb prime-target pairs. The large number of filler trials was 
selected based on previous semantic priming studies, as one way to avoid the possibility 
that priming effects may occur due to strategies (see Neely, 1991). An equal number of 
word prime - nonword targets were also included. Each nonword was created by taking 
a noun or verb not appearing elsewhere in the experiment and altering one letter, such 
that the resulting string was orthographically acceptable but was not a real word. Each 
word and nonword appeared no more than once for each participant. The resulting 
prime-target pairs were combined in a pseudorandom order such that each test item was 
separated from the next by at least two fillers.  
 Procedure. Participants were told that the experiment focused upon word 
identification processes, and that they would see a variety of words or nonwords, and 
their task was to indicate by button press whether a presented letter string was a word 
or not. "Word" responses were always made with the right hand, and "nonword" 
responses with the left. Participants were urged to respond as quickly as possible while 
trying to minimize errors. All item presentation and data collection used IBM PC-
compatible computers running E-Prime software (Schneider et al., 2002). An initial 87 
practice set of 20 single-word trials ensured that the participants understood the lexical-
decision task. The instructions then advised the participants that they would briefly see 
a word presented immediately before the target word or nonword, and they should 
attempt to ignore the prime word if possible, responding only to the target. Both the 
practice trials and experimental trials followed the same presentation mode: a central 
fixation point was displayed for 800 ms, followed by the prime word for 67 ms, 
followed by the target word, which remained on the screen until the participant pressed 
a button, followed by a 300ms blank interval. The short SOA between prime and target 
display (67 ms) was selected on the basis of previous studies showing that long SOAs 
permit strategic responding, and on the basis of a pilot study showing that a 67 ms SOA 
was sufficient to produce semantic priming (related vs. unrelated). The next trial began 
immediately thereafter. Every 100 trials the participant had the opportunity to take a 
short break. Reaction times and accuracy were recorded for each trial. 
At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed, with particular 
attention paid to whether they noticed any relationship between targets and primes. 
Those participants who noticed a relationship tended to focus upon the phonological 
similarity between filler targets and primes, or upon the wordlike properties of the 
nonword target items. No participants reported noticing any similarity in meaning 
between targets and primes. 
Design and data analysis. The critical dependent measure was the time to 
respond, indicating that a critical target is indeed a word. Errors were recorded (false 
"nonword" responses to target words) and analysed separately. The independent 
variable was the semantic distance between target and prime, which was manipulated 
within (target) items and within subjects. The effects of semantic distance upon lexical 
decision reaction time were subjected to one-way ANOVA by subjects and items, with 
the linear trend component of particular interest. Trend analysis was performed using 88 
contrast coefficients weighted on the basis of the semantic distances, both with subjects 
and items as random factors. 
 
Results 
  Participants' responses to the critical items were highly accurate, an overall 
accuracy above 98%. Correct reaction times, averaged by condition are reported in 
Table 6 (standard errors of the mean in brackets) along with error frequencies.  
Table 6. Average lexical decision latencies (RT, in ms; standard error of the mean in brackets) and error 
percentages as a function of semantic distance between target and prime. Experiment 1 (objects). 
__________________________________________________________ 
Semantic Distance  Response latencies    Error rate (%) 
_______________ ________________    _____________ 
Very close    548 [ 8.1]      1.8 [1.2] 
Close      557 [ 9.3]      1.5 [1.1] 
Medium    567 [ 9.1]       1.8 [1.3] 
Far      572 [ 9.8]       1.3 [1.1] 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Reaction times. Reaction times for correct responses were collapsed by subjects 
and then by items, and subjected to a one-way analysis of variance. The reaction times 
were submitted to an omnibus analysis of variance, which was significant both by 
subjects and items (F1(3,189) = 6.56, p < .001; F2(3,93) = 5.23, p < .001) This was 
followed up by testing the linear trend using contrast coefficients [-1.3, -0.7, -0.1, 2.1] 
corresponding to the average distances between target and distracters [very close, close, 
medium, far], reflecting decreased priming as distance increased. This linear trend was 
significant both by subjects and items (F1(1,61) = 5.21, p = .026; F2(1,31) = 4.48, p = 
.042). Orthogonal quadratic and quintic trends were also tested: quadratic term, 
although significant by items, was only marginally significant by subjects: F1(1,61) = 
2.99, p = .089, F2(1,31) = 4.26, p = .048; quintic term was nonsignificant either by 
subjects or by items F1(1,61) = 1.79, p = .196, F2(1,31) = 1.62, p = .213. These results 89 
indicate that priming effects were modulated by the semantic distance measures 
obtained from speaker-generated features.  
 Errors. Errors did not occur differently for primes from different semantic 
distances (all Fs<1). 
Discussion  
The main result from this experiment is the finding that the semantic distance 
measures modulated the amount of priming observed for words referring to objects. 
These results replicate and extend what has previously been reported by McRae and 
Boisvert (1998) and Cree et al. (1999) who also used speaker-generated feature norms to 
simulate priming effects within attractor network models. The novel finding here is that 
such an effect is modulated by the feature-based measure of semantic distance, a result 
consistent with the notion that fine-grained differences in similarity measures reflect 
gradations in semantic similarity. Next, a parallel experiment was conducted in the 
action domain to assess whether this is also true for this very different semantic domain. 
 
Experiment 2: Actions 
Method 
Participants. Forty-eight native English speakers from the UCL community 
participated in this study and received £3 for their participation. All participants 
reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Four participants who had high 
error rates (>10%) or extremely slow response times (> 3 SD's from other participants) 
were replaced. 
 Materials. Target and prime verbs were selected on the basis of the same 
distance criteria as Experiment 1. Verbal frequency did not differ across conditions 
(average frequencies from Kucera and Francis (1967) were 62.5 (SD = 28.5) in the very 
close condition, 52.9 (26.7) for close, 57.9 (25.4) for medium and 60.0 (28.1) for far; 90 
ANOVA revealed these conditions did not significantly differ: F(3, 93) < 0.5), nor did 
length in letters (average length = 4.9, 4.9, 4.8 and 4.8 respectively, significantly different 
from each other: F(3,93) < 0.1). See Appendix C for a complete list of items used in the 
experiment.  
Four experimental lists were prepared as in Experiment 1. The experimental 
items were presented within the context of a large number of filler items. In order to 
ensure that targets and primes were interpreted as verbs, filler items consisted of 
unambiguous verbs (not having a noun homonym) or words with verb-dominant 
frequency of use. There were 112 such verb-verb prime-target filler pairs (all intuitively 
"unrelated"). An equal number of word prime - nonword targets were included. 
Nonwords (based on verbs) were created in the same manner as in Experiment 1.The 
procedure, design and data analyses were also exactly the same as in Experiment 1.  
 
Results 
  Participants performed the task with a high rate of accuracy (error rate for target 
items = 3.5%). Correct RTs were averaged across semantic distance by subjects and 
items; see Table 7 for response latencies and error rates. 
 
Table 7. Average lexical decision latencies (RT, in ms; standard error of the mean in brackets) and error 
percentages as a function of semantic distance between target and prime. Experiment 2 (actions). 
__________________________________________________________ 
Semantic Distance  Response latencies    Error rate (%) 
_______________ ________________    _____________ 
Very close    602 [8.6]      3.6 [1.9] 
Close    613  [8.9]    3.1  [1.7] 
Medium   627  [9.4]      4.0  [2.0] 
Far      636 [10.0]       3.3 [1.8] 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Reaction times. Reaction times for correct responses were collapsed by subjects 
and then by items, and subjected to a one-way omnibus analysis of variance. The effect 91 
of semantic distance was significant by subjects and items (F1(3,141) = 5.01, p = .002; 
F2(3, 93) = 6.96, p < .001) As in Experiment 1 this omnibus test was followed up by 
trend analysis, with the linear trend as the measure of interest. This trend was significant 
both by subjects and items (F1(1,45) = 4.88, p = .032; F2(1,31) = 5.77, p = .023); 
neither quadratic and quintic terms were significant: quadratic term: F1(1,45) = 3.12, p 
= .084; F2(1,31) = 3.50, p = .071; quintic term: F1(1,45) = 1.94, p = .171; F2(1,31) = 
3.53, p = .070. Again, these results indicate that priming effects were linearly modulated 
by feature-based semantic distance measures.  
 Errors. Errors did not occur differently for primes from different semantic 
distances (all Fs<1). 
 
Discussion 
  This experiment established that graded semantic priming in the action domain 
can also be observed, going beyond previous studies that have investigated verb-verb 
priming in which the effects of highly related primes are compared to unrelated primes 
(e.g., Bushell & Martin, 1997; Rösler et al.,  2001; Vigliocco et al.,  2008). Hence, this 
experiment provides evidence in a lexical decision task, from the domain of actions, that 
important aspects of similarity among lexical-semantic representations can be captured 
across domains using the same general computational principles. In order to test the 
generality of these effects, it is important that they can also be observed in another 
behavioural domain in which semantic effects have been reported: the picture-word 
interference paradigm. 
 
PICTURE NAMING LATENCIES: SEMANTIC INTERFERENCE 
  In contrast to the facilitatory semantic effects arising in primed lexical decision 
(as reported in Experiments 1 and 2), semantically related words exert interfering effects 92 
during picture naming, as shown in picture-word interference experiments in which a 
distracter word is presented immediately before a target picture to be named. In these 
experiments, speakers are slower to name the picture when the word is semantically 
related to the target than when the word is unrelated (Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984; 
Schriefers et al., 1990)
14. Interference effects have been reported for both object-nouns 
(e.g., Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984; Lupker; 1979; Schriefers et al., 1990, and many 
others) and action-verbs (Roelofs, 1993; Vigliocco, Vinson & Siri, 2005). These studies, 
however, only contrasted related and unrelated words.. The experiments reported below 
extend previous work by manipulating the degree of semantic relatedness between the 
distracter word and the target picture name on the basis of the semantic distance 
measures in FUSS in the same way as in Experiments 1 and 2 above, to investigate 
whether the degree of similarity affects the amount of interference in naming, In 
Experiment 3, participants are asked to name pictures of objects while ignoring 
distracters which are object-nouns varying in semantic distance to the target noun, and 
in Experiment 4 participants name pictures of actions while ignoring distracter words 
referring to actions. If semantic distance predicts performance in this task, semantically 
related distracters should affect naming latencies as a function of their distance to the 
target word. 
  
Experiment 3: Objects 
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-six native English speakers from the UCL community 
                                                            
14 The difference between the direction of these semantic effects (facilitation in lexical decision, 
interference in picture naming) can be explained in terms of differences between the tasks. In lexical 
decision, participants are only required to recognise whether a given string of letters is a word or not, 
while in picture naming they must select and articulate a specific word, without any orthographic 
information being present (because the input is a picture). In this latter case, other semantically-related 
lexical representations could slow down the selection/naming process by competing to be selected. For 
lexical decision,  no such competition arises because it is not necessary for a unique word to be selected.  93 
participated in exchange for monetary compensation. All participants reported having 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Six participants whose responses were unsuitable 
(e.g. stuttering or speaking too quietly to trigger the voice relay) were replaced. 
 Materials. Twenty-four target pictures were selected, along with distracter 
words. Target pictures were the pictures labelled by a subset of the object-nouns from 
the feature set. The nouns that were included among the targets all had high levels of 
name agreement (as indicated by ratings in Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980, and 
confirmed to hold for speakers of UK English based in a pilot study). Distracter words 
were selected on the basis of semantic distance as in Experiments 1 and 2: very close 
(1.5 to 4.5 units in FUSS lexical-semantic distances), close (4.5 to 7.5 units), medium 
(7.5 to 10.5 units), and far (or unrelated, distance > 18.5 units). Distracters never 
appeared as targets, and targets never acted as distracters. Distracters were also 
phonologically dissimilar to their targets. 
  Distracters were matched as closely as possible for frequency and length. 
Average frequency (Kucera & Francis, 1967) for distracters in the very close, close, 
medium and far distances were respectively (42.5 (SD=17.3), 42.9 (SD=15.6), 42.1 
(SD=15.9) and 42.7 (SD=14.9)). Repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant 
differences between these groups, F(3,69) = .21, p = .60. Word length also did not 
significantly differ between conditions (mean length was 5.21, 5.38, 5.33, and 5.13 
letters); F(3,69) = .109, p = .744. A full list of materials used in this experiment can be 
found in Appendix D. Twenty-four filler pictures were also selected from semantic 
fields distinct from those represented in the target items (e.g. miscellaneous artefacts, 
plants, musical instruments); four distracter words for each filler picture were selected, 
one of which was from the same semantic field as the target picture, and three of which 
were from different semantic fields. 94 
  The experimental structure consisted of four blocks of 48 trials each (24 targets, 
24 fillers). Target pictures were divided into four sets, so that an equal number of target-
distracter pairs from each semantic distance would appear in each block, and each target 
picture would appear only once in each block. For example, the six target pictures from 
Set A might appear in the first block with very close distracter words, in the second 
block with medium distracters, in the third with close distracters, and in the final block 
with far distracters. Different sequences of blocks were assigned to four different lists 
using an incomplete Latin square design. For the purpose of preparing lists, each filler 
picture was arbitrarily paired with a target picture and assigned to blocks in a parallel 
manner. Items in a block within each list were presented to each participant in a 
pseudorandom order, with the only constraint being that target pictures and filler 
pictures alternated.  
 Procedure. Participants were told that the experiment investigated word 
production processes. They were asked to name the pictures as quickly as possible 
trying to be as accurate as possible and ignoring distracter words. Item presentation and 
data collection used IBM PC-compatible computers running E-Prime software 
(Schneider et al., 2002). Vocal response latencies were measured using an E-Prime 
Deluxe Serial Response Box. Responses were also tape-recorded and monitored online 
for accuracy. 
  An untimed picture naming phase started the experiment. The pictures were 
presented to the participants, who were asked to name the picture aloud. This ensured 
that they recognised the pictures and confirmed that the pictures had high name 
agreement. A sequence of practice trials followed this phase. During the practice trials, 
the target pictures and filler items were presented once paired with an unrelated 
distracter. If a participant exceeded 10% errors, another practice block was performed.  95 
Once the practice trials were complete, the experimental trials, divided into four 
blocks, were administered. A fixation cross appeared at the centre of the screen for 500 
milliseconds, followed by a 50 millisecond blank screen. The distracter word then 
appeared on the screen in a randomly-selected location either above or below the 
fixation cross, and 150 milliseconds later the target picture appeared in the location not 
occupied by the distracter. The target picture and distracter remained on the screen until 
triggered by vocal response (i.e. picture naming), or 2500 milliseconds elapsed. A blank 
screen was displayed for 300 milliseconds, followed by the fixation cross for the next 
trial. Between blocks participants were given the opportunity to take a short break.  
  Design and data analysis. The independent variable (manipulated within subjects 
and items) is the semantic distance between target and distracter. The main dependent 
measure was the duration between presentation of a target picture and a participant's 
(correct) response as measured by a voice relay. A secondary dependent measure was 
the number of errors. One-way analysis of variance (with trend contrast coefficients) 
was carried out upon the difference scores, with particular attention to the linear trend. 
As in the previous experiments reported here, trend contrast coefficients were weighted 
on the basis of the semantic distances, both with subjects and items as random factors. 
  Three types of errors were identified. Content errors were scored when the 
participant made an error in naming the target picture (including semantic substitution 
errors, recognition errors, stutters and dysfluencies). Detection errors were scored when 
the voice relay failed to detect the correct word onset (voice relay triggered too early, 
too late, or not at all). Finally, trials with response latencies deviating more than three 
standard deviations (by participant and condition) were classified as outlier errors. 
Analyses of variance, using semantic distance as the independent variable, were 
conducted on each error category separately. 96 
Results 
Naming latencies. All three types of errors were excluded from the naming 
latencies analyses. Correct response latencies are reported in Table 8.  
 
Table 8. Average picture naming latencies (RT, in ms; standard error of the mean in brackets) and error 
percentages of different types as a function of semantic distance between target and distracter. 
Experiment 3 (objects). 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Error  type  (%) 
 
Semantic Distance  Response latencies Content  Detection  Outlier
 _____________________________________________________________ 
Very close    671 [ 8.8]    5.4    1.2    0.9 
Close    657  [  8.2]   4.4   1.4   1.3 
Medium   648  [  7.9]   4.2   0.9   1.1 
Far    642  [  8.0]   3.6   1.1   1.2 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
First, omnibus ANOVA was performed to test for the general effect of 
semantic distance. This was significant by subjects and items (F1(3,105) = 4.27, p = 
.007; F2(3,69) = 5.11, p = .003). Linear trend analysis was then performed using within-
subjects and within-items ANOVA, using contrast coefficients [-1.3, -0.7, -0.1, 2.1] 
corresponding to the average distances between target and distracters [very close, close, 
medium, far] to test the hypothesis of linear trend. This linear trend component was 
significant both by subjects and items (F1(1,35) = 5.59, p = .024, F2(1,23) = 4.71, p = 
.041), indicating that the semantic interference effect was modulated by semantic 
distance measures obtained from the speaker-generated features. Tests of orthogonal 
quadratic and quintic trends revealed only marginal significance of either: quadratic: 
F1(1,35) = 3.30, p = .078, F2(1,23) = 2.58, p = .122; quintic: F1(1,35) = 2.66, p = .120, 
F2(1,23) = 1.99, p = .172, indicating that the primary effect of semantic distance was 
linear. 97 
  While very close and close distracter-picture pairs were always from the same 
semantic field, and far pairs never were, word-picture pairs in the medium distances 
range were not always from the same category. Distracter words at medium distance 
were sometimes from the same category as the picture and at other times from a 
different category, because otherwise it would have been impossible to have a sufficient 
number of items.. To check whether naming latencies were affected by this, a post-hoc 
test was conducted. Among the distracters of medium distance, 6/24 were from the 
same category as the target. Comparing the interference effects for these six items to the 
18 items from different categories, no significant difference was observed (t<1). In 
other words, there was no additional benefit of category membership beyond feature-
based semantic distance for these items.  
Errors. Analyses of variance by subjects and items were performed to determine 
whether errors (overall error rate reported in Table 8) of different types systematically 
varied by semantic distance between target and distracter. Only content errors were 
affected by semantic distance, F1(3,69) = 6.22, p < .01, F2(3,141) = 5.91, p = .02 
(errors were more common for distracters from closer semantic distances), all other Fs 
< 1. 
Discussion 
  The finding of an overall interference effect is not surprising, as it has been 
observed in a number of previous studies; as in Experiments 1 and 2 the novel finding 
is the modulation of this effect by FUSS semantic distance measures: interference was 
greatest for the most similar distracters according to FUSS measures. Next, a parallel 
experiment was conducted in the action-verb domain to assess whether FUSS measures 
of semantic similarity are equally good at predicting performance in this domain in 
terms of graded interference effects.  
 98 
Experiment 4: Actions 
Method 
 Participants. Forty-eight native English speakers from the UCL community 
participated in exchange for monetary compensation. All participants reported having 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Eight participants' responses were inconsistent 
(e.g. stuttering or speaking too quietly to trigger the voice relay), and one participant was 
unable to comprehend the task; these participants were replaced. 
 Materials. Twenty-one target pictures depicting actions with high levels of name 
agreement (Druks & Masterson, 2000) were selected, along with associated distracter 
words meeting a series of criteria similar to those of Experiment 1. A critical additional 
criterion both for targets and distracters was that their names, if homonymous with 
nouns, were required to have a dominant frequency of verb usage (>90%). Distracter 
words were selected from the set on the basis of semantic distance: very close (1.5 to 
4.5 units of FUSS lexical-semantic distance), medium (4.5 to 10.5 units, but favouring 
items closer than 7.5 units whenever possible), and far (or unrelated, distance > 18.5 
units). Distracters were matched as closely as possible for frequency, length, and to 
minimise phonological dissimilarity to the target word. Frequencies (Kucera & Francis, 
1967) did not significantly differ between conditions (mean frequency was 58.2 
(SD=26.3) for very close, 57 (24.6) for medium, and 58.7 (25.7) for far distance; F(2, 40) 
< 0.2), nor did length (mean lengths 4.57, 4.67, 4.62 respectively, F(2,41) < 0.1). Only 
targets for which suitable distracters could be found at each distance were included; 
also, distracters never appeared as targets, and vice versa. A full list of the items used in 
this experiment can be found in Appendix E. One filler for each experimental item was 
created as in Experiment 3. Twenty-one filler pictures were selected; and three distracter 
words for each filler picture were selected, one of which was similar to the target picture 
(intuitively judged), and two of which were unrelated. 99 
  The experimental structure consisted of three blocks of 42 trials each (21 
targets, 21 fillers). Target pictures were divided into three sets, so that an equal number 
of target-distracter pairs from each semantic distance would appear in each block, and 
each target picture would appear only once in each block (as in Experiment 3). 
Different sequences of blocks were assigned to three different lists using an incomplete 
Latin square design. Blocks were otherwise treated the same as in Experiment 3. 
 Procedure. The same basic procedure was followed as in Experiment 3. 
P a r t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  i n s t r u c t e d  t o  n a m e  e a c h  a c t i o n  u s i n g  a  s t e m + " i n g "  ( e . g .  jumping, 
walking), a response type heavily favoured by participants naming action pictures in 
unconstrained settings. Design and data analyses were the same as in Experiment 3, 
with the exception that there were only three semantic distance conditions in the 
present Experiment. 
 
Results 
Naming latencies. As in Experiment 3, all trials in which an error was recorded, 
or in which response latencies deviated more than three standard deviations (by 
participant and condition) were excluded from the naming latencies analyses. Correct 
response latencies are reported in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Average picture naming latencies (RT, in ms; standard error of the mean in brackets) and error 
percentages as a function of semantic distance between target and distracter. Experiment 4 (actions). 
__________________________________________________________________ 
    
       Error  type  (%) 
 
Semantic Distance  Response latencies Content  Detection  Outlier 
_______________ ________________  ______________________________ 
Very close    790 [ 8.0]    6.4    0.9    0.7 
Close-medium   778  [  6.3]   4.4   1.1   0.9 
Far    761  [  7.6]   4.4   0.8   0.9 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 100 
First, omnibus ANOVA assessed the effect of semantic distance, which was 
significant by subjects and items (F1(2,94) = 9.42, p < .001; F2(2,40) = 7.90, p < .001)  
Trend analysis was performed using within-subjects and within-items ANOVA, using 
contrast coefficients [-0.7, -0.3, 1.0] corresponding to the average distances between 
target and distracters [very close, medium, far] to test the hypothesis of linear trend. The 
linear trend component was significant by subjects and items (F1(1,47) = 11.68, p = 
.001, F2(1,20) = 8.91, p = .007), while the corresponding orthogonal quadratic 
component was not significant (both Fs < 1.2). 
 Errors. Error frequencies are reported in Table 9. Analysis of variance by 
subjects and items was performed to determine whether errors of different types 
systematically varied by semantic distance between target and distracter. Only content 
errors were affected by semantic distance (F1(2,61) = 3.21, p = .046; F2(2,142) = 4.00, 
p = .028; all other Fs (by subjects and items) < 1). 
Discussion 
  The main result from this experiment, beyond replicating the finding of 
semantic interference for verb naming (Roelofs, 1993; Vigliocco, Vinson & Siri, 2005), 
is the observation of a modulation of the interference effect for words referring to 
actions, parallel to the effect observed for the object-nouns. Thus, the results of 
Experiments 3 and 4 converge in indicating that parallel effects can be observed for 
object and action domains, in support of the notion that a common semantic distance 
model based on speaker-generated features can predict performance in both domains 
despite the various differences in featural composition described in Chapter 3.  
 
General Discussion 
In all four experiments, FUSS semantic distance measures predicted fine-grained 
performance on tasks sensitive to semantic similarity, both for object and action 101 
domains. These experiments provide important evidence that the semantic 
representations of words referring to objects and words referring to actions can be 
based on the same general principles despite the numerous differences between the 
content and functions of such words, and also that important aspects of the semantic 
organisation of words referring to actions can be captured through the assumptions of 
FUSS. Most importantly, graded effects were observed across the four experiments. 
Although these findings are consistent with many models of semantic representation, 
this is the first time such predictions have been tested in semantically complex domains 
of knowledge. Graded effects have previously been reported only in content domains of 
colour and number (Klopfer, 1996; Brysbaert, 1995; Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Pavesi & 
Umiltá, 1998) which may be special content domains for which it is easy to describe the 
underlying conceptual dimensions (hue and saturation for colours, quantity for 
numbers). This finding of gradation is particularly important in the action domain which 
has received much less attention in behavioural studies of this type, showing that 
gradation in similarity among representations of words referring to actions also is a 
good predictor of semantic effects despite the many differences between object and 
action domains (see Vigliocco et al., 2004).  
Although most other models of semantic representation also predict graded 
effects (at least for nouns referring to objects), whether on the basis of shared features, 
length of network connections, proportion of shared hidden units or proximity in 
attractor space, there are some exceptions where at least some knowledge (e.g. 
evolutionarily distinct categories) is strictly categorical in nature (e.g. Caramazza & 
Shelton, 1998). In such cases, these categories should be fully distinguished from each 
other and should not exhibit gradation. We will return to this issue in Chapter 8. In the 
next chapter, the behavioural results reported here are used to test the relative ability of 102 
FUSS to predict fine-grained semantic effects for object and action domains, compared 
to other models which also predict graded semantic effects. 103 
Chapter 7: Comparing models of fine-grained semantic effects 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that fine-grained semantic effects can be 
predicted by FUSS, a model of lexical-semantic representation based on speaker-
generated features. The next question is whether other models of word meaning can 
also predict performance to a similar degree. After all, at least considering the object 
domain, it seems that nearly all models of semantic organisation would predict graded 
semantic effects (McRae; HAL; LSA; Wordnet; Network Models
15; Semantic Fields). It 
is not clear, however, whether this would be the case for the action domain given that 
models usually do not discuss this domain of knowledge.  
Moreover, with the exception of two types of models: global co-occurrence 
models such as LSA (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) and HAL (Burgess & Lund, 1997) and 
certain hierarchical network models such as Wordnet (Aguirre & Rigau, 1996; 
Budanitsky & Hirst, 2001; Fellbaum, 1990; Miller, 1995; Miller & Fellbaum, 1991; 
Richardson, Smeaton, & Murphy, 1994), existing models of semantic organisation do 
not allow us to empirically evaluate graded effects. For example, connectionist models 
designed to account for semantic priming often use artificially-generated semantic 
representations instead of real words (e.g. Plaut, 1995 used "category prototypes", which 
were each a random pattern of activation across 100 semantic features, and generated 
"category exemplars" by randomly altering some of the features of a given prototype in 
a designated manner). Other models that have used actual words, such as McRae et al. 
(1997) and other similar models, are limited to the object domain. The models that 
allow the derivation of quantitative predictions, however, differ among themselves in 
terms of goals, representational assumptions and implementations. Comparing the 104 
predictive power of similarity measures derived from FUSS to those derived from LSA 
and Wordnet allows an evaluation of the assumptions on which the different models are 
based. Here, using the data from Experiments 1-4 reported in the previous chapter, 
FUSS semantic distances are formally compared to similarity measures obtained from 
LSA and Wordnet.  
 
Method 
Operationalisation of Similarity Measures 
In order to draw comparisons between the different models' ability to predict 
performance, it was necessary to obtain measures of semantic similarity between pairs 
of words for each. For FUSS, these are the distances described in previous chapters. 
For LSA, measures of semantic similarity (cosines between words' representations in 
similarity space, higher values reflecting greater proximity) were obtained through LSA's 
web-based interface (http://lsa.colorado.edu), using the "General reading up to 1st year 
of college" topic space and the "Matrix comparison" application. For Wordnet, 
measures were obtained using the Wordnet 1.6 database (Miller & Fellbaum, 1991). 
Wordnet has a hierarchical link structure between representations, and a measure of 
semantic distance between two words was obtained by counting the number of 
hypernym/hyponym (superordinate/subordinate) links between them, based on the 
nearest shared hypernym (e.g. the most-specific shared superordinate term), using 
software developed by Lewis (2002). In Wordnet, homonyms and polysemous forms 
are encoded with different senses, therefore it was necessary to sense-encode each 
target word explicitly. This was done with reference to the target pictures used in the  
                                                                                                                                                                        
15 Network models only predict graded effects if they contain more information than simply <ISA> links 
between subordinates and superordinates. The latter type of strictly hierarchical models would only 
predict graded effects between categories (depending on shared superordinates at higher levels) and no 
graded effects among members of the same category. 105 
experiment: senses best corresponding to each target picture were selected. In the case 
of ambiguous coding (e.g. carrot has two similar senses: "deep orange root of the 
cultivated carrot plant" and "orange root, important source of carotene"), distances 
based on both senses were evaluated; one set of distances was selected for such items, 
based on proximity to other exemplars from that semantic field. For the carrot example, 
the second sense was more similar to that of other vegetables (because it falls into 
"food" hierarchy, while the first sense falls into "plant organ" hierarchy), so it was 
selected for analysis. 
  Additional assumptions were necessary in order to obtain Wordnet distances for 
verbs referring to actions. This is a consequence of the differing organisation of the 
object and action spaces within Wordnet. Whereas object nouns are organised 
hierarchically on the basis of hypernym/hyponym relations, the action spaces are 
instead organised in a more complex manner, including hypernym/troponym (manner 
of doing something), entailment and antonymy. A consequence of this organisation is 
that finding the shortest path between two action verbs in Wordnet is more complex 
than doing the same within the object-noun space where it is almost always solved by 
identifying a common hypernym. Again, software designed by Lewis (2002), configured 
to investigate hypernym/ troponym/ entailment/ antonymy/ synonymy links, where 
the length of the shortest path indicates the degree of similarity, was used.. A further 
complication is that many of the target verbs have more than one sense (and also have 
more senses than the object nouns). For example, the verb run has 42 distinct senses. 
This renders the sense-coding effort more difficult. Nevertheless, the sense-coding 
criteria used for the object nouns remained useful in identifying the sense that most 
closely corresponds to a pictured action. Finally, in Wordnet there are multiple separate 
clusters of action verbs ("verb files") which are represented independently (i.e., no links 
exist between them). For verbs in separate clusters, a high value was assigned to the 106 
Wordnet distance measure (n=12 nodes), comparable to the largest distance found in 
the experimental set of items to indicate their relative degree of isolation under 
Wordnet's similarity structure. 
 
Design and Analysis 
In order to compare FUSS to LSA and Wordnet semantic similarity measures, 
multiple regression models were used to establish the predictive power of each similarity 
measure on lexical decision RTs or naming latencies. Because all experiments were 
conducted within (target) items, multiple regression was performed, with target items 
treated as a categorical factor using dummy variables, entered at the first step, the 
residuals of which were passed to a second step in which one of the semantic similarity 
measures was used as a predictor. The resulting regression model fit separate parallel 
lines for each target item, whose slope corresponds to the effect of semantic similarity 
controlling for item variability. Because the semantic similarity measures tend to 
correlate with each other, partial correlations between the dependent measure and a 
given semantic similarity measure (controlling for variation due to items) were 
compared using Meng, Rosenthal and Rubin's (1992) Z test. These analyses were 
conducted to compare the level of correlation between RTs (or naming latencies) and 
FUSS distances, between RTs and LSA, and between RTs and Wordnet similarity 
measures. 
  Sequential multiple regression was performed in order to contrast the 
performance of the different semantic similarity measures. With lexical decision RT or 
naming latency as a response variable, a first step was always to enter in predictors 
consisting of dummy variables to code for target item, thus removing target item-
specific variability from the RT data. In a second step, either FUSS distances, LSA 
similarity measures, or Wordnet node counts were entered. 107 
 
Results 
Experiment 1: Semantic Priming for Objects 
  For the model including FUSS, model R
2 = .925 (regression ANOVA F = 
36.845, p<.001); partial correlation between FUSS and RTs controlling for items was 
.665 (feature distance term, t = 8.683, p<.001). For the model including LSA, model R
2 
= .893 (regression ANOVA F = 24.482, p<.001); partial correlation between LSA and 
RTs controlling for items was -.442 (LSA term, t = 4.782, p<.001). For the model 
including Wordnet, model R
2 = .902 (regression ANOVA F = 27.421, p<.001); partial 
correlation between Wordnet and RTs controlling for items was .519 (Wordnet term, t 
= 5.922, p<.001). 
  Partial correlations between semantic predictors and naming latencies 
(controlled for item variability) were compared using Meng et al.'s (1992) Z test on 
correlation magnitudes. For the comparison between FUSS and LSA (measures 
correlated at r = -.5202 for this set of items), Z = 3.269, p < .001 (one-tailed), indicating 
that FUSS was a better predictor of lexical decision RTs than was LSA. For the 
comparison between FUSS and Wordnet (measures correlated at r = +.7313), Z = 
2.884, p = .002, indicating that FUSS was also better than Wordnet at predicting RTs. 
LSA and Wordnet did not significantly differ on this measure (p = .3208). 
 
Experiment 2: Semantic Priming for Actions 
  For the model including FUSS, model R
2 = .877 (regression ANOVA F = 
21.084, p<.001); partial correlation between FUSS and RTs controlling for items was 
.699 (feature distance term, t = 9.535, p<.001). For the model including LSA, model R
2 
= .824 (regression ANOVA F = 13.923, p<.001); partial correlation between LSA and 
RTs controlling for items was -.589 (LSA term, t = 6.876, p<.001). For the model 108 
including Wordnet, model R
2 = .778 (regression ANOVA F = 10.416, p<.001); partial 
correlation between Wordnet and RTs controlling for items was .286 (Wordnet term, t 
= 2.909, p=.005). 
  Partial correlations between semantic predictors and naming latencies 
(controlled for item variability) were compared using Meng et al.'s (1992) Z test on 
correlation magnitudes. For the comparison between FUSS and LSA (measures 
correlated at r = -.4821 for this set of items), Z = 1.758, p =.039 (one-tailed), indicating 
that FUSS was better at predicting naming latencies than was LSA. For the comparison 
between FUSS and Wordnet (measures correlated at r = +.2774), Z = 4.854 p < .001, 
indicating that FUSS was also better than Wordnet at predicting latencies. LSA 
similarity was also significantly better than Wordnet (Z = 3.245; p < .001). 
 
Experiment 3: Picture-Word Interference for Objects 
  For the model including FUSS, model R
2 = .891 (regression ANOVA F = 
24.267, p<.001); partial correlation between distances and RTs controlling for items was 
-.640 (feature distance term, t = 7.305, p<.001). For the model including LSA, model R
2 
= .854 (regression ANOVA F = 17.115, p<.001); partial correlation between LSA and 
RTs controlling for items was .455 (LSA term, t = 4.452, p<.001). For the model 
including Wordnet, model R
2 = .871 (regression ANOVA F = 19.948, p<.001); partial 
correlation between Wordnet and RTs controlling for items was -.546 (Wordnet term, t 
= 5.717, p<.001). 
  Partial correlations between semantic predictors and naming latencies 
(controlled for item variability) were compared using Meng et al.'s (1992) Z test on 
correlation magnitudes. For the comparison between FUSS and LSA (measures 
correlated at r = -.5493 for this set of items), Z = 2.480, p =.0066 (one-tailed), 
indicating that FUSS was a better predictor of naming latencies than was LSA. For the 109 
comparison between FUSS and Wordnet (measures correlated at r = +.7267), Z = 
1.653, p = .0492, indicating that FUSS was also better than Wordnet at predicting 
latencies. LSA similarity measures and Wordnet did not significantly differ on this 
measure (p = .2857). 
 
Experiment 4: Picture-Word Interference for Events 
  For the model including FUSS, model R
2 = .955 (regression ANOVA F = 
41.792, p<.001); partial correlation between feature-based distances and RTs controlling 
for items was -.681 (feature-based distance term, t = 5.961, p<.001). For the model 
including LSA, model R
2 = .945 (regression ANOVA F = 32.671, p<.001); partial 
correlation between LSA and RTs controlling for items was .577 (LSA term, t = 4.464, 
p<.001). For the model including Wordnet, model R
2 = .921 (regression ANOVA F = 
22.885, p<.001); partial correlation between Wordnet and RTs controlling for items was 
-.238, a nonsignificant correlation (Wordnet term, t = 1.567, p=.125). 
  Partial correlations between semantic predictors and naming latencies 
(controlled for item variability) were compared using Meng et al.'s (1992) Z test on 
correlation magnitudes. For the comparison between FUSS and LSA (measures 
correlated at r = -.5790 for this set of items), Z = 1.221, p =.111 (one-tailed), indicating 
that FUSS was not significantly better at predicting naming latencies than was LSA. For 
the comparison between FUSS and Wordnet (measures correlated at r = +.3754), Z = 
3.717, p < .001, indicating that FUSS was better than Wordnet at predicting latencies. 
LSA similarity was also significantly better than Wordnet (Z = 2.211; p = .027). 
 
Discussion 
The results of the model comparisons show not only that FUSS consistently 
predicts the degree of semantic effects observed in primed lexical decision and picture-110 
word interference (as already illustrated to some extent by the linear contrasts described 
in the Results of Experiments 1-4), but also that FUSS's predictive power is superior to 
that of the other models tested. FUSS measures were superior to LSA-based measures 
for three of the four experiments, and superior to Wordnet-based measures for all four.  
The differences in performance between these models might be attributed to 
differences in the models themselves. LSA is primarily focused upon issues of 
acquisition and the development of semantic representations from a given input 
(particularly, extraction of meaning relations from text). Because of this, it is not 
necessary that LSA's representations are interpretable in any manner beyond abstractly 
representing a word's meaning in the context of other words (Burgess & Lund, 1998). 
The present focus, instead, is directly upon meaning representation, thus the 
information from which the FUSS similarity space is developed must be interpretable in 
order to allow us to evaluate assumptions concerning featural representations. They are 
thus constrained by neuroanatomical considerations grounding the featural descriptions 
in a manner that is not possible (or even desirable) for models such as LSA and HAL 
(Glenberg & Robertson, 2000). The greater predictive power of FUSS over LSA may be 
plausibly related to the different focus of the two approaches: because LSA is 
concerned with extracting meaning information from text, it cannot avoid embedding a 
certain degree of noise due to to homonymy and polysemy. Given the present focus 
upon meaning representation, words were selected and speaker-generated features were 
gathered in a manner designed to avoid homonymy/ polysemy as much as possible.  
FUSS also outperformed similarity measures derived from Wordnet in all of the 
experiments. With respect to words referring to objects (Experiments 1 and 3), the 
poorer performance of Wordnet-based similarity may be a consequence of its network 
structure. Nouns are organised hierarchically, which has a very straightforward 
consequence: all words under the same mother node and linked to the mother node by 111 
the same relational link are equidistant. This implies the impossibility of graded effects 
between any pair of words under a given mother node. This has less of a detrimental 
effect in the object domain because of the large number of hierarchical levels in the 
object representation space. However, the same is not true for verbs referring to 
actions; Wordnet-based similarity was a very poor predictor of behavioural results for 
the action domain (Experiments 2 and 4). In particular, this measure was worse than 
FUSS or LSA in both experiments and did not even reach significance in Experiment 4. 
Unlike objects, actions in Wordnet are organised into far fewer levels, and into isolated 
networks. For example, intuitively cough and spit are very similar to sneeze. However, 
within Wordnet, cough and spit are represented within a network of words referring to 
acts of expulsion, while instead sneeze is represented in an independent network referring 
to involuntary acts. Both the existence of isolated networks and lack of depth in the 
hierarchical organisation within each network may contribute to Wordnet’s poor 
predictive performance in the domain of actions. 
It is important to consider, however, that some of the success of FUSS at 
predicting the semantic effects in Experiments 1-4 may be related to the fact that these 
experiments were designed in a manner that could have favoured FUSS over Wordnet 
or LSA. After all, all of the items in these experiments passed through selection and pre-
processing before they were included in FUSS, and they were selected on the basis of 
FUSS distances. Had these distances failed to correspond to some extent with intuition 
about semantic relatedness, these experiments would probably not have been carried 
out. The same is not true of Wordnet or LSA; the items were selected and the 
experiments carried out before these models were consulted. There is therefore an 
element of circularity involved; an ideal basis for comparison would involve a set of 
items chosen without reference to FUSS, Wordnet or LSA. Unfortunately FUSS has a 
very limited vocabulary for this purpose (most of the items used in published semantic 112 
priming studies are not included in FUSS), and extending FUSS to include a 
substantially greater number of words would be an extremely time-consuming effort.  
In general, however, the results of these model comparisons show that FUSS 
can not only predict the degree of semantic effects for both object and action domains, 
but also that its predictive power is superior to other extant models of representation 
that allow the extraction of item-specific similarity measures. These results, however, are 
still relatively constrained, referring only to fine-grained similarity among pairs of words 
that are reasonably closely related. However, FUSS also makes predictions at a relatively 
coarser level--the relative proximity between semantic categories or groups of words 
(e.g. the analyses of between-field semantic distances reported in Chapter 6). In the next 
chapter, Experiment 5 tests whether proximity at this level also has behavioural 
consequences. 113 
 
Chapter 8: Testing category-level predictions of FUSS 
 
The results of the four experiments reported in Chapter 6 clearly demonstrated that 
FUSS was a strong predictor of behavioural performance at the item-level: the degree of 
semantic priming or interference between two words was highly predicted by the 
feature-based distance between them in the object and action domains. Coarser-grained 
properties of similarity, measured as proximity among categories, were also observed, as 
discussed in the analyses of category-level semantic distances in Chapter 5. If it could be 
shown that these latter patterns of proximity are also reflected in behavioural 
performance, it would provide additional evidence for the implementational 
assumptions underlying the development of FUSS. 
Experiment 5: Semantic blocking in picture naming 
The "semantic blocking effect" in picture naming (Damian, Vigliocco & Levelt, 
2001; Kroll & Stewart, 1994) arises when speakers are asked to name pictures in the 
context of other pictures. When the pictures in a given block are from the same 
semantic field, naming a picture is slower than for the same picture when it is presented 
in a block with semantically-unrelated pictures. It is generally agreed upon that such 
effects arise from semantic competition during the conceptually-driven lexical retrieval 
process (Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999).  
Here, the semantic blocking effect is used to test whether graded similarity 
effects among groups of items can be observed, and whether these effects are similar 
for words referring to objects and words referring to actions. Within the object domain, 
as described previously, category membership has powerful effects, most striking in 
patients who are selectively impaired or spared in one category of knowledge, such as 
animals (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998); body-parts (Shelton, Fouch & Caramazza, 1998) 114 
and fruits and vegetables (Hart, Berndt & Caramazza, 1985). These findings have led 
some researchers to postulate that domains playing a fundamental role for our survival 
(e.g. animals, plants and body-parts) are represented categorically in semantic memory 
within dedicated neural substrates (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998). In this view, semantic 
distance effects may not be observed between evolutionarily motivated categories. 
These should act as isolable clusters because they are independent from other domains 
of knowledge. In contrast, graded effects may be observed between categories which 
are not evolutionarily motivated. This contrasts with proposals like FUSS according to 
which graded effects should be observed only for certain categories of knowledge. For 
actions, instead, the first aim of this experiment is to assess whether the basic semantic 
blocking effect in the object domain is also observed in the action domain. Also of 
interest is whether graded effects are observed for actions, and whether the degree of 
gradation differs for the two domains. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-four native English speakers from the UCL community participated in 
the experiment in exchange for payments of £3. All had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision.  
Materials 
Groups of action and object pictures were selected based upon FUSS semantic 
distance rather than on predefined categories such as tools, animals, etc. This was done 
beginning with all of the picturable words referring to objects and actions included in 
FUSS. Objects and actions were considered separately in this process as these semantic 
domains are largely separate (see chapter 5). From these sets of items, subsets were 
selected which exhibited both within-group semantic similarity (low semantic distances 
among them) and dissimilarity to other sets (high semantic distances between exemplars 115 
of different sets). In order to allow the investigation of graded similarity effects between 
sets of items, three sets of objects and three sets of actions (each containing eight items) 
were selected: two sets relatively close to each other, and a third relatively far from the 
other two.  
  For objects, the sets of items came from three well-defined categories with 
obvious category labels: vehicles (average within-set distance = 2.71 units), clothing 
(5.35), and body-parts (7.35). Clothing and body-parts were "near" sets (with an average 
distance between exemplars from the two = 13.51 units) while the other two were "far": 
vehicles and clothing (18.30) and vehicles and body-parts (18.53). Most object pictures 
were taken from Snodgrass & Vanderwart (1980) with a few prepared in a similar style 
specifically for this experiment.   
For actions, the groups of pictures do not fall into such clearly-defined 
categories, but can be broadly designed as "body actions" such as hop, kick, walk (with 
an average within-set distance = 7.66), "tool actions" such as cut, draw, shovel (11.44), and 
"actions involving the mouth" such as drink, frown, yawn (12.21). Body and tool actions 
were "near" sets (16.74); body actions and actions involving the mouth (21.60), and tool 
actions and actions involving the mouth (20.45) were "far". Action pictures were taken 
from Druks and Masterson (2000), and additional pictures were drawn by the same 
artist who drew the pictures for Druks and Masterson. Semantic distances between the 
words referring to actions were somewhat larger than between the words referring to 
objects. This was necessary in order to ensure that the action pictures were 
distinguishable from each other. All items included in the experiment are listed in 
Appendix F. 
Visual similarity ratings. Because semantic distance is correlated with visual 
similarity (see Vitkovitch, Humphreys & Lloyd-Jones, 1993), it was important to 
consider if pictures in these sets (which differ in semantic similarity to each other) also 116 
differ visually. Visual similarity ratings were collected for the object and action pictures 
(following the procedure used by Damian et al., 2001), by presenting all possible pairs 
of object or action pictures to participants who were asked to rate their similarity in 
appearance. Instructions emphasised the focus upon visual appearance over semantics, 
providing examples such as tennis racquet, guitar and piano where visual similarity was high 
for members of different semantic categories, and low for members of the same 
semantic category. The scale ranged from 1 (not similar at all) to 5 (very similar); see 
Table 10 for average ratings as a function of semantic condition (within-set, e.g. visual 
similarity between pairs of body parts; near, e.g. visual similarity between body parts and 
clothing; far, e.g. visual similarity between body parts and vehicles). Most of the 
conditions differed significantly from each other; for objects, within-set pictures were 
the most visually similar to each other, followed by close pictures, and far pictures the 
least visually similar. For actions, within-set pictures were the most similar to each 
other, but close and far did not differ. However, visual similarity was rated as very low 
overall regardless of condition, reducing the likelihood that any putative semantic effect 
is due to visual similarity. 
 
Table 10. Average visual similarity ratings between object and action pictures as a function of semantic 
condition (standard deviations in brackets). 
_____________________________________________ 
   Semantic  condition 
  Within-set  Close   Far 
  _________________________________ 
Objects  1.93 (1.14)  1.60 (0.97)  1.27 (0.87) 
Actions  1.71 (1.20)  1.60 (1.04)  1.50 (0.96) 
_____________________________________________ 
 
  Preparation of experimental lists. Parallel experimental lists were prepared for 
objects and actions, including three experimental conditions created from combinations 117 
of the different sets of items (illustrated below with object-noun examples; action-verb 
lists were created in the same way): semantically far, semantically close, and within-set. 
Blocks of items representing the semantically far condition were created by selecting 
four items from each of two semantically far sets, e.g. {arm, finger, foot, hand; aeroplane, 
bicycle, bus, car}. Because there were eight items in each set, two such blocks were created 
(in this case, the second one would include {leg, neck, shoulder, thumb; helicopter, lorry, 
motorcycle, train}). The particular items that would appear in these two blocks were 
selected randomly for each participant. The semantically close condition was created in 
a similar manner, selecting four items from each of two semantically close sets (e.g. 
{arm, finger, foot, hand; belt, glove, hat, shirt} in the first set, and {leg, neck, shoulder, thumb; 
shoe, sock, trousers, waistcoat} in the other. Finally, the within-set condition was created 
using only members of a single set (e.g. {arm, finger, foot, hand; leg, neck, shoulder, thumb}). 
These conditions are summarised in Table 11: 
Table 11: Composition of the different semantic conditions for words referring to objects and to actions, 
Experiment 5. The number of different blocks in a given condition appears in parentheses. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
   Objects     Actions 
__________________________________________________________ 
Semantically far    Body parts and vehicles (2)   Body actions and mouth actions (2) 
      Clothing and vehicles (2)    Tool actions and mouth actions (2) 
__________________________________________________________ 
Semantically close   Body parts and clothing (2)   Body actions and tool actions (2) 
__________________________________________________________ 
Within-set   Body  parts  (1)    Body  actions  (1) 
   Clothing  (1)    Tool  actions  (1) 
   Vehicles  (1)    Mouth  actions  (1) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
As can be seen from Table 11, there is only one instance of each within-set 
block, compared to the semantically close and semantically far conditions. In order to 
make these conditions statistically comparable to each other, two versions of each 
within-set block were created. In both cases, they contained all eight exemplars of a set, 
but half were treated as fillers: for example, among {arm, finger, foot, hand; leg, neck, 
shoulder, thumb}, in a first block {arm, finger, foot, hand} would be treated as experimental 118 
items (named in the context of other body parts) and as filler items in the second. The 
experimental items in the second block would be {leg, neck, shoulder, thumb} (again, 
named in the context of other body parts), and those items would be treated as fillers in 
the first block. This allows identical treatment of the three semantic conditions for each 
participant: four pictures from a set, named in the context of other items from within 
the set, in the context of items from a semantically near set, and in the context of items 
from a semantically far set. This resulted in 12 different blocks for object-nouns and 12 
for action-verbs.  
Within a block, each of the eight pictures was presented to be named a total of 
four times (32 trials per block). Pictures were ordered pseudorandomly: each picture 
was sampled once before any picture was repeated in a block, and no picture appeared 
twice in succession.  
Each block was presented twice in the course of the experiment (thus a total of 
24 blocks). Blocks were presented in pseudorandom order (each block was sampled 
once before any block was repeated in the experiment, and no block appeared twice in 
succession). Stimuli were presented using E-Prime experimental software (Schneider, 
Eschman & Zuccolotto, 2002) on IBM-PC compatible computers; response latencies 
were collected using a PST Serial Response Box (Psychology Software Tools) and tape 
recorded for error analysis. 
Procedure 
  Participants were assigned to a word type condition (object-noun naming, n = 
40; or action-verb naming, n = 54). They were instructed that pictures would be 
presented on the computer screen, and their task was to name the picture aloud as 
quickly as possible. They were asked to name the object pictures using single nouns and 
the action pictures, using the –ing form of the verb. Prior to the experiment proper, to 
ensure that they knew the target label of all the pictures, each picture was presented for 119 
the participants to name, and the experimenter provided the label in the (few) instances 
in which participants failed to name a picture correctly. Then, participants were 
presented with a practice block.  
In the experiment proper, each block began with a button press of the 
participant. A fixation cross appeared on screen for 300ms, followed by a blank screen 
of 450ms. The target picture appeared in the centre of the screen and remained until the 
voice key detected a response, or 2500ms if no response was detected. Responses were 
followed by a 200ms blank screen, followed by the fixation cross for the next trial. Each 
session was tape-recorded and scored for accuracy. 
Results 
Response latencies 
Error trials and response latencies faster than 250ms or slower than 1500ms 
were excluded from the latency analyses. Figure 6 reports average response latencies for 
object-nouns and action-verbs in the different semantic conditions. 
Figure 6. Average correct naming latencies as a function of word type and semantic condition, 
Experiment 5. 
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First, a two (word type: objects vs. actions) by three (semantic condition: within-set, 
semantically close and semantically far) ANOVA was carried out, both on subjects and 
items The main effect of word type was significant (F1(1,92) = 11.61, p < .001, F2(1,30) 
= 14.54, p<.001), reflecting longer naming latencies for actions than objects. The main 
effect of semantic condition was also significant (F1(2,184) = 19.01, p < .001, F2(2,60) 
= 16.14, p<.001), reflecting the effects of semantic distance. The interaction was not 
significant (F1(2,184) = 1.34, p = .26, F2(2,60) < 1), indicating that the semantic 
condition had the same effect for object and action domains. 
Since semantic groups were at different distances for objects and actions, 
separate linear trend analyses were performed on the simple main effects of semantic 
blocking to assess the role of semantic distance. Linear contrasts were calculated on the 
basis of the semantic distances between items in within-set, semantically close, and 
semantically far conditions, as intervals were not equidistant. The resulting contrast 
coefficients were [-6.4, 0.8, 5.6] for objects, and [-6.2, 1.0, 5.2] for actions. The linear 
trend was significant for objects (F1(1,39)=20.87, p<.001, F2(1,15)=18.30, p<.001); it 
was also significant for actions (F1(1,53)=24.44, p<.001, F2(1,15)=21.73, p<.001). 
Corresponding quadratic trends were not significant (Fs < 1). In both cases this pattern 
of data reflects a graded increase in naming latencies, with the fastest latencies observed 
in the semantically far condition, medium latencies in the semantically near condition, 
and the slowest latencies in the within-set condition. 
Errors  
Errors occurred on 6.9% of the trials and involved failure to detect initial word 
onset, cases in which the voice relay detected sounds before the initial word onset, and 
erroneous or dysfluent utterances. Analysis of variance showed no significant effect of 
semantic blocking condition on the number of errors, either for object or action naming 
(all Fs < 1).  121 
Discussion 
Parallel, graded patterns of semantic blocking interference were observed for 
separate sets of words referring to objects and to actions, selected not on the basis of a 
priori category membership, but from FUSS semantic distances. These results cannot be 
attributed solely to visual similarity, which is correlated to semantic similarity, mainly 
because graded semantic effects were observed for action-verbs even though visual 
similarity ratings did not significantly differ for semantically near and semantically far 
conditions. If visual similarity were playing a role in these results, it might be expected 
that word type would interact with semantic condition (because object-noun pictures 
were rated as more visually similar for semantically near than for semantically far items). 
  These results are important because they complement the results presented in 
Chapter 6 which showed that FUSS can predict graded semantic effects between pairs 
of highly-related words. FUSS can also predict graded semantic effects between groups 
of words; thus its representations also accurately reflect a higher level of organisation, in 
addition to being indicative of similarity among individual words. Most important is the 
fact that these effects are not only observed for words referring to objects for which 
category-level organisation is quite clear, but also for words referring to actions where 
this is less so. These results also are contrary to theories of organisation that do not 
permit gradation between categories (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), but instead are 
consistent with views in which semantic fields in a given domain (object, action) are not 
strictly distinct from each other (consistent with the notion that category boundaries are 
only vaguely defined, perhaps best described in terms of family resemblance; Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975). 122 
Chapter 9: Discussion and conclusions 
General summary 
Previous chapters describe the implementation and testing of FUSS (Featural 
and Unitary Semantic Spaces), made up of a conceptual representational space which is 
operationalised by the speaker-generated features themselves, and a separate level of 
semantic representation,  operationalised as a space derived from properties of similarity 
among words' featural content. Crucially, this model included representations not only 
of nouns referring to objects, a domain which has already received substantial attention 
using similar approaches, but also nouns and verbs referring to actions, using a 
common set of representational assumptions across domains. 
This work began with the collection of speaker-generated features for a 
collection of words referring to objects and actions, described in Chapter 2. Analysis of 
featural content (Chapter 3) reveals how the broad domains of objects and actions 
differ from each other, but also highlighted substantial differences between semantic 
fields within each domain. The distribution and patterns of feature types across 
semantic fields are consistent with a wide range of evidence from a number of research 
domains. For example, feature type composition of living things vs. artefacts converge 
with results of imaging studies showing that sensory-motor areas are differentially 
activated for these types of words (e.g. Martin & Chao, 2001; Hauk et al., 2004; 
Tettamanti et al., 2005; Vigliocco et al., 2006). They can also account for patterns of 
category-related impairment after brain damage (particularly the living/nonliving 
distinction) in terms of feature types, also making additional novel predictions about the 
extent to which other domains of knowledge should also be affected. For example, 
words referring to actions related to sensory experience (e.g. light emission, sounds and 
noises) should be impaired along with living things if such impairments hinge on 
dependence on sensory features.  123 
  As a next step, the speaker-generated features were used to generate a separate 
level of lexical-semantic representation, modelled using self-organising maps. Properties 
of similarity between words' featural input led to patterns of organisation at this level as 
described in Chapter 4, ranging from the broad distinction between objects and actions, 
to category-level organisation, to fine-grained organisation among individual words in a 
semantic field (Chapter 5). Differences between words referring to objects and actions, 
often used as motivation for entirely separate representation schemes, emerged despite 
a single set of assumptions underlying the representation of both in FUSS. For example, 
words referring to objects exhibited strong categorical distinctions for the most part, 
while this was seldom true for words referring to actions, a difference emergent from 
characteristics of the featural input rather than any differences in the representational 
space per se. These analyses also revealed that words' grammatical class did not exert any 
effects on their semantic representations beyond the semantic distinction between 
objects and actions: nouns referring to actions were not distinguished at the lexical-
semantic level from verbs with similar meanings. 
  In a series of experiments, behavioural consequences of FUSS's semantic 
similarity were tested, using tasks where semantic effects arise automatically in language 
processing. FUSS measures of fine-grained similarity among pairs of words predicted 
the degree of semantic priming in lexical decision, both for objects (Chapter 6, 
Experiment 1) and for actions (Chapter 6, Experiment 2), and predicted the degree of 
interference from distracter words in picture naming, again both for objects (Chapter 6, 
Experiment 3) and actions (Chapter 6, Experiment 4). Crucially, comparison of FUSS 
with other models of semantic representation from which word-level similarity 
measures can be derived (LSA, Wordnet) revealed that FUSS outperformed the other 
two models across these four data sets (Chapter 7). Predictions derived from FUSS also 
predicted effects beyond the word level: graded semantic blocking effects in picture 124 
naming were observed based on FUSS relatedness of sets of words, again both for 
objects and actions (Chapter 8, Experiment 5). Together these results show how the 
assumptions of FUSS lead to properties of lexical representation and processing that are 
consistent with a wide range of data from behavioural experimentation, patterns of 
impaired performance after brain damage, and imaging results.  
 
FUSS as a theory of lexical-semantic representation 
We now return to the central questions raised in the Introduction. What is the 
content of word meaning? How is word meaning organised? What is the relation 
between words? In FUSS, it is clear what makes up word meaning: first, featural 
properties of meaning corresponding to concepts, some of which are organised 
according to the sensory/motor channel by which they are experienced (e.g. visual, 
auditory, tactile, motoric, etc.). This conceptual level of representation is thus organised 
by modality, although any given concept should be considered as a group of coactivated 
features across multiple modalities. Speaker-generated features serve as a verbal proxy 
for this input and allow us to investigate how different words' meanings depend upon 
different input channels. Words' meanings are represented separately, in a supramodal 
system that serves to integrate information across modalities, a system that further 
serves to bridge between concepts and lexical information such as syntax, orthography 
and phonology. This system is organised according to properties of similarity among 
sets of features for different words. Implemented here using self-organising maps 
(Kohonen, 1997), similarity among words emerges on the basis of characteristics of the 
featural input such as shared and distinctive features, feature salience and patterns of 
correlation and decorrelation among features, expressed in terms of spatial proximity in 
a low-dimensionality space ("map") derived from the high-dimensionality featural input. 125 
Of course, as described here, there are several important potential weaknesses 
of FUSS which should be addressed at this stage. Foremost among these is the verbal 
nature of the featural input: all of the input to FUSS as implemented here is speaker-
generated features: written words or phrases referring to properties that make up 
meaning. After all, the actual input to the system is meant to be via sensory-motor 
systems rather than verbal descriptions. As such it might be argued that these features 
merely reflect verbal knowledge (thus, information represented at the lexical-semantic 
level) rather than providing any insight into nonlinguistic (i.e. perceptual/motoric) 
information. This can be addressed, however, by reference to the imaging literature; 
there are now a large number of studies showing that processing words produces 
activation in sensory-motor areas that correspond very well to the featural makeup of 
such words in FUSS's feature set (e.g. Martin & Chao, 2001; Hauk et al., 2004; 
Tettamanti et al., 2005; Vigliocco et al., 2006). If the sensory-motor properties of 
speaker-generated features were only informative about verbal knowledge and not 
about sensory-motor knowledge, such correspondence would not be expected. Featural 
makeup in FUSS also corresponds well with patterns of impairment that have often 
been attributed to differential impairment to sensory or functional properties of objects 
(particularly the distinction between living and nonliving entities), e.g. (SFT cites). 
There is also, however, an additional concern also related to the verbal nature of 
the speaker-generated features: there are certain kinds of featural input difficult to 
describe verbally (at least in English). This was particularly noticeable when participants 
attempted to describe shapes and sizes of objects. Beyond simple descriptors of shape 
(e.g. <round>, <straight>, <long>, <thin>) and size (e.g. <big>, <small>), 
participants diverged greatly in the way they attempted to express finer details of shape 
and size, nearly all of which had to be discarded as "idiosyncratic" given the feature 
collection methods, despite containing important information clearly relevant to the 126 
objects in question. For example, some participants attempted to estimate size precisely 
(e.g. hammer is <between six and 12 inches long, and about one inch wide>, apple is 
<about six inches around>), others relatively using arbitrary anchors (e.g. cat is <smaller 
than a dog> and <larger than a mouse>, elephant is <larger than a person>), and others 
in terms of relative dimensions (e.g. hammer is <wider than it is long>). Concerning 
shape, a similar range of strategies were observed. Some participants attempted to 
describe objects using idiosyncratic descriptions of combinations of simple verbalisable 
shapes (e.g. scissors has <two rings, attached to two long triangles, joined together part 
way down>, pear is <like a circle with a bump on top>), others used shape analogies 
(e.g.  drill  is <shaped like a gun>), and a number of participants reported after the 
experiment that they would have liked to describe the shapes of some things but were 
unable to do so clearly (e.g. a few instances of features like <shape?> which appeared to 
reflect the same kind of difficulty). Issues like these could result in problems for 
representations of those words for which properties like size and shape are important, 
under-representing them due to difficulty in verbalising them. However, this potential 
problem also seems to have limited consequences. This can be seen from the results of 
the behavioural experiments presented in Chapters 6 and 8. If some types of words 
have inaccurate or limited featural representations, this should have translated into poor 
performance by FUSS in predicting fine-grained behavioural effects. Instead, FUSS 
consistently exhibited strong performance in predicting the results of multiple tasks 
involving words referring to objects and to actions, and did not appear to be particularly 
worse for any of the semantic fields from which words were selected for these 
experiments. Presumably, then, other properties that participants were able to verbalise 
were sufficient to make up for this particular limitation of FUSS. 
Another potential criticism of FUSS applies to its apparent inflexibility in 
representation. After all, the featural input corresponding to each word is a fixed vector 127 
of feature weights, and each word's representation at the lexical-semantic level 
corresponds to a single point in representation space (defined via ensemble averages 
across multiple self-organising maps). Words, however, are used flexibly, as illustrated 
for example by the existence of strong context effects. To exemplifiy the importance of 
context effects, Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell, and Nitsch (1974), in a classic 
experiment showed that when participants saw words like piano in sentences that either 
stressed a piano's weight ("The man lifted the piano") or its sound ("The man tuned the 
piano") their recall of the word piano was better in response to a cue that was related to 
the original context: heavy cued piano better than with a nice sound when the weight had 
been stressed in the initial sentence; and the reverse pattern was true when the sound 
had been stressed. This pattern of results is difficult to accommodate within a binary 
featural system. The differential effects of context seem to require that features like 
<heavy> and <makes sound/music> can have differential weights, depending on the 
context. However, speaker-generated features used in FUSS were collected in a neutral 
context, in lists consisting of other (unrelated) words, suggesting that FUSS may only be 
capable of representing words in neutral contexts (or prototypical contexts). Properties 
of FUSS, however, enable it to deal straightforwardly with flexibility in representation 
and context effects. First, although this particular implementation of FUSS was trained 
with a single training vector with fixed weights for each word in the set, a more realistic 
model of language experience would instead include a variable set of featural inputs 
corresponding to the features that are important for that word in that particular episode. 
This serves to set up distributional conditions making it more likely that a new instance 
will be encompassed or at least near existing regions of conceptual/feature space that 
map onto words in lexical-semantic space. For example, exposure to piano in the two 
different contexts above would include many features in common, but very different 
weights related to its weight or its sound. Over multiple exposures to different sets of 128 
featural inputs, a region of multidimensional featural space will come to be associated 
most strongly with piano and thus any subsequent activation falling within this region of 
feature space will also correspond to piano. This does not even require that the model 
has received input spanning the entire potential range of contexts, but even permits it to 
respond correctly in novel contexts. This is because the algorithms underlying self-
organising maps are designed to select a "winner": the best-matching output unit (here, 
"word"), corresponding to any possible input in feature space. In other words, effects of 
context such as those of Barclay et al. (1974) would arise as variation from the 
prototypical weights of a word's features, which nonetheless are still most similar to that 
word than to any others, according to the model's representation state at that point in 
time. 
One other potential concern reflects FUSS's ability to represent other domains 
of knowledge. Although FUSS represents an important move forward from models that 
concern only words referring to concrete objects, it still has a highly limited range of 
domains (some objects, actions and events). Although the success of FUSS at 
representing action words as well as object-nouns should not be underestimated, future 
work should also consider other domains of words. For example, consider the case of 
properties and qualities (somewhat corresponding to adjectives and adverbs) – data 
from speech errors (Garrett) and semantic field analysis suggest these are typically 
organised around poles of opposition which could be roughly considered to be 
something like basic level for objects, e.g. large-small;  smooth-rough;  dark-light;  fast-slow. 
Some properties (of various kinds) were included in a pilot stage of the feature 
collection phase, and participants tended to produce features of the following sorts. 
First, superordinate features were quite common, such as <size>, <texture>, 
<brightness>, <speed>; also common were features referring to the sensory channel 
through which a property could be experienced, such as <vision>, <touch>, 129 
<hearing>. Both features referring to superordinates and sensory channels are also very 
typical of object and action words. For properties and qualities, participants were also 
very likely to generate lists of entities for which a given property is prototypical (e.g., 
perhaps <elephant>, <house>, <tree> for large; <sun>, <light bulb>, <fire> for 
bright), and they were also much more likely to produce antonymic features (e.g. <not 
large> for small). Within certain relational accounts such as network models, both of the 
latter would straightforwardly correspond to types of labelled links between concepts. 
In FUSS, instead, patterns of lexical-semantic similarity would result from sets of 
properties that are prototypical for the same entities, in addition to shared superordinate 
and sensorimotor features. Of course this cannot be the end of the story, because 
mutual relationships of various kinds are lost. For example, the feature <not black> is 
not linked to the word black, nor is there a mutual relationship between the feature 
<red> of the word apple, and the word red  with feature <apple>, or vice versa (see also 
Hampton, 1981, for a discussion of how more complex relationships between features 
may be needed when considering featural representations of abstract concepts). 
Nonetheless, other shared properties should be sufficient to provide a high quality 
estimate of semantic similarity among words of these kinds. This suggests that FUSS 
can be a promising approach beyond objects, actions and events.  
 
FUSS in the context of other theoretical approaches 
Concerning the various theoretical approaches to representing meaning, FUSS 
can be seen as a sort of hybrid, incorporating both elements of featural views and 
elements of relational views. This dual nature is in contrast to many models of meaning, 
as it arises because FUSS draws a strong distinction between conceptual and lexical-
semantic levels of representation, in each of which different principles are instantiated. 
Featural views are reflected straightforwardly in the model's reliance upon speaker-130 
generated features to reflect the conceptual level of representation (e.g. Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975; Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Collins & Quillian, 1969; Hampton, 1979; 
1981; Hampton & Gardiner, 1983; Jackendoff, 1990; Minsky, 1975; Norman & 
Rumelhart, 1975; Shallice, 1993; Smith & Medin, 1981; and on larger scales by Cree & 
McRae, 2003; Cree et al., 2006; Cree et al., 1999; Garrard et al., 2001; McRae & Cree, 
2002; McRae et al., 2005; McRae et al., 1999; Randall et al., 2004; Rogers & McClelland, 
2004). Like many of the featural models developed in the 1970s, a strength of FUSS 
derives from its flexibility. Word meaning is not considered to be strictly based upon 
certain features, but instead upon sets of co-occurring features, weighted according to 
salience, and considering a word to correspond to a probabilistic volume in 
multidimensional feature space rather than a single point (akin to views permitting fuzzy 
category boundaries, and using principles of family resemblance, (e.g. Hampton, 1979; 
Rosch, 1973; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976). FUSS goes beyond typical 
featural models developed in the cognitive tradition, however, by explicitly linking some 
of these features to sensorimotor experience, and as such grounding representation in 
reality. As such it is strongly influenced by models developed in cognitive neuroscience 
and neuropsychology (e.g. Farah & McClelland, 1991; Devlin et al., 1998)..  
But FUSS is also relational in nature, when it comes to the lexical-semantic level. 
Here, semantic similarity measures are strictly relational in nature, corresponding as they 
do to ensemble average distances between points in the multiple self-organising maps 
that reflect this level of representation as implemented here. Crucially, and unlike many 
relational models (e.g., HAL: Burgess & Lund, 1997; LSA: Landauer & Dumais, 1997; 
Osgood, 1962; Osgood et al., 1975; Osgood et al., 1957; Snider & Osgood, 1969), these 
similarity measures are interpretable, corresponding as they do to aspects of the featural 
input. This also obviates a major concern that has generally been levelled at relational 
models: that they do not tend to be grounded in reality in any way. Here, the relational 131 
lexical-semantic level is grounded in reality through its featural input. The particular 
relations between items in FUSS's lexical-semantic space, however, cannot be directly 
analysed in the same manner as is possible with relational models where the relations 
are contentful, such as network models where relational links are labelled (e.g. Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; or Wordnet: Miller & Fellbaum, 1991), or semantic field theory where 
relations are straightforwardly described in terms of specific principles that are relevant 
only to certain fields of knowledge. 
Grounding language in experience 
One of the fundamental assumptions underlying FUSS is the importance of 
sensorimotor experience to the development and representation of word meaning. In 
this particular implementation, such experience is represented by verbal speaker-
generated features referring to information gained through sensorimotor channels. 
Although it is uncontroversial that word meaning is learned to an important extent 
through interactions with the world through sensorimotor experience, various theories 
differ with respect to extent to which linguistic representations and processes are linked 
with sensory and motor representations and processes. As discussed by Meteyard & 
Vigliocco (in press), classes of theories of semantic representation can be considered to 
fall along a continuum in this regard. At one end of the continuum are strong 
embodiment hypotheses which embed assumptions of necessary and direct 
engagement: semantic representations of (concrete) entities and events necessarily 
depend upon primary sensory and motor systems, and that those systems are directly 
engaged during semantic processing rather than being transduced or mediated by other 
systems. The tight link and shared characteristics of the two systems would create 
strong dependency relations between the two: semantic processing would necessarily 
engage sensorimotor systems, and vice versa. Such theories are exemplified by Gallese 
and Lakoff (2005) who propose that all aspects of semantic representation and 132 
processing are contained across multimodal sensorimotor systems rather than being 
reduced to a common (amodal or supramodal) system. Similar in character are theories 
by Pulvermüller (2001), Barsalou and colleagues (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, Kyle 
Simmons, Barbey & Wilson, 2003), and Glenberg and colleagues (Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002, 2003) all of whom propose that semantic 
representations and processes are automatically and necessarily linked to low-level 
sensory and motor systems (see Meteyard, 2008; Meteyard & Vigliocco, in press). At the 
other extreme of this continuum are purely symbolic, amodal theories where semantic 
representations are fully independent from sensorimotor content, with any links 
between the two occurring outside the semantic system. Any exchange of information 
between the two systems would thus be necessarily mediated by other cognitive 
systems. Examples of such theories include the WEAVER++ model of lexical retrieval 
(Levelt, 1989; Levelt et al, 1999), global co-occurrence models such as LSA (Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997) and HAL (Burgess & Lund, 1997), and relational similarity accounts as 
described by Osgood and colleagues (Osgood, 1962; Osgood et al., 1975; Osgood et al., 
1957; Snider & Osgood, 1969).  
The two contrasting classes of theories above, however, are not the only 
possibilities, but merely the extremes of a continuum. For example, "weak 
embodiment" hypotheses (Meteyard, 2008; Meteyard & Vigliocco, in press) are those in 
which semantic representations are grounded in low-level sensorimotor systems, but the 
semantic system itself is supramodal, serving to bind together information from 
different modal systems. FUSS falls into this class of theories: semantic representations 
(whether implemented as self-organising maps as described in Chapter 4, or any other 
implementation whereby this level of representation is conceived as a single 
representation space uniting featural information across modalities) are supramodal but 
grounded in low level sensorimotor systems. Like the strong embodiment hypotheses, 133 
these theories hold that sensorimotor systems are essential underpinnings of semantic 
representations, but they diverge in that these systems are not so strictly linked, either in 
terms of the necessity for these systems to be invoked in all semantic processing, or in 
terms of the direct processing links between the two (the degree of directness thus 
defining a particular theory's position along the continuum between strongly embodied 
and abstract/amodal). Effects showing interdependence between semantic and lower-
level sensorimotor systems should be observed under some conditions (depending 
upon the processing assumptions of a particular model), but unlike strong embodiment 
hypotheses such effects need not necessarily be symmetrical nor arise in all 
circumstances. 
  There is now a substantial and growing body of evidence concerning the 
relation between low-level sensorimotor systems and language processing, generally 
favouring embodied hypotheses over strictly amodal ones (see Meteyard & Vigliocco, in 
press, for an extensive review). In behavioural experimentation, evidence of this nature 
can be seen in studies showing that "purely linguistic" tasks are affected by perceptual 
or motor processing, or that "purely perceptual" or "purely motor" tasks are affected by 
semantic content of language stimuli. Such findings are inconsistent with the central 
assumptions of amodal theories, under which these kinds of processes should be 
independent of each other, but fall naturally from embodied assumptions under which 
they are closely linked. For example, a close link between motor systems and sentence 
processing systems has been demonstrated in a number of studies. For example, 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) presented participants with sentences describing motor 
actions in the imperative form (e.g. "Close the drawer"), or as transfer actions involving 
themselves (e.g. "Courtney handed you the notebook") and asked them to judge their 
sensibility by button presses. Crucially, the buttons were laid out in a configuration that 
required participants to move their hand either away from or toward their body. 134 
Participants were faster to respond when the direction of response was consistent with 
the physical motion implied in the sentence content (e.g. moving the hand away from 
the body for "Close the drawer", or toward the body for "Courtney handed you the 
notebook") than when it was inconsistent (see also Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006). Such 
results should not be observed given the assumptions of amodal systems, because the 
type of response should be irrelevant to the task of deciding whether a sentence makes 
sense or not if semantic processing is independent from motor systems. Many other 
studies have shown the same kinds of effects using a range of motor responses: 
responding with hand vs. foot in judging sentences involving hands or feet (Buccino, 
Riggio, Melli, Binkofski, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2005); responding with rotary motion to 
sentences implying rotation in a particular direction (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006); and 
performing manual sorting tasks involving directional motion while producing 
sentences referring to directional motion (Casasanto & Lozano, 2007).   
Results consistent with embodiment have also come from tasks related to visual 
perception of motion. For example, Meteyard, Bahrami and Vigliocco (2007) asked 
participants to do a difficult perceptual task involving identification of coherent visual 
motion near threshold, and at the same time they were listening to blocks of words 
referring to directional motion not relevant to the task. When the two were inconsistent 
(e.g., visual motion was upwards and words referred to downwards motion), 
participants were less able to detect coherent visual motion, reflected in reduced d'. This 
indicates effects of (passive) lexical processing on a low-level perceptual task, consistent 
with embodiment hypotheses where these would be closely linked. Meteyard, Zokaei, 
Bahrami and Vigliocco (in press) also found effects of motion perception on language 
processing: threshold-level patterns of directional motion impeded lexical decision on 
words referring to direction when the two were inconsistent. Any number of findings 
consistent with embodiment hypotheses can also be found in the imaging literature 135 
(reviewed in Meteyard & Vigliocco), where it has long been taken for granted that 
meaning must be grounded in sensorimotor experience, in part because neuroscientific 
theorising mostly does not make a distinction between conceptual and semantic 
representations.  
  Together these findings provide strong evidence against strictly amodal accounts 
of semantic representation, but are not definitive with respect to contrasting strong 
from weak embodiment hypotheses. One possible angle for gaining leverage on this 
issue may come from the distinction between semantic and conceptual levels of 
representation. As discussed in the introduction, cross-linguistic evidence seems to 
demand not only that these levels of representation be distinguished from each other, 
but also that they embed (at least some) different principles of organisation. This is 
particularly evident from the results of Vigliocco, Vinson, Paganelli and Dworzynski 
(2005) and Kousta et al (in press), where effects of Italian gender are observed at the 
semantic level but not at the conceptual level. Under weak embodiment hypotheses like 
FUSS, such findings can be easily accommodated due to the different principles of 
organisation of the (modal) conceptual system and the (supramodal) lexical-semantic 
system. For strong embodiment theories, however, these findings seem to demand that 
some differences exist between semantic and conceptual systems, an arrangement 
difficult to implement given the strong dependency between these both in terms of 
representation and processing. 
 
Going beyond purely sensory and motor information 
  Up to this point, the discussion of FUSS has revolved around the extent to 
which its representations can be derived from sensorimotor input, without much regard 
for the other kinds of information that make up a sizeable fraction of the speaker-
generated features that are produced across different types of words. As discussed in 136 
Chapter 3, "Other" features, those which did not fall into any category of sensory, 
functional or motoric, account for 37.6% of all feature weights among the words in the 
set, and were even higher in some domains of knowledge (e.g. half of all feature weights 
for words referring to clothing and communication were classified as "Other"). Such 
features reflect a wide range of types, including encyclopaedic information (e.g. that 
zebras and elephants come from Africa; that tomatoes grow in gardens and onions 
grow in the ground; that cows give milk and live on farms); compositional information 
(e.g. that combs are made of plastic, and daggers are made of metal); information about 
the kinds of participants that can perform a particular action (e.g. that punching and 
arriving are done by humans, while licking, drinking and tasting are done by humans 
and by animals); information about superordinate category labels (e.g. that dogs are 
pets, mammals and animals; or that knives are utensils, tools, weapons and objects); 
information about higher-order cognitive processes (e.g. that giving is intentional and 
involves generosity; or that hiccuping is involuntary, embarrassing and disruptive), and 
many other sorts of features that also do not easily fall into sensorimotor classes. In 
fact, a large proportion of "Other" features seem to be best described as being learnt 
through experience with language much more than direct sensorimotor experience. It is 
therefore important to consider how such information could come to play a role in 
semantic representation, particularly given the crucial role of sensorimotor experience as 
discussed above, and the apparent need for a linguistic system to be in place before 
language information can contribute meaningfully. 
  A developmental framework within which this apparent paradox can be 
explained has been advanced by Gleitman and colleagues (Gleitman, 1990; Gleitman, 
Cassidy, Nappa, Papafragou & Trueswell, 2005; Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Trueswell & 
Gleitman, 2004). Under this account, multiple sources of information contribute to the 
development of the lexicon. Different sources contribute differentially depending on 137 
the domain of knowledge, and the availability of these different sources evolves over 
time. More specifically, the initial state is one where the only available information is the 
extralinguistic context accompanying a word, sensorimotor information in other words. 
This serves well for the sensorimotor properties of concrete objects for which such 
properties are especially salient, but less so for actions and even less so for more 
abstract concepts ("hard words", Gleitman et al. 2005). Once these basic-level object 
representations develop, they serve as a foundation for the development of syntactic 
knowledge, which in turn can contribute to further lexical development (e.g., learning 
action verbs). More abstract words would be learnt through a similar developmental 
process, as metalinguistic knowledge builds even further upon ordered, contentful 
linguistic content. In FUSS, representing a mature (adult) system, this developmental 
trajectory is no longer evident. Instead, all of these multiple sources of information are 
in place and contribute to word meaning appropriately depending on the domain of 
knowledge.  
Current research in our lab is exploring these issues in more depth, assessing the 
extent to which the development of semantic representations can benefit from 
interaction between sensorimotor information and linguistic contexts, rather than a 
system which treats the two as independent sources of information (Andrews, Vigliocco 
& Vinson, 2005a, b; submitted). We are also beginning to investigate the meanings of 
abstract words, which are not included in the implementation of FUSS presented here. 
After all, any theory of word meaning should also account for representations of 
abstract words, which have been relatively neglected in theories of semantic 
representation. It is often considered that abstract words are solely or mostly 
represented linguistically while concrete words are also grounded in perception and 
action. Although this is most evident in dual coding theory (Paivio, 1971; 1986; 1991; 
2007) where concrete words benefit from access to a nonlinguistic "imagistic" system, 138 
such views are widely prevalent (see Kousta, Vinson, Andrews & Vigliocco, submitted, 
for a review). However, initial evidence is strongly suggestive that, just like concrete 
words, the representations of abstract words may also develop through links with lower-
level systems—those involved in processing emotions (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 
2005; Kousta et al., submitted). These lines of work should further illuminate the extent 
to which sensorimotor, emotional and linguistic input converge in providing input to 
developing the meanings of words. 
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Appendix A. Items for which speaker-generated features were obtained, and their semantic field labels. 
Words referring to actions are classified generally following Levin (1993).  
Complete featural data, including feature weights for each word, and feature type classification as 
described in Chapter 3, have been permanently archived online, and may be downloaded from 
www.psychonomic.org/archive (search for Author: Vinson; Year: 2007). 
 
the loss  noun: action 
the ache  noun: body-action 
the blink  noun: body-action 
the burp  noun: body-action 
the cough  noun: body-action 
the frown  noun: body-action 
the hiccup  noun: body-action 
the itch  noun: body-action 
the smile  noun: body-action 
the sneeze  noun: body-action 
the snore  noun: body-action 
the squint  noun: body-action 
the throw  noun: body-action 
the touch  noun: body-action 
the tremble  noun: body-action 
the wink  noun: body-action 
the yawn  noun: body-action 
the pull  noun: change-location 
the push  noun: change-location 
the call  noun: communication 
the challenge  noun: communication 
the chat  noun: communication 
the command  noun: communication 
the cry  noun: communication 
the demand  noun: communication 
the plea  noun: communication 
the request  noun: communication 
the scream  noun: communication 
the shout  noun: communication 
the sigh  noun: communication 
the suggestion  noun: communication 
the threat  noun: communication 
the whine  noun: communication 
the whisper  noun: communication 
the yell  noun: communication 
the construction  noun: construction 
the repair  noun: construction 
the crash  noun: contact 
the hit  noun: contact 
the knock  noun: contact 
the slap  noun: contact 
the bombardment  noun: destruction 
the destruction  noun: destruction 
the murder  noun: destruction 
the donation  noun: exchange 
the exchange  noun: exchange 
the loan  noun: exchange 
the trade  noun: exchange 
the flame  noun: light-emission 
the flash  noun: light-emission 
the flicker  noun: light-emission 
the glow  noun: light-emission 
the shine  noun: light-emission 
the sparkle  noun: light-emission 
the approach  noun: motion-direction 
the arrival  noun: motion-direction 
the ascent  noun: motion-direction 
the descent  noun: motion-direction 
the entry  noun: motion-direction 
the escape  noun: motion-direction 
the return  noun: motion-direction 
the chime  noun: noise 
the clang  noun: noise 
the clash  noun: noise 
the clatter  noun: noise 
the crackle  noun: noise 
the screech  noun: noise 
the chirp  noun: noise-animal 
the growl  noun: noise-animal 
the meow  noun: noise-animal 
the oink  noun: noise-animal 
the bear  noun: animal 
the bird  noun: animal 
the camel  noun: animal 
the cat  noun: animal 
the cow  noun: animal 
the dog  noun: animal 
the donkey  noun: animal 
the duck  noun: animal 
the elephant  noun: animal 
the fish  noun: animal 
the fox  noun: animal 
the giraffe  noun: animal 
the goat  noun: animal 
the horse  noun: animal 
the leopard  noun: animal 
the lion  noun: animal 
the mouse  noun: animal 
the pig  noun: animal 
the rabbit  noun: animal 
the sheep  noun: animal 
the swan  noun: animal 
the tiger  noun: animal 
the wolf  noun: animal 
the zebra  noun: animal 
the ankle  noun: body part 
the arm  noun: body part 
the beak  noun: body part 
the chin  noun: body part 
the ear  noun: body part 
the elbow  noun: body part 
the eye  noun: body part 
the face  noun: body part 
the feather  noun: body part 
the finger  noun: body part 
the fur  noun: body part 
the hair  noun: body part 
the hand  noun: body part 
the head  noun: body part 
the knee  noun: body part 
the leg  noun: body part 
the lips  noun: body part 
the mouth  noun: body part 
the neck  noun: body part 
the nose  noun: body part 
the paw  noun: body part 
the shoulder  noun: body part 
the tail  noun: body part 
the teeth  noun: body part 
the thumb  noun: body part 
the toe  noun: body part 
the tongue  noun: body part 
the wing  noun: body part 
the wrist  noun: body part 140 
the belt  noun: clothing 
the blouse  noun: clothing 
the coat  noun: clothing 
the dress  noun: clothing 
the glove  noun: clothing 
the hat  noun: clothing 
the mitten  noun: clothing 
the pants  noun: clothing 
the scarf  noun: clothing 
the shirt  noun: clothing 
the shoe  noun: clothing 
the skirt  noun: clothing 
the sock  noun: clothing 
the suit  noun: clothing 
the sweater  noun: clothing 
the vest  noun: clothing 
the apple  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the artichoke  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the asparagus  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the banana  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the bean  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the broccoli  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the cabbage  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the carrot  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the cauliflower  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the celery  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the cherry  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the corn  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the cucumber  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the eggplant  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the grape  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the grapefruit  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the lemon  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the lettuce  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the lime  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the mushroom  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the onion  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the orange  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the pea  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the peach  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the pear  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the pepper  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the pineapple  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the plum  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the potato  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the pumpkin  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the raisin  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the raspberry  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the spinach  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the strawberry  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the watermelon  noun: fruit and vegetable 
the bomb  noun: misc. artefact 
the book  noun: misc. artefact 
the box  noun: misc. artefact 
the carpet  noun: misc. artefact 
the ceiling  noun: misc. artefact 
the chair  noun: misc. artefact 
the couch  noun: misc. artefact 
the curtain  noun: misc. artefact 
the door  noun: misc. artefact 
the doorknob  noun: misc. artefact 
the fence  noun: misc. artefact 
the floor  noun: misc. artefact 
the fork  noun: misc. artefact 
the gate  noun: misc. artefact 
the roof  noun: misc. artefact 
the rug  noun: misc. artefact 
the seat  noun: misc. artefact 
the sofa  noun: misc. artefact 
the stool  noun: misc. artefact 
the table  noun: misc. artefact 
the wall  noun: misc. artefact 
the window  noun: misc. artefact 
the axe  noun: tool 
the broom  noun: tool 
the brush  noun: tool 
the chisel  noun: tool 
the comb  noun: tool 
the crowbar  noun: tool 
the dagger  noun: tool 
the drill  noun: tool 
the dustpan  noun: tool 
the file  noun: tool 
the gun  noun: tool 
the hammer  noun: tool 
the hatchet  noun: tool 
the hoe  noun: tool 
the knife  noun: tool 
the pen  noun: tool 
the pencil  noun: tool 
the pliers  noun: tool 
the rake  noun: tool 
the razor  noun: tool 
the saw  noun: tool 
the scissors  noun: tool 
the screwdriver  noun: tool 
the shield  noun: tool 
the shovel  noun: tool 
the spoon  noun: tool 
the sword  noun: tool 
the toothbrush  noun: tool 
the tweezers  noun: tool 
the wrench  noun: tool 
the airplane  noun: vehicle 
the bicycle  noun: vehicle 
the boat  noun: vehicle 
the bus  noun: vehicle 
the car  noun: vehicle 
the helicopter  noun: vehicle 
the motorcycle  noun: vehicle 
the raft  noun: vehicle 
the ship  noun: vehicle 
the train  noun: vehicle 
the tricycle  noun: vehicle 
the truck  noun: vehicle 
the van  noun: vehicle 
to find  verb: action 
to lose  verb: action 
to bleed  verb: body-action 
to blink  verb: body-action 
to breathe  verb: body-action 
to burp  verb: body-action 
to cough  verb: body-action 
to cry  verb: body-action 
to drink  verb: body-action 
to drool  verb: body-action 
to eat  verb: body-action 
to feel  verb: body-sense 
to frown  verb: body-action 
to grin  verb: body-action 
to hear  verb: body-sense 
to hiccup  verb: body-action 
to hold  verb: body-action 
to inhale  verb: body-action 
to inject  verb: body-action 
to itch  verb: body-action 141 
to kick  verb: body-action 
to knock  verb: body-action 
to lick  verb: body-action 
to listen  verb: body-sense 
to look  verb: body-sense 
to notice  verb: body-sense 
to retch  verb: body-action 
to see  verb: body-sense 
to sense  verb: body-sense 
to shave  verb: body-action 
to sit  verb: body-action 
to smell  verb: body-sense 
to smile  verb: body-action 
to smoke  verb: body-action 
to sneeze  verb: body-action 
to sniff  verb: body-sense 
to snore  verb: body-action 
to spit  verb: body-action 
to squint  verb: body-action 
to stand  verb: body-action 
to stay  verb: body-action 
to swallow  verb: body-action 
to taste  verb: body-sense 
to throw  verb: body-action 
to tickle  verb: body-action 
to touch  verb: body-sense 
to tremble  verb: body-action 
to vomit  verb: body-action 
to wash  verb: body-action 
to watch  verb: body-action 
to wink  verb: body-action 
to yawn  verb: body-action 
to ache  verb: body-sense 
to die  verb: body-action 
to carry  verb: change-location 
to drag  verb: change-location 
to drop  verb: change-location 
to eject  verb: change-location 
to lift  verb: change-location 
to move  verb: change-location 
to place  verb: change-location 
to pull  verb: change-location 
to push  verb: change-location 
to put  verb: change-location 
to send  verb: change-location 
to bend  verb: change-state 
to blend  verb: change-state 
to empty  verb: change-state 
to fill  verb: change-state 
to mix  verb: change-state 
to pour  verb: change-state 
to shake  verb: change-state 
to spray  verb: change-state 
to stir  verb: change-state 
to twist  verb: change-state 
to admit  verb: communication 
to advise  verb: communication 
to argue  verb: communication 
to ask  verb: communication 
to call  verb: communication 
to chat  verb: communication 
to command  verb: communication 
to demand  verb: communication 
to greet  verb: communication 
to invite  verb: communication 
to plead  verb: communication 
to preach  verb: communication 
to read  verb: communication 
to request  verb: communication 
to say  verb: communication 
to scream  verb: communication 
to shout  verb: communication 
to speak  verb: communication 
to suggest  verb: communication 
to talk  verb: communication 
to teach  verb: communication 
to tell  verb: communication 
to threaten  verb: communication 
to warn  verb: communication 
to whine  verb: communication 
to whisper  verb: communication 
to write  verb: communication 
to yell  verb: communication 
to build  verb: construction 
to construct  verb: construction 
to draw  verb: construction 
to fix  verb: construction 
to make  verb: construction 
to paint  verb: construction 
to repair  verb: construction 
to bump  verb: contact 
to crash  verb: contact 
to hit  verb: contact 
to press  verb: contact 
to punch  verb: contact 
to slap  verb: contact 
to bake  verb: cooking 
to boil  verb: cooking 
to cook  verb: cooking 
to fry  verb: cooking 
to grill  verb: cooking 
to roast  verb: cooking 
to steam  verb: cooking 
to bomb  verb: destruction 
to break  verb: destruction 
to chop  verb: destruction 
to destroy  verb: destruction 
to kill  verb: destruction 
to murder  verb: destruction 
to smash  verb: destruction 
to stab  verb: destruction 
to accept  verb: exchange 
to acquire  verb: exchange 
to borrow  verb: exchange 
to buy  verb: exchange 
to donate  verb: exchange 
to exchange  verb: exchange 
to get  verb: exchange 
to give  verb: exchange 
to lend  verb: exchange 
to loan  verb: exchange 
to pay  verb: exchange 
to receive  verb: exchange 
to sell  verb: exchange 
to take  verb: exchange 
to trade  verb: exchange 
to want  verb: exchange 
to burn  verb: light emission 
to flame  verb: light-emission 
to flicker  verb: light-emission 
to glow  verb: light-emission 
to shine  verb: light-emission 
to sparkle  verb: light-emission 
to approach  verb: motion-direction 
to arrive  verb: motion-direction 
to ascend  verb: motion-direction 142 
to come  verb: motion-direction 
to descend  verb: motion-direction 
to enter  verb: motion-direction 
to escape  verb: motion-direction 
to fall  verb: motion-direction 
to follow  verb: motion-direction 
to go  verb: motion-direction 
to lead  verb: motion-direction 
to leave  verb: motion-direction 
to return  verb: motion-direction 
to rise  verb: motion-direction 
to sink  verb: motion-direction 
to bounce  verb: motion-manner 
to chase  verb: motion-manner 
to creep  verb: motion-manner 
to dive  verb: motion-manner 
to drive  verb: motion-manner 
to fly  verb: motion-manner 
to halt  verb: motion-manner 
to hop  verb: motion-manner 
to jog  verb: motion-manner 
to limp  verb: motion-manner 
to march  verb: motion-manner 
to pedal  verb: motion-manner 
to ride  verb: motion-manner 
to run  verb: motion-manner 
to skid  verb: motion-manner 
to slide  verb: motion-manner 
to stagger  verb: motion-manner 
to step  verb: motion-manner 
to stop  verb: motion-manner 
to swerve  verb: motion-manner 
to swim  verb: motion-manner 
to travel  verb: motion-manner 
to wade  verb: motion-manner 
to walk  verb: motion-manner 
to wander  verb: motion-manner 
to chime  verb: noise 
to clang  verb: noise 
to clatter  verb: noise 
to crackle  verb: noise 
to rattle  verb: noise 
to screech  verb: noise 
to sigh  verb: noise 
to sing  verb: noise 
to snap  verb: noise 
to bark  verb: noise-animal 
to chirp  verb: noise-animal 
to growl  verb: noise-animal 
to meow  verb: noise-animal 
to oink  verb: noise-animal 
to brush  verb: tool-action 
to cut  verb: tool-action 
to drill  verb: tool-action 
to hammer  verb: tool-action 
to hoe  verb: tool-action 
to pound  verb: tool-action 
to rake  verb: tool-action 
to saw  verb: tool-action 
to shovel  verb: tool-action
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Appendix B. Items used in Experiment 1 (semantic priming in lexical decision, objects) 
 
                 Primes                                                 
 __________________________________________________ 
Target Very  close Close Medium Far 
 
apple peach lemon  bean  raft 
artichoke carrot  pepper  lime  comb 
axe hammer  spanner  pencil  ceiling 
banana peach  melon  potato  broom 
cabbage onion  pepper  lime  rug 
camel zebra mouse  swan  sofa 
celery aubergine*  mushroom watermelon  dustpan 
cherry pear  lemon bean  spoon 
chin lips  tongue  nose donkey 
coat suit  shoe belt bus 
corn bean pea  pear sofa 
cucumber broccoli  pumpkin  strawberry  shield 
dagger sword razor  hammer  tongue 
dog rabbit  tiger  duck  comb 
elbow wrist  ankle  thumb  tiger 
fence gate  wall  roof  bus 
finger thumb  wrist  knee  couch 
hat scarf  shoe  belt  bomb 
hoe chisel  hatchet  tweezers  tricycle 
neck hair  ear  arm  tail 
orange plum  raisin  pumpkin  dustpan 
pig goat  lion  duck  bomb 
pliers hammer  hatchet  scissors  tricycle 
rake shovel  hatchet  sword  carpet 
raspberry plum  lemon  bean  broom 
saw hammer  drill pencil  curtain 
screwdriver chisel  hatchet sword  feather 
sheep goat  zebra swan  beak 
shoulder arm  leg  thumb  bus 
toe leg knee  wrist  van 
trousers* shirt  glove  belt  couch 
wolf fox  cow duck pen 
 
* Semantic features for this word were obtained for its US English translation 
equivalent. 144 
Appendix C. Items used in Experiment 2 (semantic priming in lexical decision, actions) 
 
                 Primes                                                 
 __________________________________________________ 
Target Very  close Close Medium Far 
 
ascend rise  walk  march write 
bake grill  cook eat  drop 
break drop  lose  kill  cook 
buy trade  demand  accept  drive 
carry hold press stop  look 
chat speak  write  ask  drive 
clatter screech  snore  whine roast 
construct build  draw  bend  flash 
descend rise  enter  press  speak 
dive swim  wade  boil knock 
drink swallow  vomit  frown  whine 
empty pour  mix  spray  bark 
fill spray  blend  invite  blink 
fix repair  build  destroy  touch 
hiccup cough sigh  yell  shave 
hop run rise leave  trade 
kick walk stand  rise  build 
lend trade  demand  accept  touch 
lift hold  press  fall write 
listen hear  sing  call  hit 
oink chirp  clang  snore  squint 
plead demand  accept  suggest  drive 
preach suggest  argue  smoke steam 
punch slap  stab  ache  yawn 
read write  speak  ask  eat 
scream yell  chirp  snap  eject 
sell borrow  acquire  invite  sparkle 
shout yell  clang rattle  itch 
sneeze breathe  smell  vomit  shake 
stir twist  bounce  wander  flame 
taste eat  cook spit  pull 
teach advise  suggest  request  swallow 
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Appendix D. Items used in Experiment 3 (picture-word interference, objects) 
 
              Distracters  
 __________________________________________________ 
Target Very  close Close Medium Far 
apple peach lemon  bean  raft 
axe hammer  spanner  pencil  ceiling 
banana peach  melon  potato  broom 
camel zebra mouse  swan  sofa 
celery aubergine*  mushroom watermelon  dustpan 
cherry pear  lemon bean  spoon 
coat suit  shoe belt bus 
corn bean pea  pear sofa 
cucumber broccoli  pumpkin  strawberry  shield 
dog rabbit  tiger  duck  comb 
fence gate  wall  roof  bus 
finger thumb  wrist  knee  couch 
hand arm  leg  thumb  bus 
hat scarf  shoe  belt  bomb 
hoe chisel  hatchet  tweezers  tricycle 
lettuce onion  pepper lime  rug 
orange plum  raisin  pumpkin  dustpan 
pig goat  lion  duck  bomb 
pliers hammer  hatchet  scissors  tricycle 
rake shovel  hatchet  sword  carpet 
saw hammer  drill pencil  curtain 
screwdriver chisel  hatchet sword  feather 
sheep goat  zebra swan  beak 
trousers* shirt  glove  belt  couch 
 
* Semantic features for this word were obtained for its US English translation 
equivalent. 
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Appendix E. Items used in Experiment 4 (picture-word interference, actions) 
 
                            Distracters 
 _________________________________ 
Target Very  close Medium Far 
 
bleed ache  stab  sigh 
bounce shake  push  wash 
cough hiccup  snore  squint 
dive swim  pour  glow 
drill build  repair  smile 
drink swallow  grin  warn 
eat taste  vomit  kill 
hop step rise buy 
kick run  stand  trade 
knock rattle  growl shine 
pound slap  bump  lick 
press hold  carry speak 
slide push drag argue 
sneeze breathe  smell  borrow 
stop enter  fall  touch 
talk call read  follow 
throw hold  leave  call 
wade swim steam  twist 
walk jog  wander  donate 
bleed ache  stab  sigh 
bounce shake  push  wash 
cough hiccup  snore  squint 
dive swim  pour  glow 
drill build  repair  smile 
drink swallow  grin  warn 
eat taste  vomit  kill 
hop step rise buy 
kick run  stand  trade 
knock rattle  growl shine 
pound slap  bump  lick 
press hold  carry speak 
slide push drag argue 
sneeze breathe  smell  borrow 
stop enter  fall  touch 
talk call read  follow 
throw hold  leave  call 
wade swim steam  twist 
walk jog  wander  donate 
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Appendix F. Items used in Experiment 5 (semantic blocking in picture naming) 
 
Objects: 
Body-parts: arm; finger; foot; hand; leg; neck; shoulder; thumb 
Clothing: belt; glove; hat; shirt; shoe; sock; trousers*; waistcoat* 
Vehicles: aeroplane*; bicycle; bus; car; helicopter; lorry*; motorcycle; train 
Actions: 
Body actions: hop; kick; march; run; sit; slide; stop; walk 
Mouth actions: drink; eat; frown; smile; sneeze; spit; taste; yawn 
Tool actions: cut; dig; draw; drill; paint; rake; saw; shovel 
* Semantic features for this word were obtained for its US English translation 
equivalent. 148 
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